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Foreword
by José Luis Machinea
This volume deals with macroeconomic issues and their relation to 
economic growth. It belongs to a line of research developed by ECLAC 
during recent years on the globalization of financial volatility, macro- 
economic management, and growth.
This line of research has been encouraged by the frustrating GDP 
growth of Latin American economies since the 1980s. Even disregard­
ing the so-called lost decade resulting from the debt crisis, in the subse­
quent period 1990-2004 growth averaged a disappointing 2.6% per 
year. One policy area associated to that outcome has been a short­
legged macroeconomic environment, detrimental for both capital and 
labor performance. It has been dominated by highly unstable aggregate 
demand and m isaligned exchange rates, frequently far away from 
trend levels. These imply an "unfriendly" environment for investment 
decisions, commonly with "wrong" prices for an efficient resource allo­
cation. Our purpose in this volume is to analyze policy measures that 
contribute to avoid costly mistakes and to recover economic growth. 
We build on the reforms already made, making reforms to the reforms 
when necessary. We seek to achieve a macroeconomics-for-growth, or real 
macroeconomics.
This new book is the result of a research project coordinated by 
ECLAC, supported by the Ford Foundation, on M anagement o f  
Volatility, Financial Globalization and Growth in EEs, studying the gesta­
tion and bust of the Asian crises and the contagion experienced by 
Latin America. Additionally, the country cases of Korea and Malaysia 
in East Asia under the Asian crisis, and of South Africa in the post­
apartheid period were analyzed. These three countries exhibit features 
that make them especially relevant.
Capital flows have been at the core of the financial crises, macro­
instability and, in general, the poor growth performance of EEs in 
recent times. The demand for "accountability" has grown recently, 
activated by the fact that, in the last seven-year period (1998-2004),
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the Latin American economies (LACs) grew only 1.7% per year on 
average and per capita GDP stagnated.1 The growth performance of 
South Africa is also dismal, though the causes are more complex than 
in Latin America. The six m ain East Asian countries performed som e­
what better over that period, with a 3.3% average GDP increase, where 
the Republic of Korea and Malaysia stand out as two dynamic outliers. 
This average is, however, well below the 7 or 8% rates of their previous 
historical performance. In both regions, real macroeconomic instability 
-  in terms of aggregate demand, interest rates and exchange rates -  has 
been present in an outstanding fashion. In fact, in these recent crises 
sharp gaps between actual and potential GDP and outlier exchange 
and interest rates have been recorded. Actual total factor productivity 
has contracted and the supply of physical and human capital has been 
discouraged. Several EEs have stepped down to lower growth paths; 
from Argentina, to Korea, to Malaysia or Chile.
Firms and labor, as well as tax proceeds, have been hit by real macro- 
economic instability. Extreme macroinstability has been associated 
with strong swings in aggregate demand. For instance, all across-the- 
board changes in Latin American economic activity have been led by 
fluctuations in aggregate demand; the sharper swings in GDP have 
been endogenous to those changes in aggregate demand, all of which 
have been driven by capital surges. The recessive adjustm ents in East 
Asia in 1997-98 were also led by reversals of capital flows, which fol­
lowed the voluminous previous inflows.
Of course, out-surges are not the only relevant variable; there are 
other international variables and many country specific, economic and 
political, variables playing around. However, for the Latin American 
region as a whole, capital account cycles have been notably strong 
compared to any combination of other domestic or external variables. 
The sudden stops in capital flows have been located mainly in flows 
other than greenfield foreign direct investment (FDI), and have largely 
been associated with the behavior of the private sector, rather than the 
fiscal accounts. We show that the private sector response has been, fre­
quently, misled by a procyclical bias in macroeconomic policies.
We are convinced that the present volume is a significant contribu­
tion to this crucial concern of ECLAC: to develop a market economy 
capable to growth in a sustained way, in which both productivity and
1 W e include, in  these averages, estimates for 2004 that was a year o f  recovery, 
the best since 1997 for the m ajority o f  LACs; South Africa and East Asian 
econom ies also exhibited significant recovery in  2004.
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the welfare of people expand persistently, and are distributed in a 
growingly more equitable fashion. That is why we are highly indebted 
with the authors of the chapters of this volume and, particularly, with 
Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, the coordinator of this project.





Development is a complex process, and few countries have been 
successful in a sustained fashion. An efficient com bination of macro 
and meso or micro policies is required; just m issing one significant 
ingredient can lead to failure. Domestic efforts are crucial, but also the 
external environment is m ost relevant. Our m ain concern is the effect 
on growth and equity, the two crucial joint objectives of economic 
policy. The aim is to develop a growing, better functioning economy, 
in which both the productivity and the well-being of people will 
increase. How do capital stock, capital formation and labor markets 
react to changes in capital flows and the macroeconomic environ­
ment? How does overall productivity evolve and how is it distributed 
am ong people? How can alternative macroeconomic approaches con­
tribute to build equity into the economic system and thus achieve 
growth with equity? What are the key variables behind the time span 
of adjustment and how different markets respond? Some of these con­
cerns are addressed in this book.
This policy-oriented research follows a solid line of work of ECLAC 
on macroeconomics, capital flows and the nexus with growth. Two 
related institutional books, published in recent years by ECLAC, are: (i) 
Growth with Stability, a contribution to the 2002 Monterrey 
International Conference on Financing for Development, and (ii) 
Globalization and Development, which was the central issue of the 
twenty-ninth session of ECLAC, held in Brasilia in 2002. A number of 
specific projects have dealt with these issues. Three of them are:
(i) Capital Flows and Investment Performance (published by 
OECD/ECLAC in 1998), a research conducted jointly with the 
OECD Development Centre, that examined the behavior of capital 
formation in Latin America in response to the capital surges of the 
1990s.
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(ii) Financial Crises in "Successful" Emerging Economies, supported by the 
Ford Foundation and published by the Brookings Institution Press 
in 2001, studied the emergence of financial crises in four "success­
ful" emerging economies (EEs). The analysis focused on two Latin 
American (Chile and Mexico), and two Asian countries (Republic 
of Korea and Taiwan Province of China).
(Hi) From Capital Surges to Drought (a Palgrave/WIDER publication, 
2003), which was the output of a joint project of ECLAC with the 
World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) of 
the United Nations University. This research focused m ainly on 
the analysis of agents supplying external funding since the Asian 
crises.1
This new book is the result of a research project coordinated by 
ECLAC and supported by the Ford Foundation on M anagement o f  
Volatility, Financial Globalization and Growth in Emerging Economies, 
studying the gestation and bust of the Asian crises, the contagion expe­
rienced by Latin America, and policy responses. Additionally, the 
macroeconomic experiences of Korea and Malaysia in the East Asian 
crisis, and of South Africa in the post-apartheid period were analyzed. 
All three countries exhibit features that make them especially relevant.
We chose to focus on emerging economies and issues that can 
provide relevant lessons for Latin American countries. We have 
selected six papers of the ECLAC project for this volume. One paper 
deals with the links between macroeconomic and meso or microeco­
nomic policies, and the nexus between long-term and short-term 
effects, in the search for a better macroeconomics for productive devel­
opment. Several LACs have been performing ambitious reforms of their 
pension systems. There are numerous studies of the reforms in them ­
selves, on fiscal im plications and im pact on domestic capital markets. 
However, research on the macroeconomic im plications of the regula­
tion of investments of pension funds, particularly overseas, is notably 
scarce. Another paper focuses in this issue, first in general analytical 
terms, and then takes the paradigmatic case of Chile, country with a 
deep pension reform that is a quarter of a century old.
Some countries made innovative macroeconomic reforms by intro­
ducing market-based prudential regulations of capital inflows. Two
1 A m ong other issues, it exam ined bank lending criteria, m ultinational banks, 
prudential supervision experiences, derivative markets, the behavior o f  risk- 
rating agencies, and explored som e dom estic counter-cyclical policies in EEs.
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such cases are illustrated by Colom bia and Chile in the 1990s; one 
paper makes a comparative analysis of these two LACs. We selected 
three non-LAC emerging economies: Korea, Malaysia and South Africa. 
One paper compares the outstanding differences as well as similarities 
in the approaches adopted, by Korea and Malaysia, after the explosion 
of the East Asian crisis; both countries, after a period of orthodox reces­
sive adjustment, applied sharp positive macroeconomic shocks. 
Another paper focuses on South Africa, that followed an approach 
rather in line with the Washington Consensus in a few years before the 
end of apartheid and strengthened that approach afterwards, particu­
larly in relation to macroeconomic and trade policies.
The introductory chapter, by the project coordinator, discusses four 
issues relevant for m acroeconom ic balance and growth in emerging 
economies. First, it exam ines the potential contribution of capital 
flows to econom ic convergence between EEs and developed nations, 
and compares it with the actual growth outcome. Latin America is 
found to have diverged, not only during the "lost decade" of the 
1980s, but as well during the subsequent decade and a half. Second, 
channels linking financial crises with slack growth are set out; how 
countries hit by crisis tend to move to a lower growth path; the inten­
sity of the downward adjustment depends on how deep is the penetra­
tion into vulnerability zones during the "good" or boom  years: 
intensity of exchange rate appreciation, short-term shares of external 
liabilities, currency mismatches are examples of sources of vulnerabil­
ity (real m acroeconom ic im balances, in our term inology). Third, it 
analyzes the reasons why, during capital surges, financial capital con­
tinue to flow into EEs that display m ounting vulnerabilities; the 
leading procyclical role of short-termist agents, both dom estic and 
international, is emphasized. Fourth, two alternative definitions of 
macroeconomic balances are discussed. The prevailing "neo-liberal" or 
"orthodox” definition based on purely financial m acroeconomic bal­
ances (principally, low inflation and balanced fiscal budgets), is con­
trasted with an alternative approach based on comprehensive 
balances, that explicitly include an economic activity close to the pro­
duction frontier (potential GDP), "right” exchange rates and sustain­
able external balances; that is, "m acroeconom ic balances of the real 
econom y". A fiscal approach based on structural balances is a new 
significant facilitator for achieving those real balances. The research 
confirms that the adoption of a reformed macroeconomic approach is 
one crucial ingredient for correcting the severe "growth frustrations" 
experienced by many EEs.
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Chapter II, by José Antonio Ocampo (Under-Secretary General for 
Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations and former 
Executive Secretary of ECLAC), tackles the issue of Latin America's frus- 
tratingly low economic growth, notwithstanding the deep market 
reforms implemented during the 1990s. The new development strategy 
-  including across-the-board trade and financial liberalization -  was 
effective in reducing inflation, bringing budget deficits under control, 
generating export dynamism, attracting FDI and increasing productiv­
ity in leading firms and sectors. Nonetheless, economic growth has 
been frustratingly low and volatile, with frequent balance-of-payments 
disequilibria or crises, and persistently depressed domestic savings and 
investment. Overall productivity performance has been poor, largely 
because of a significant underutilization of physical capital and labor. 
Increasing productive and labor market dualism has become one of the 
most outstanding effects of the reform process, where the expansion of 
a segment of "world class" firms coexists with rising unemployment 
and labor market informality. This paper examines the growth record 
of the reform period in the light of both macroeconomic and sectoral 
(mesoeconomic) performance, and discusses the links of macro and 
meso policies with growth performance. Ocampo offers a "structural­
ist" interpretation and puts forward policy proposals.
One outstanding feature of structural changes has been the reform of 
pension systems. In chapter III, Roberto Zahler (President of the 
Central Bank of Chile from 1991 to 1996 and international consul­
tant), focuses in the macroeconomic implications of private pension 
funds and their role in the transmission of external shocks.
Most analyses of pension fund portfolio diversification take as given 
the macroeconomic context in which they are inserted, and focus on 
the microeconomic conditions under which returns are maximized 
and/or risk minimized. The analysis of the macroeconomic im plica­
tions of pension funds is usually limited to their long-term impact, 
specifically on savings. Zahler explores some of the short-run macro- 
economic implications in EEs, based on the Chilean experience, where 
a reformed fully-funded system has been in place for over two decades. 
The analysis suggests that the size of the Chilean pension funds and 
the degree of concentration of that industry imply that they can have 
strong effects on the foreign exchange and domestic financial markets, 
thus altering the macroeconomic environment. This could feedback on 
less employment and/or lower wages, consequently affecting overall 
welfare, the labor market and the future benefits of workers as pension­
ers. In particular, he argues that the costly macroeconomic adjustment
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of 1998-99 was aggravated by the Chilean pension funds pro-cyclical 
behavior of their investments abroad. The chapter concludes that the 
signilicant weight achieved by institutional investors is such that, in 
emerging economies, public regulations governing their portfolio deci­
sions should consider not only microeconomic matters, but also issues 
of real macroeconomic stability and growth.
Chapter IV, by Ffrench-Davis (Principal Regional Adviser of ECLAC 
and Professor of Economics, University of Chile) and Leonardo Villar 
(member of the Board of the Central Bank of Colom bia and Professor 
of Economics, Universidad de los Andes), presents a comparative 
analysis of the macroeconomic policies of Chile and Colombia during 
the 1990s; in particular, it considers their exchange rate regimes, 
capital account regulations, and the genesis and m anagem ent of 
financial crises. In 1995, when contagion from the tequila crisis was 
spreading through Latin America, both countries were exempt from 
contagion and recorded high rates of economic growth. Many analysts 
attribute this positive performance to their having undertaken a com ­
prehensive set of prudential measures to avoid excessive exposure to 
short-term capital flows and pressures toward excessive real apprecia­
tion. In fact, both countries were using a market-based reserve require­
ment on short-term inflows, crawling-bands, and other instruments for 
reducing domestic vulnerability to capital flows. Despite the fact that 
short-term debt represented only a small share of foreign debt in both 
countries, after the Asian crisis vulnerability to international shocks 
was rather significant. In both nations, real interest rates rose sharply 
in 1998 and GDP growth was negative in 1999; outflows associated to 
short-term external debt were small, while outflows by domestic resi­
dents, via institutional investors, were very sizable, as also documented 
in the chapter by Zahler, and had significant recessive effects on eco­
nomic activity. The similarities between Chile and Colombia, however, 
do not go much further. During the 1990s, average GDP growth rates 
were very high in Chile and posted fiscal surpluses and high private 
savings, while in Colom bia average GDP growth was below historical 
levels, and there was an increasing fiscal deficit and falling domestic 
savings.
Chapter V reviews the post-crisis macroeconomic adjustm ent and 
the impact of policy responses on the real economies of Korea 
and Malaysia. In both countries, the gestation of the crisis was rather 
similar to that of LACs, notwithstanding that their fundam entals -  
rates of GDP growth, of capital formation and of domestic savings -  
were notably superior. Both economies opened their capital accounts
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in a situation of plentiful international supply of funding. Given their 
evident sound economic fundamentals, these countries attracted huge 
inflows with outcomes rather similar to those of LACs in the same cir­
cumstances: real exchange rate appreciation, external balance deficits, 
rising short-term foreign liabilities, increasing price/earnings ratios in 
stock markets. Both countries suffered under the Asian financial crisis, 
with GDP drops of 7% in 1997. Initially, both applied restrictive poli­
cies, subsequently their policy responses were quite different in several 
respects. Korea sought liquidity assistance from the IMF, which obliged 
it to implement a structural adjustment program, while Malaysia was 
able to recover policy independence in the process of crisis resolution. 
Korea and Malaysia adopted diametrically contrasting policies on 
capital flows in response to the crisis. Korea drastically liberalized its 
capital account (however, keeping some restrictions on capital outflows 
by residents) with a floating exchange rate regime (although with a 
huge accumulation of reserves during recovery), while Malaysia 
imposed stringent capital controls and returned to a fixed (but deval­
ued) exchange rate. However, both countries, to face recession in 1998, 
made a swift change toward a sharp expansionary macroeconomic 
policy stance, based on vigorous expansive fiscal and monetary poli­
cies. This contributed to an economic recovery, in 1999, notably faster 
and stronger than in other EEs. The positive role of counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies in post-crisis recovery raises the question of 
whether the initially tight monetary and fiscal policy was kept for too 
long and, therefore, deepened the crisis in Korea and Malaysia. The 
experiences of these two economies, and their m anagem ent of the 
aftermath of the crisis appear to be extremely relevant for LACs.
Chapter VI examines macroeconomic policy and performance in 
South Africa since the transition from apartheid to democracy in April 
1994, which opened the way for re-integration into the global 
economy. After a decade o f democracy, annual growth averaged 2.7%, 
official unem ployment was over 28% and there had been little reduc­
tion in the high inequality inherited. It is argued that the poor perfor­
mance in the real economy has been linked with the policy emphasis 
on purely financial stability, in particular lowering the fiscal deficit to 
below 3%, and using interest rates to lower the inflation rate to the 
target range of 3-6%, with little regard to the cyclical changes of aggre­
gate demand and macro prices. The paper outlines how the political 
economy of the transition to democracy produced this policy stance 
and the process of external liberalization that guided it. It then traces 
the evolution of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies over the
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decade, and shows that notwithstanding their "success" in achieving 
domestic financial objectives (low inflation and fiscal discipline), insta­
bility was simply transferred to the external account, in the form of 
three foreign exchange crises and to the real economy via unstable 
aggregate demand and macro-prices. With productive investment 
further reduced by low confidence and savings depressed by rising con­
sum ption propensities -  both linked to the transition -  the prospects 
for sustained growth remain poor.
We appreciate the active participation of authors and invited special­
ists at two international seminars, conducted in 2002 and 2003, at 
ECLAC headquarters in Santiago. We acknowledge the valuable 
support of the Ford Foundation and the intellectual encouragement 
from Manuel Montes. As usual, ECLAC provided a stimulating environ­
ment for a most fruitful discussion. Heriberto Tapia gave highly profes­
sional support in revising the analytical and empirical content of drafts 
of all chapters. Lenka Arriagada and Marcela Osses were exceptionally 
efficient in the preparation of the final typescript. Naturally, 
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Latin America has exhibited contrasting features in its economic perfor­
mance in the last decade and a half of market-based reforms. There has 
been good progress in achieving low inflation, improved fiscal balances, 
and high export growth. However, in parallel, low average GDP growth, 
low productive investment, and high volatility of economic activity 
associated with changes in capital flows are outstanding features of the 
performance of Latin American economies (LACs) since the early 1990s. 
Here we examine their relation to the sort of macroeconomic policies 
that were implemented. Success in achieving low inflation and moderate 
fiscal balances has not been accompanied by an effective demand close 
to potential GDP nor by interest and exchange rates providing sustain­
able signals for efficient resource allocation. The macroeconomic envi­
ronment, in general, has been providing an unfriendly framework and 
wrong macro-prices for productive development.
In this chapter we document these features and offer policy propos­
als, particularly contributing to build into the market a macroeco­
nomic environment prone for growth.
* The author did benefit from  a stimulating discussion in tw o international sem­
inars o f  this project, organized at ECLAC’s Headquarters in 2002 and 2003, and 
valuable com m ents received at seminars at the OECD and the 2004 Congress o f  
the Latin Am erican Studies A ssociation (LASA). I appreciate the com m ents 
o f  several colleagues at ECLAC and the research support and com m ents o f  
Heriberto Tapia.
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2 Seeking Growth under Financial Volatility
The incidence of capital flows on domestic economic activity has 
been an outstanding feature of LACs during the past quarter century. 
In the last ten years, East Asian economies joined the club. Actually, in 
recent decades, the association of flows with economic growth has 
been heterogeneous, and apparently has been worsening: on frequent 
occasions, capital surges have not been accompanied by vigorous 
capital formation and sustainable GDP growth. This fact highlights the 
central role played by the m echanism by which externally generated 
boom-bust cycles in capital markets are transmitted to the different 
host markets, and the vulnerabilities and hysteresis effects they may 
generate. This implies that an essential objective of macroeconomic 
policies is to reap the benefits from external savings, but reducing the 
intensity of capital account cycles and their negative economic and 
social effects on LACs, and more generally on emerging economies 
(EEs).
Capital account cycles are associated to the twin phenom ena of 
volatility and contagion, both in the expansive phases and in the con­
tractive episodes. Significant shifts in expectations, usually reinforced 
by subsequent risk-rating changes, lead to sharp procyclical adjust­
ments in the availability of financing, maturities and spreads. The most 
damaging, as argued below, are the medium-term fluctuations rather 
than very short-term volatility: several years of abundant financing (i.e. 
1991-94 and mid-1995 to 1997), followed by several years of dryness 
(most of 1998-2004).
In section 1, the arguments in favor of a generalized capital 
account opening by developing economies are analyzed. It is conven­
tionally argued that capital inflows are a significant source for eco­
nom ic convergence for developing econom ies. We focus on what 
actually has happened with economic convergence and capital surges 
to EEs since the 1990s (first issue). In section 2, the im plications of 
bust episodes are discussed. It is argued that all recessions leave 
significant lasting econom ic and social costs (second issue). Even the 
better-behaved recoveries usually end in a GDP plateau notoriously 
below the pre-crisis plateau. In section 3, it is analyzed why, repeat­
edly, crises are built, principally, in boom  periods (third issue). The 
role of short-termist agents and processes of persistent positive shifts 
of the supply of funding during the boom  stage are em phasized. In 
section 4, a contrast is presented between the "orthodox" view of 
purely financial m acroeconomic balances (limited principally to low 
inflation and balanced fiscal budgets), and an alternative approach 
concerned with comprehensive balances, that also includes em ploy­
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ment, economic activity persistently close to potential GDP, and sus­
tainable external balances, that is, "m acroeconom ic balances of the 
real econom y" (fourth issue).
1. Capital inflows for econom ic developm ent convergence
Flows of funds from capital-rich to capital-scarce countries, and catch- 
ing-up in technological and m anaging innovation, are two crucial 
ingredients for a successful process of international convergence of 
living standards; to simplify matters, we use as a measure of conver­
gence per capita GDP levels (see Table 1.1, below).
a) Benefits from  flow s
i. Flows from capital-rich to capital-scarce economies 
M obilization of external savings is the m ost classic, and certainly the 
strongest, argument in favor of capital flows to LDCs. At the aggregate 
level, capital movements from developed to developing countries are 
assum ed to improve the efficiency of world resource allocation, 
because real returns on marginal investment in capital-rich countries 
are expected to be systematically lower than those in capital-scarce 
countries. Consequently, flows to LDCs can benefit both supplier and
Table 1.1 Per capita GDP growth in selected economies, 1971-2004
(annual averages, percentages)
1971-80 1981-89 1990-2004
Korea 5.7 7.3 4.9
Malaysia 5.4 2.8 3.9
East Asia <f>) 5.2 4.4 3.7
Argentina 1.2 -2 .4 1.3
Brazil 6.1 0.1 0.4
Chile 0.9 1.1 3.7
Colom bia 3.0 1.5 0.8
M exico 3.4 -0 .8 1.4
Latin America (19) 3.3 -0.7 0.9
South Africa 1.4 -0 .8 -0 .3
United States 2.2 2.5 1.8
World 1.9 1.4 1.1
Source: Based on figures from ADB, ECLAC, IMF and the World Bank. East Asia includes 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand. Latin America includes 
19 countries.
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demander economies.1 Indeed, net inflows of external savings can sup­
plement domestic savings, raise productive investment and boost 
growth. In turn, expansion of aggregate income can further increase 
domestic savings and investment, thereby creating a virtuous circle in 
which there is sustained economic expansion, eventual elimination of 
net foreign debt, and transformation of the country into a capital 
exporter; it is the so-called virtuous debt cycle (ECLAC, 1995, ch. X), that 
contributes to the convergence of levels of economic development. LDCs 
more likely to receive private capital inflows are the EEs. Actually, they 
concentrate the overwhelming majority of private flows to LDCs.
Although obviously highly stylized, this traditional framework has 
some powerful im plications. First, capital inflows should consistently 
be directed to augm ent aggregate investment, and not be diverted to 
consumption; that is, the crowding-out of national savings should be 
avoided.2 Second, an aggressive domestic savings effort is called for: 
from the outset of a debt cycle, the marginal savings rate must attain a 
level much higher than the average rates of domestic savings as well as 
of investment; thus, it would eventually give way to a savings surplus. 
Initially, m atching interest and profits remittances; subsequently, for 
the repayment of capital. Third, there must be efficient absorptive 
capacity in the domestic market; that is, investment must be allocated 
efficiently (requiring the supply of the other ingredients of the produc­
tion function -  whether domestic or imported, for instance via FDI -  
and a real macroeconomic environment suitable for productive invest­
ment). Fourth, the country must invest intensively in tradable goods 
and services in order to generate a trade surplus large enough to trans­
form domestic savings into foreign currency, to service external liabili­
ties. Fifth, creditors m ust be willing to provide stable and predictable 
flows of finance on reasonable terms.
1 Recent literature argues that marginal returns to capital can be equalized 
w ithout equalizing marginal productivities. G ourinchas and Jeanne (2004, 
section IV) assert that this "w ou ld  im ply that the capital flows that need to  be 
preserved are FDI, and n ot necessarily credit flows", as a way "to  im port produc­
tivity". This approach inserts in  recent literature that underscores the weight o f  
factor quantity on  GDP growth. O n the contrary, the fact that GDP per capita is 
strongly associated w ith the stock o f  capital per worker supports the view  that 
the speed o f  capital form ation  is a significant determ inant o f  GDP grow th. In 
2000, the capital intensity per worker o f  the US and the Latin American 
econom ies, was US$111,000 and US$16,000, respectively, in  constant prices o f  
1995 (see Ffrench-Davis and Tapia, 2004; Ros, 2000, ch. 1).
2 This im plies that dom estic savings increase, at least, in the am ount that the 
rent o f  foreign capital rises.
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These conditions may not all be complied with in practice: countries 
may experience a significant crowding-out of domestic savings by 
foreign savings; investments may not always be efficient or channeled 
sufficiently into tradables, and creditor behavior may differ from the 
desired pattern. Indeed, as convincing as the traditional argument for 
the transfer of international savings to relatively poorer countries is, 
the above problems and ensuing payments crises have often caused 
this valuable developmental mechanism to fail its target.3
ii. Flows compensating shocks
A second contribution of capital mobility is that it can help to balance 
transitory differences between output and expenditure, or to spread out 
over time the adjustment to permanent changes in relative prices; thus, it 
allows stabilizing consumption and investment, generating a stabilizing 
intertemporal adjustment. However, this counter-cyclical behavior not 
always does evolve smoothly in practice. Usually, it is not easy to ascer­
tain whether a downturn in the external sector is transitory and, if so, for 
how long. This uncertainty, coupled with imperfections in international 
capital markets (especially informational asymmetries, enforcement 
obstacles, and contagion of changes of suppliers mood; see section 3, and 
Stiglitz, 2000), represent obstacles to the arrival of matching amounts of 
external finance at those times when they are required.
Given the smallness of EEs markets, vis-à-vis international financial 
markets, a stabilizing behavior is potentially feasible. However, that 
has happened systematically only during periods of generalized abun­
dant supply. For instance, in 1991-97 (except early 1995 for Latin 
America), the specific agent affected by a falling export price could 
borrow rather easily. On the contrary, in other cases, of moderate or 
weak supply, a worsening of the terms of trade has led to sharper 
dryness or to a consolidation of an already existing binding external 
restriction, as in 1998-2003; the outcome tends to be a private capital 
account contributing to a destabilizing intertemporal adjustm ent.4 In
3 See the research presented in  Ffrench-Davis and Reisen (1998), particularly, 
that o f  U thoff and Titelman (1998).
4 It is interesting to  recall that it was public (multilateral and bilateral) supply of 
funds, w hich  behaved counter-cyclically in the 1980s and 1990s (see ECLAC, 
2002a, ch. 4). Prasad, Rogoff, et al. (2003, section I.c and table 4), conclude that 
"procyclica l access to  international capital markets appears to  have had a per­
verse effect on  the relative volatility o f  consum ption  for financially integrated 
develop ing econ om ies". Kindleberger (1978) and Eichengreen (2003, ch . 2) 
provide interesting historical analysis o f  financial cycles.
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these circumstances, financial markets, systematically, have pressed EEs 
authorities to face the negative external shocks with a procyclical reces­
sive policy.
When this second role of international capital m obility is played 
procyclically, the costs of adjustment for developing countries can be 
enorm ous. That is because in the face of negative external shocks 
(and easily exhaustible domestic international reserves), any shortfall 
in capital inflows will require immediate cutbacks in domestic expen­
diture to restore the external balance. As discussed in section 2, even 
when actual GDP is below potential GDP, output will alm ost cer­
tainly fall because o f the natural rigidities standing in the way of 
resource reallocation, and a perverse hysteresis com es into action 
because there also tends to be an over-proportional cutback in invest­
ment (see section 4). The crisis-affected econom y will be unable to 
return to the previous growth path; actually, it would be facing m ul­
tiple equilibria.
iii. Flows diversifying risk
Third, if analytically finance is treated analogously to goods, social 
benefits could be perceived in a multi-way international exchange in 
financial assets, since capital mobility would allow individuals to 
satisfy their risk preferences more fully through greater asset 
diversification; this is a micro-benefit. This argument has been widely- 
used for justifying a full opening of the capital account of developed 
and developing countries alike, particularly including the opening to 
outflows of domestic funds.5
There are several ways to diversify risk or insure against diverse types 
of risk. For instance, by trade diversification and stabilization funds 
(including international reserves policy) to face exports and imports 
instability as a prudential macroeconomic policy. At the micro-level, 
with sectoral and geographical diversification by the firm, and by pro­
ducers of goods and services operating with derivative markets (see 
Dodd, 2003). But, a quite different matter is a capital account opening 
to diversify the financial assets and equity stock portfolio of residents.
5 It is relevant that Korea and Malaysia -  the tw o fastest recovering EEs after the 
Asian crisis -  kept restrictions on  outflow s by  residents as a countercyclical 
m acroeconom ic device (Mahani, Shin and W ang, 2005). Zahler (2005) discusses 
the m acroecon om ic im plications o f  outflow s from  dom estic institutional 
investors, illustrated with the case o f  Chilean private pension funds.
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It is evident that free trade in goods, as well as flows o f greenfield 
FDI, and free trade in financial assets are not identical (Diaz- 
Alejandro, 1985; Devlin, 1989; Bhagwati, 1998). The former transac­
tion tends to be com plete and instantaneous, whereas trade in 
financial instrum ents is inherently incom plete and of uncertain 
value, since it is based on a prom ise to pay in the future. In a world 
of uncertainty, incom plete insurance markets, inform ational costs 
and contagious changes of m ood, ex ante and ex post valuations of 
financial assets m ay be radically different. The gap in time between a 
financial transaction and paym ent for it, generates externalities in 
market transactions that can m agnify and m ultiply errors in subjec­
tive valuations, to the point where finally the market corrections may 
be abrupt, overshooting and destabilizing (Stiglitz, 1998); that would 
im ply a m acroeconomic cost. Thus, some form of regulation of trade 
in financial assets may not only make specific markets function more 
efficiently, but improve the overall perform ance of the economy 
through the enhancem ent of m acroeconom ic stability and better 
long-term investment performance.
From the point of view of growth convergence, this third argument 
is not too relevant for enhancing development. First, for a given 
country, financial opening for the im plem entation of financial risk 
diversification implies liberalizing outflows by residents. Most, proba­
bly, it would tend to encourage net outflows from -  the more incom ­
plete, smaller, less liquid and less deep -  developing or emerging 
markets, rather than the opposite. Evidently, that may diversify risk for 
domestic financial investors and agents (most probably does not con­
tribute to diversity risk on returns to domestic producers), but probably 
reduces savings available domestically and financing for productive 
investment.
Second, there are som e interesting analytical pieces in the litera­
ture supporting this third argum ent. For instance, O bstfeld (1994) 
develops a m odel based on the hypothesis that global financial inte­
gration im plies a portfolio shift from low-risk-low-returns capital to 
high-risk-high-returns capital. Fie concludes that that shift could 
contribute to “enorm ous welfare gain s” (Obstfeld, 1998, p. 10). 
There are three comm ents I would like to pose in this respect: (i) the 
assertion about the size of the effects -  even more than the sign -  
reveals an a priori belief or desire; (ii) there is an overlapping of the 
risk diversification argum ent with that of flows from capital-rich to 
capital-scarce markets in response to differential returns; there is 
need to identify what is truly different in the pure financial risk
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diversification argum ent;6 (iii) actually, what do we observe? That 
cross-border flows tend to move into better-known and non-high 
risk assets; a look at stocks (for instance, ADRs or GDRs) and bonds 
of EEs transacted internationally, docum ents it sharply: they usually 
correspond to large, mature, and better graded dom estic firms. In 
particular, the sam e happens with financial investm ent abroad of 
EEs residents. The exception, covering a broader set of assets, is in 
the case of the bubbles, in which investors actually do not reveal an 
appetite-for-risk, but rather an assum ption away of risk during the 
contagion of over-optim ism . In brief, there is no w ell-documented 
connection o f risk diversification with the sources of dom estic pro­
ductivity increases.
Third, international financial diversification has presently being 
given evident priority in policy-making; for instance, when eliminating 
capital gains taxes on cross-border operations and in the encourage­
ment to financial investment in offshore markets. But, the fact is that 
both activities are quite isolated from the sources of systemic competi- 
tivity and productive development. That sort of priority tends to con­
centrate energy of economic agents in purely financial activities; this 
implies a neo-rent-seeking attitude: to make profits at the expense of 
other agents, instead of profit derived from increased productivity. The 
problem is not one of all or nothing, but of a rebalance in favor of 
"productivism” and longer-term horizons.
iv. Capital account opening and macroeconomic discipline 
This is the newest argument in favor of capital account liberalization. It 
states that the dependency from inflows can make a significant contribu­
tion to deter political authorities from following irresponsible and pop­
ulist macroeconomic policies. It is argued that, consequently, fully 
opening the capital account would encourage "sound macroeconomic 
fundamentals". This is partly true for domestic sources of instability, i.e., 
large fiscal deficits, permissive monetary policy and arbitrary exchange- 
rate overvaluation. However, actually, we have observed that lax demand 
policies or exchange-rate overvaluation has tended to be encouraged by 
financial markets during booms (in periods of over-optimism
6 Other relevant argument is the obvious positive role fulfilled b y  financial 
intermediaries in  relaxing liquidity constraints and in reducing search costs for 
small- and m edium -sized agents (SMEs), w hich  is crucial for econ om ic growth 
and equity. It is dom estic intermediaries w ho concentrate that role overw helm ­
ingly. Access abroad o f  SMEs is notably limited.
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of financial agents), whereas excessive punishm ent during crises has 
tended to force authorities to adopt overly contractionary policies 
("irrational overkill").7
In fact, the opening of the capital account m ay lead EEs to import 
external financial instability, with capital inflows engendering a wors­
ening in macroeconomic fundamentals. Thus, although this market 
discipline can serve as a check to domestic sources of instability -  not 
necessarily very efficient, given the whims of opinions and expecta­
tions characteristic of financial markets -  it certainly becomes a source 
of externally generated instability. Not only the market may perceive 
inaccurately that some domestic policies are inadequate, indeed, it may 
induce deviations of those variables from sustainable levels: it is the 
market itself which, during the booms, has generated incentives for 
EEs to enter vulnerability zones (see section 3).
One additional, most worrisome, im plication is that legitimate 
national political authorities may lose the capacity to pursue the policy 
proposals for which they were elected. To this issue we turn at the end 
of this chapter.
b) Actual grow th  perform ance
In the post-war II period, global GDP growth has recorded high per 
capita rates. The average for the whole world in the last half-century is 
similar to the rates achieved by Great Britain and United States when 
they conquered, in that sequence, the role of more powerful economy 
in the world (see Maddison, 2001). The speed of world growth has 
shown a declining trend in recent decades, with GDP per capita rising 
1.9% in the 1970s, 1.4% in the 1980s, and 1.1% in 1990-2004 (table 
1.1). Of course, there are many other intervening variables in the evolu­
tion of GDP, but in this latter period there are two outstanding new 
factors.8 One is the technological revolution taking place in recent 
years, evidently a positive contributing factor for increasing productiv­
ity and, we assume, generating higher growth; the other is the more
7 This source o f  market discipline can also pose obstacles to  necessary social 
reform  (for instance, to  higher taxes to  finance efficient hum an capital invest­
m ent) or to  the ability to  capture econ om ic rents from  natural resources that 
w ould  otherwise be forgone.
8 In the case o f  Latin America there has been a significant financial and trade 
liberalization and massive privatizations, with m uch  broader room  for private 
markets. Analysis o f  reforms and outcom es are presented in Kuczynsky and 
W illiam son (2003); Stallings and Peres (2000); Ffrench-Davis (2005). See certain 
similarities with the South African reforms after Apartheid in Gelb (2005.)
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intensive increase in domestic and international financial activism. 
This is a good candidate to explain, at least partly, the slower growth 
due to the deviation of resources and efforts from productivity 
enhancement ("productivism ") and toward neo-rent seeking 
("financierism"), with a procyclical bias. Efficiency, in any human 
activity, requires a sound balance between different activities, objec­
tives, voices, time horizons, etc. That balance must be recovered.
Here we will focus on growth trends in EEs during the latter period. 
Given the four arguments discussed above in favor of capital account 
opening, we want to document whether there has been growth conver­
gence during this recent period of broad liberalization of capital 
accounts and other structural reforms in EEs.9 Table 1.1 shows that, in 
the 1970s, both East Asia and Latin America (notably Brazil) converged 
with the United States and progressed faster than the world economy. 
In the next two decades, East Asia continued to converge, though more 
mildly: it converged even in the most recent period (1990-2004), 
notwithstanding its 1998 recession. Latin America, on the contrary, 
has diverged since the 1980s (ECLAC, 2002b; IDB, 2004; Ocampo, 
2005). In the period of deep free market reforms, significant liberaliza­
tion of trade and high capital inflows, in 1990-97 (with a brief down­
turn in 1995), a significant share of foreign savings was not directed to 
capital form ation (GKF), and of the fraction allocated to GKF a 
significant share was invested in the production of non-tradables.10 
Consequently, it generated severe vulnerabilities for the following 
period of supply drought (since 1998). Overall, annual growth per 
capita in 1990-2004 was merely 0.9% in Latin America, as compared to 
1.1% in the world as a whole, and 1.8 % in the United States.
It is interesting that, within Latin America, there was a convergence 
in the adoption of neo-liberal reforms, but there was an increased 
divergence in economic growth of the region with respect to the USA 
and the world average. Table 1.1 shows that one exception in Latin
9 An excellent, com prehensive re-interpretation o f  recent growth experiences is 
developed in Rodrik (2003); an earlier analysis is in  Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995). Prasad, Rogoff, et al. (2003) present an interesting survey on  the effects 
o f  financial globalization on  LDCs growth.
10 Tw o simple, straight-forward relations: (i) in  1990-97, net capital inflow s 
increased m ore, in com parison  to  the 1980s, than GKF (even after changes in 
dom estic savings are con trolled  by terms o f  trade); (ii) exports increased less 
than imports, and the standard way o f  measuring "tradables" usually exhibits a 
falling share in GDP, despite the significant rise in the export ratio (see Ffrench- 
Davis, 2005, ch. IV).
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American growth performance was the case of Chile, whose average 
growth per capita doubled that of the USA in 1990-2004 (3.7% versus 
1.8%). Those years enclose two different subperiods; it is most relevant 
that a significant welfare convergence was achieved only in 1990-97 
(with 5.3% per capita growth), period in which Chile searched quite 
actively for real macroeconomic balances, including the regulation of 
short-term and liquid capital inflows, active exchange rate and m one­
tary policies, a significant fiscal surplus during boom  periods and a 
copper stabilization fund by the Treasury. The set of policies initiated 
in 1990, with the return to democracy, represented a reform to the 
reforms conducted in the 1970s (Ffrench-Davis, 2002, ch. 10).11
2. Recessions, recovery and elusive growth
A dom inant feature of the "new generation" of business cycles in EEs 
are the sharp fluctuations in domestic private spending and balance 
sheets, associated to boom-bust cycles in external financing. The rise of 
external financing contains a significant exogenous or push origin 
(Calvo, 1998); but actual inflows tend to produce policy changes, 
which introduce pull or endogenous factors. We interpret that the 
former effect prevails when a growing deficit on current account and 
appreciating exchange rates coexist with an accumulation of interna­
tional reserves. That happened in most LACs in 1990-94 and 1996-97, 
and in East Asia in 1992-96.
External shocks, both positive and negative, are multiplied domesti­
cally if the exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policies stance are pro­
cyclical, as it is actually expected to be by financial market agents and 
even by multilateral financial agencies As a consequence of a procycli­
cal behavior, during the capital surges we have observed that EEs have, 
frequently, penetrated in vulnerability zones, during adjustment processes 
including some com bination of (i) rising external liabilities, with a 
large liquid or short-term share (IMF, 1998; Rodrik and Velasco, 2000),
(ii) large current account external deficits, (iii) appreciated exchange 
rates, (iv) currency and maturity mismatches, (v) high price/earnings 
ratios of domestic financial assets, and (vi) high prices of real estate.
11 Outstanding features o f  trade, financial and m acroeconom ic reform s o f  the 
1990s in LACs were rather similar to  those o f  Chile in  the 1970s, sharing what I 
have show n to  be severe mistakes, prone to  financial crisis and "unfriendly" 
with productive investment (see Ffrench-Davis, 2002, on  Chile; and 2005, chs. I 
and III, on  Latin America).
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Bust in EEs, usually has come after a boom  in capital inflows, which 
have been generating all these destabilizing market signals (Ffrench- 
Davis and Ocampo, 2001).
The longer and deeper the economy's penetration into those vulnera­
bility zones, the more severe the financierist trap in which authorities 
could get caught, and the lower the probability of leaving it without 
undergoing a crisis and long-lasting economic and social costs. The 
absence or weakness of policies moderating the boom  -  putting breaks 
during overheating -  12 endangers the feasibility of adopting a strong 
reactivating policy under a recessive environment after the bust.
Bust has been led by a sudden stop of inflows and a sudden rise of 
outflows: Latin America in August 1982; Mexico in December 1994 and 
East Asia in 1997; or a somewhat more gradual change brought in by 
the Asian contagion13 toward Latin America in 1998-99. All have 
implied a shift from liquidity to dryness in domestic financial and cur­
rency markets.
In this sort of crises, a downward adjustm ent on aggregate demand 
takes place after the drying of supply. The negative financial shock 
underlying the Asian crisis was compounded by a concomitant worsen­
ing of the terms of trade; evidently, there were no spontaneous capital 
flows compensating the swings of the terms of trade. Usually, there has 
been an "autom atic" com ponent in the domestic adjustment, associ­
ated to a significant lost of reserves, complemented to different 
degrees, with policy-increased interest rates, depreciation and fiscal 
contraction. Naturally, the drop in domestic dem and (or of its rate of 
growth) tends to correct the external deficit, and consequently that 
source of the demand for foreign currency. In all sharp processes, then 
follows a drop in GDP (growth), what tends to make necessary a subse­
quent additional fall in aggregate demand. Obviously, the larger the 
cumulative drop in GDP, the heavier the economic and social costs of 
adjustment and the foregone welfare. A positive feature, nonetheless, is 
that the resulting output gap (potential GDP minus actual GDP) pro­
vides room for a subsequent recovery.
12 A feature o f  the gestation o f  m odern  financial crises is that "overheating" has 
taken place, frequently, w ith falling in flation rates, led by  exchange rate appre­
ciation and rising external deficits. A notorious case is that o f  Argentina in 
1996-2001 with a negative average inflation in that period.
13 yye use a defin ition  w hich  includes the contagion  o f  optim ism  am ong finan­
cial agents during the capital surge, as well as a contagion o f  pessimism with the 
bust.
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Indeed in all moderately or well-managed economies, a recovery 
follows usually the fall in activity. We stress that m ost of the drop in 
GDP does not imply, necessarily, a destroyal of capacity but a transi­
tory underutilization, an output gap. That is a recessive gap. In a per­
fectly flexible economy, with an efficient com bination of demand- 
reducing and switching policies there would be no output loss associ­
ated to the downward adjustm ent of aggregate demand. The actual 
huge GDP losses with respect to the previous growth trend, in all the 
cases we have observed, clearly signal that the universe we are dealing 
with is not too flexible vis-à-vis sharp recessive shocks, and that policies 
are not efficient or have become less efficient with the loss of effective 
tools.
Even in the outstanding cases of fast recovery -  the so-called v- 
shaped recoveries -  significant costs have been observed. Generally, 
countries, which have undergone severe crises, display evidence that 
they are pushed into a lower GDP path: in brief, an economy 
that exhibited a 7% growth trend and suffers a 7% drop, tends to expe­
rience a 14% output gap; consequently, a 7% recovery, in the year after 
recession, tends to leave a 14% gap. Figure 1.1 depicts the cases of 
Korea and Malaysia, that exhibit the better-behaved recoveries among 
EEs. Before the crisis, both were in a growth trend in the order of 7% 
per year, considered sustainable by most observers. Even these two out­
standing economies, after 1998, remain notoriously below the previous 
trend.14 Financial crises are extremely costly, stressing the importance 
of crises-avoiding reforms and policies.
There are three particularly relevant medium-term effects on GDP. 
One is a sharp reduction of productive investm ent that occurs during 
the crisis, which naturally deteriorates the future path of potential 
GDP; for instance, the already mediocre investment ratios in LACs fell 
1.5 points between the averages of 1992-99 and 2000-2003, reaching a 
ratio even lower than in the lost decade of the 1980s (see section 4).
Second, the worsening of balance sheets (Krugman, 1999), as shown 
by the experience of EEs, indicates that restoring a viable financial 
system takes several years, generating adverse effects throughout 
the period in which it is rebuilt; frequently, also, the Treasury or the 
Central Bank have diverted funds to support banks or debtor firms. 
Third, a growing body of evidence docum ents that boom-bust cycles 
have ratchet effects on social variables (Rodrik, 2001; World Bank, 
2003). The deterioration of the labor market (open unem ployment, a
14 In econom etric terms, this implies the existence o f  a unit root in real GDP.
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A. Korea (billion won, 1995 prices)
Figure 1.1 GDP and aggregate dem and in Korea and Malaysia, 1987-2003 
Source: Author's calculations based on  ADB data.
worsening in the quality of jobs or in real wages, and rise in informal­
ity) is generally very rapid, whereas the recovery is slow and incom ­
plete. This is reflected in the long-lasting worsening of real wages in 
Mexico after the tequila crisis (Frenkel and Ros, 2004); one crucial vari­
able behind this outcome, that leaves negative "structural" changes in 
the labor market, is that labor supply keeps rising, while capital forma­
tion experiences a sharp drop and the average rate of use of the stock 
of capital is reduced.
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These three problems signal policy priorities during the crisis: sustain­
ing public investment, encouraging private investment; contributing 
to reschedule liabilities, and assisting in solving currency and maturity 
mismatches; reinforcing a social network that uses the opportunity to 
improve the productivity of temporarily underutilized factors, and the 
need to reform the approach to macroeconomic policies (see section 4).
3. W h y  p r iv a te  n o n -F D I f lo w s  t o  EEs are  p r o c y c l i c a l  a n d  
t e n d  t o  d e s ta b iliz e  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  b a la n c e s
Most recent macroeconomic crises in East Asia and Latin America have 
shown a close association with strong swings of private capital flows. 
An outstanding feature is that currency and financial crises have been 
suffered by EEs that usually were considered to be highly "successful" 
by IFIs and financial agents; actually, they were awarded with grow- 
ingly improving grades from international risk rating agencies 
(Ffrench-Davis and Ocampo, 2001; Frenkel, 2004; Reisen, 2003; 
W illiamson, 2003b); accordingly, EEs were rewarded with falling 
spreads, in parallel with accumulating rising stocks of external liabili­
ties (see figure 1.2 below).
The sharp increase of international financial flows since the early 
1990s was notably more diversified than in the 1970s. But the outcome 
is potentially more unstable, in as much as the trend has been a shift 
from mid-term bank credit, which was the predom inant source of 
financing in the 1970s, to a set of equity portfolio flows, liquid bonds, 
medium- and short-term bank financing; short-term time deposits; 
acquisitions of domestic firms by foreign investors. Thus, paradoxi­
cally, since the 1990s there has tended to be a diversification toward 
highly reversible sources o f  funding; they tend to share the spreads of 
over-optimism and over-pessimism. The reversibility of flows is not 
observed during the expansive-boom stage of the cycles, but its perva­
siveness, for real macroeconomic stability, explodes abruptly with the 
negative change of m ood of m arkets.15 Notwithstanding the rising 
share of FDI along the past decade, the capital account still included a 
significant proportion of volatile flows, as well as inflows unlinked
15 The accelerated grow th o f  derivatives markets contributed to  soften  "m icro ­
instability" but has tended to  increase "m acro-instability" and to  reduce trans­
parency. See an analysis o f  the channels by  w hich  stability and instability are 
transmitted in D odd (2003).
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with the direct generation of additional productive capacity such as 
mounting mergers and acquisitions.16
That change in the composition of supply -  associated to technolog­
ical innovation, institutional and policy changes in developed 
economies, led by US authorities and powerful lobbying forces 
(Bhagwati, 2004; Pfaff, 2000) -  was accompanied by a fast opening in 
the capital accounts of EEs, particularly in East Asia and Latin America; 
this opening was im plem ented in a period of abundant supply. The 
fact is that both regions moved into vulnerability zones (we repeat the 
signals: some com bination of large external liabilities, with a high 
short-term or liquid share; currency and maturity mismatches; a 
significant external deficit; an appreciated exchange-rate; high 
price/earnings ratios in the stock market, plus low domestic investment 
ratios in LACs). In parallel, as discussed below, agents specialized in 
microeconomic aspects of finance, placed in the short-term or liquid 
segments of capital markets, acquire a dom inant voice in the genera­
tion of macroeconomic expectations.
There is an extremely relevant and interesting literature on the 
causes of financial instability: the asymmetries o f information between 
creditors and debtors, and the lack of adequate internalization of the 
negative externalities that each agent generates (through growing vul­
nerability), that underlie the cycles of abundance and shortage of 
external financing (Krugman, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002; Harberger, 1985). 
Beyond those issues, as stressed by Ocampo (2003), finance deals with 
the future, and evidently concrete "inform ation" about the future is 
unavailable. Consequently, the tendency to equate opinions and 
expectations with "inform ation" contribute to herd behavior and mul­
tiple equilibria. Actually, we have observed a notorious contagion, first 
of over-optimism, and then of over-pessimism in many of the financial 
crises experienced by EEs in the last three decades.
However, over and above these facts, there are two additional fea­
tures of the creditor side that are crucially important. One feature is the 
particular nature o f the leading agents acting on the supply side (Ffrench- 
Davis, 2003). There are natural asymmetries in the behavior and objec­
tives of different econom ic agents. The agents predom inant in the
16 It must be recalled that about one-half o f  FDI in flow s in to  Latin America in 
1995-2002 corresponded to  acquisitions and mergers (UNCTAD, 2003). Prasad, 
Rogoff, et al. (2003, table 1 and figure 3) report data on  volatility o f  total inward 
FDI, bank loans and p ortfo lio  investm ent. They con firm  the con clu sion  from  
other abundant research that FDI is less volatile.
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financial markets are specialized in short-term liquid investment, 
operate within short-term horizons, and naturally are highly sensitive 
to changes in variables that affect returns in the short-run.17 The 
second feature is the gradual spread of information, among prospective 
agents, on investment opportunities in EEs. In fact, agents from differ­
ent segments of the financial market become gradually drawn into new 
international markets as they take notice of the profitable opportuni­
ties offered by emerging economies previously unknown to them. This 
explains, from the supply-side, why the surges of flows to emerging 
economies -  in 1977-81 and 1991-97 -  have been processes that went 
on for several years rather than one-shot changes in supply. In this 
sense, it is relevant for policy design to make a distinction between two 
different types of volatility of capital flows, short-term ups-and-downs, 
and the medium-term instability, which leads several variables -  like 
the stock market, real estate prices and the exchange rate -  to move 
persistently in a given direction, providing "wrong certainties" to the 
market and encouraging capital flows, seeking economic rents rather 
than differences in real productivity. Private capital flows, led by m id­
term volatility (or reversibility) of expectations, usually have a strong 
and costly procyclical bias.
On the domestic side, high rates of return were potentially to be 
gained by creditors from capital surges directed to EEs. At the time of 
their financial opening, in the 1980s and early 1990s (see Morley, 
Machado and Pettinato, 1999), Latin American economies were experi­
encing recession, depressed stock and real estate markets, as well as 
high real interest rates and initially undervalued dom estic currencies. 
Indeed, by 1990, prices of real estate and equity stocks were extremely 
depressed in Latin America, and the domestic price of the dollar was 
comparatively very high (see ECLAC, 1995; Ffrench-Davis and 
Ocampo, 2001).
In the case of East Asia, when they opened their capital accounts 
during the 1990s, the international supply of funding was already 
boom ing. As com pared to LACs, they were growing notably fast,
17 Persaud (2003), argues that m odern  risk-management by  investing institu­
tions (such as funds and banks), based o n  value-at-risk measured daily, works 
procyclica lly  in the b o o m  and bust. Procyclicality is reinforced b y  a trend 
toward h om ogen ization  o f  creditor agents. A com plem entary argum ent by 
Calvo and M endoza (2000) exam ines h ow  globalization  m ay prom ote con ta ­
gion  by  discouraging the gathering o f  in form ation  and by  strengthening incen­
tives for im itating market portfolio.
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with high savings and investm ent ratios. However, equity stock was 
also cheap as com pared to capital-rich countries (exhibited low 
price/earnings ratios), and liquid external liabilities were extrem ely 
low. Naturally, as discussed in section 1, the rate of return tends to 
be higher in the productive sectors of capital-scarce EEs than in 
mature markets that are capital-rich. Then, there is potentially space 
for very profitable capital flows from suppliers in the latter to the 
former m arkets. The expected adjustm ents in any em erging 
economy m oving from a closed to an open capital account, in those 
conditions, should tend to be similar to those recorded in LACs. The 
outcom e in both  em erging regions, for instance, was a spectacular 
rise in stock prices, m ultiplying in average the price index by four in 
1990-94 and (after a drop with the tequila crisis) by two in 1995-97 
in LACs, and by two in East Asia in 1992-94 (see Ffrench-Davis, 
2003, table 2.1).
During the boom  is when the degrees of freedom to choose policies 
are broader. The increased supply o f external financing in the 1990s 
generated a process of exchange-rate appreciation in most LACs, as 
well as, more moderately, in East Asia; the expectations of continued, 
persistent, appreciation encouraged additional inflows from dealers 
operating with maturity horizons located within the expected appreci­
ation of the domestic currency.18 For allocative efficiency and for 
export-oriented development strategies, a macro-price -  as significant 
as the exchange rate - 19 led by capital flows conducted by short-termist 
agents reveals a severe policy inconsistency. The increase in aggregate 
demand, pushed up by inflows and appreciation, and a rising share of 
the domestic demand for tradables, augments "artificially” the absorp­
tive capacity and the demand for foreign savings. Thus, as said, the 
exogenous change -  opened by the transformations recorded in inter­
national capital markets -  was converted into an endogenous process, 
leading to dom estic vulnerability given the potential reversibility of 
flows.
18 For short-term ist agents the actual and expected profitability were increased 
with the appreciation process. That same process, if perceived as persistent, 
w ould tend to  discourage investment in the production o f  tradables intensive in 
dom estic inputs. Therefore, it is m ost relevant, because o f  its po licy  im plica­
tions, what happens w ith  the behavior o f  exchange rates during the expansive 
or b oom  stage. It is then w hen  external im balances and currency and maturity 
mismatches are, inadvertently, being generated.
19 Since the allocative role o f  the exchange rate was notably enhanced with 
trade reforms, its instability became m ore dam aging for allocative efficiency. See 
ECLAC (1995, chs. Ill and IV); Velasco (2000); W illiam son (2003a).
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In brief, the interaction between the two sets of factors -  the nature o f  
agents and a process o f  adjustment -  explains the dynamics of capital 
flows over time: why suppliers keep pouring-in funds while real macro- 
economic fundam entals worsen. When creditors discover an emerging 
market, their initial exposure is low or non-existent. Then they gener­
ate a series of consecutive flows, which result in rapidly increasing 
stocks of financial assets in the EE; actually, too rapid and/or large for 
an efficient absorption; frequently, the absorption is artificially 
increased by exchange rate appreciation, and a rising real aggregate 
demand with an enlarged external deficit as a consequence.
The creditor's sensitivity to negative news, at some point, is likely to, 
suddenly, increase remarkably when the country has reached vulnera­
bility zones; then, the creditors take notice of (i) the rising level of the 
stock of assets held in a country (or region), (ii) the degree of depen­
dence of the debtor market on additional flows, which is associated 
with the magnitude of the current account deficit, (iii) the extent of 
appreciation, (iv) the need of refinancing of maturing liabilities, and 
(v) the am ount of liquid liabilities likely to flow out in face of a crisis. 
Therefore, it should not be surprising that, after penetrating deeply in 
those vulnerability zones, the sensitivity to adverse political or eco­
nom ic news and the probability of reversal of expectations grows 
steeply (Calvo, 1998; Rodrik, 1998).
The accumulation of stocks of assets abroad by financial suppliers, 
until well advanced that boom  stage of the cycle, and, then, a subse­
quent sudden reversal of flows, can both be considered to be rational 
responses on the part of individual agents with short-term horizons. 
This is because it is of little concern to this sort of investors whether 
(long-term) fundamentals are being improved or worsened while they 
continue to bring inflows. What is relevant to these investors is that 
the crucial indicators from their point of view -  prices of real estate, 
bonds and stock, and exchange-rates -  can continue providing them 
with profits in the near term and, obviously, that liquid markets allow 
them, if needed, to reverse decisions timely; thus, they will continue to 
supply net inflows until expectations of an im m inent near reversal 
build up.
Indeed, for the most influential financial operators, the more rele­
vant variables are not related to the long-term fundam entals but to 
short-term profitability. This explains why they may suddenly display 
a radical change of opinion about the economic situation of a country 
whose fundamentals, other than liquidity in foreign currency, remain 
rather unchanged during a shift from over-optimism to over-pessimism.
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Naturally, the opposite process tends to take place when the debtor 
markets have adjusted downward "sufficiently". Then, the inverse 
process makes its appearance and can be sustained for some years, like 
in 1991-94 or 1995-97, or short-lived like in late 1999 and 2000. It is 
relevant for equity and average growth that the upward process usually 
tends to be more gradual or slower than the downward adjustment, 
which tends to be abrupt.
It is no coincidence that, in all three significant surges of the last 
quarter century, loan spreads underwent, in a process, a continued 
decline, notwithstanding that the stock of liabilities was rising sharply: 
spreads fell for 5-6 years in the 1970s; over 4 years before the tequila 
crisis, and over a couple of years after that crisis. Figure 1.2 depicts the 
evolution of EMBI for LACs, exhibiting a persistent improvement 
between the first quarter of 1995 and the third quarter of 1997.
This behavior of spreads has implied, during the expansive side of 
the cycle, a downward sloping locus, drawing a sort of a medium-run 
supply curve, a highly destabilizing feature indeed. During all three 
expansive processes there has been an evident contagion of over-opti­
m ism among creditors and, rather than appetite for risk, there prevails
Figure 1.2 Country risk and capital flows to Latin America, 1995-98 
Source: Bloom berg and IMF.
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an underestimation or assuming away of risk. In this respect, it is inter­
esting to recall the evident parallel, in the 1990s, between spreads of 
Mexico (today praised as then a well-behaved reformer) and Argentina 
(today qualified as a non-reformer in that decade) (see Ffrench-Davis, 
2003, figure 2.2). Apparently, creditors did not perceive any significant 
difference between these two economies until 1998.
With respect to debtors, in periods of over-optimism, m ost debtors 
do not borrow thinking of default and expecting to be rescued or to 
benefit from a moratoria. Contrariwise, expectations of high yields 
tend to prevail: borrowers are also victims of the syndrome of financial 
euphoria during the boom  periods (Kindleberger, 1978).
In conclusion, economic agents specialized in the allocation of 
financial funding (I will call it microfinance, as opposed to macro­
finance), who may be highly efficient in their field but operate with 
short-horizons "by training and by reward", have come to play the 
leading role in determining macroeconomic conditions and policy 
design in EEs. It implies that a "financierist" approach becomes pre­
dom inant rather than a “productivist" approach. Growth with equity 
requires improving the rewards for productivity enhancement rather 
than financial rent-seeking searching for capital gains. There is need to 
rebalance priorities and voices.
4. A macroeconomics-for-growth
There is a broad consensus that macroeconomic "fundam entals" are a 
most relevant variable. However, there still is wide m isunderstanding 
about what constitutes "sound fundamentals", and how to achieve and 
sustain them.
a) A tw o-p illar m acroecon om ics
The approach that has been in fashion in the mainstream world and 
IFIs, even up to today, emphasizes macroeconomic balances of two 
pillars: low inflation and fiscal balances, with a clear om ission of the 
overall macroeconomic environment for producers, which includes 
other m ost influential variables such as aggregate demand and 
exchange rates. We call it financial macroeconomic balances.20
20 See analyses on  shortcom ings in the m acroeconom ic policies im plem ented in 
the 1990s in  Latin America, in W illiam son (2003a) and Ffrench-Davis (2005, ch. 
2). As said, Prasad, Rogoff, et al. (2003), docum ent the procyclica l behavior o f  
financial flows and som e o f  its im plications.
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This approach evidently includes other ingredients, but assumes, 
that the hard, relevant, proof is in fulfilling those two pillars. This 
interpretation implies that success in achieving those two pillars leads 
to productive development in a liberalized economy, or that it 
becomes sufficient with the addition of microeconom ic reforms. This 
approach is well illustrated, for example, by Stanley Fischer (1993), 
that after m entioning several intervening variables, concludes that 
"the evidence reviewed and presented in this paper supports the con­
ventional view that a stable macroeconomic environment, m eaning a 
reasonably low rate of inflation and a small budget deficit, is conducive 
for sustained economic growth". Additionally, a frequent assertion in 
the more recent conventional literature is that an open capital account 
imposes m acroeconomic discipline to EEs.21 Indeed, this approach 
assumes, sometimes explicitly or frequently implicitly, that full 
opening of the capital account would contribute to balance the exter­
nal sector and automatically generate an aggregate demand consistent 
with productive capacity. It is well docum ented that that is not the 
usual experience in the frequent cases of external, positive and nega­
tive, financial shocks experienced by EEs (Ffrench-Davis and Ocampo, 
2001).
As shown, LACs were successful in the 1990s in reducing inflation to 
one-digit figures, and balancing their fiscal budgets (fiscal deficits aver­
aged, of course, with diversity among countries, less than 0.5% of GDP 
in 1995-97). In fact, several LACs fulfilled the m ain requirements of 
neo-liberal macroeconomic balances. However, economic activity was 
notably unstable, as depicted in figure 1.3; in the period covered, 
overall changes in GDP were led by ups-and-downs in aggregate 
demand, and these responded mostly to shifts in net capital flows; for 
instance, monetary adjustments were associated to changes in interna­
tional reserves rather than to changes in domestic credit by the Central 
Bank (both are sources of high-power money).
The behavior of aggregate demand, at levels consistent with potential 
GDP, is a crucial part of a third pillar of real macroeconomic balances, 
which has frequently failed in neo-liberal experiences. As well, are well- 
aligned macroprices, like interest and exchange rates. Frequently, these 
prices and aggregate demand were out-of-equilibria, as reflected in
21 A recent w orking paper o f  the IMF (Tytell and W ei, 2004) exam ines the "dis­
cipline effect" o f  financial globalization on  m acroeconom ic balances, focusing 
on  the tw o pillars in fashion -  low  in flation  and fiscal balances -  disregarding 
the other com ponents o f  a com prehensive set o f  real m acroeconom ic balances.
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Figure 1.3 Latin Am erica: GDP and aggregate dem and, 1990-2004 (annual 
growth rates, %)
Source: ECLAC data. Includes 19 countries. Preliminary figures for 2004.
economies working either below potential GDP or at full capacity with a 
large external deficit. They tend to miss the intermediate area where, 
precisely, mid-term equilibrium values are usually found.
East Asia fulfilled for decades real macroeconomic balances: low 
inflation, fiscal responsibility, together with sustainable exchange rates 
and external balances, and moderate interest rates (with a mild 
financial repression). In the 1990s, East Asia continued to fulfill the 
two conventional pillars -  low inflation and fiscal surpluses -  but lost 
the third pillar, of sustainable macrobalances for the real economy. 
Therefore, most EEs were implementing a financial or two-pillar macro­
economics at the outset of the Asian crises, with the euphoric support 
of specialists in microfinance. A financierist approach had become 
binding.
b) Imbalanced financierism and macroeconomic instability
"Financierism" tends to lead, unsurprisingly, to unsustainable macro- 
economic imbalances, with an effective demand that deviates sharply 
from the production frontier and with "wrong" or outlier macroprices 
and ratios. In figure 1.3, we observe a notorious mid-term instability of 
GDP growth for the total of Latin America; obviously, that of individ­
ual countries tends to be even more unstable. The data show that 
changes in GDP have been led by ups-and-downs in aggregate demand. 
Given that fiscal balances have characterized East Asia, and that LACs
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Figure 1.4 Latin America: Gross fixed capital form ation, 1970-2004 (%  o f  GDP, 
scaled to 1995 prices)
Source: ECLAC data for 19 countries. Preliminary figures for 2004.
reduced their deficits during the 1990s capital surges, it is evident that 
increases in aggregate demand were intensive in private expenditure, 
an outcome strongly associated to the evolution of net capital inflows 
(Marfan, 2005). Actually, capital tended to flow from private sources to 
private users.
The resulting real macroeconomic instability in EEs, in this era of 
globalization, provides an undermined environment for productive 
investment. That is one strong force behind the poor achievement of 
LACs investment ratios in the 1990s, when they averaged 20% of GDP; 
they surpassed by merely one percentage point the 1980s average 
(19%), but remained about six points below that in the 1970s; with the 
contagion of the Asian crisis, in the present decade the investment 
ratio experienced a drop even below the level exhibited in the 1980s 
(see figure 1.4).
c) The role of output gaps and capital formation
A significant, well-documented, variable underlining the drop in pro­
ductive investment is the output gap between actual and potential 
GDP (Agosin, 1998; Schmidt-Hebbel, Serven and Solimano, 1996). The 
gap reflects the underutilized installed capacity in firms and other com­
ponents o f the stock of physical capital, falling employm ent and 
reduced actual total factor productivity (Ffrench-Davis, 2005, ch. 3).
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Profits tend to decrease while the m ood of lenders becomes somber.22 
A notorious effect of these recessive situations, usually, has been a 
sharp reduction in investment ratios; for instance, a drop of fixed 
capital formation in 1995, of 13% in Argentina and 30% in Mexico; in 
1998 fell 21% in Korea and 43% in Malaysia; in 1999 it declined 18% 
in Chile, and between 1998 and 2002, the drop recorded 56% in 
Argentina and 11% in all Latin America.
With the various episodes of economic recovery, investm ent ratios 
usually increased from their previous depressed levels (in 1985, 1990, 
1995) as shown by Figure 1.4. However, there tended to persist a 
significant (although gradually reduced) output gap. Experience indi­
cates that strong increases in investment are associated to a macroeco­
nom ic environment that is able to place effective demand at a level 
consistent with potential output, with right exchange and interest 
rates, and that situation is expected by private investors to be sustain­
able. Chile was the outstanding case to fulfill those conditions, and to 
exhibit a noticeable increase in the investment ratio in 1991-98 (see 
Agosin, 1998; Ffrench-Davis and Villar, 2005).
Two additional forces have strengthened the negative incidence of 
output gaps on domestic private investment. One is a change in the rela­
tive composition of FDI from greenfield investment to acquisitions 
(UNCTAD, 2003), stimulated by depressed prices of domestic assets and 
depreciated currencies; it is likely that many of these acquisitions would 
not have taken place under real macroeconomic equilibrium. The second 
is a negative response of public investment. In particular, expenditure in 
infrastructure. As documented by Easterly and Serven (2003), most LACs 
"witnessed a retrenchment of the public sector from infrastructure provi­
sion and an opening up to private participation". In most LACs, "private 
participation did not fully offset the public sector retrenchment".
The reported drop in investment ratios is a significant variable 
explaining why GDP growth was 5.6% in the 1970s, and averaged 
merely 2.6% in the fifteen years between 1990 and 2004.
It is policy relevant to disaggregate GDP into two components. One 
component of GDP are exports of goods and services,23 whose demand
22 The gap naturally differs am ong sectors, destinations, and type o f  firms. 
W here the gap is expected to persist, producers naturally will tend to  postpone 
or cancel investm ent plans. In recessions, additionally, the financial sector 
restraints its lending activity, particularly to  producers o f  non-tradables.
23 The relevant figures are the value-added to GDP by exports; that is, gross 
exports o f  goods and services minus their im ported inputs.
Table 1.2 Growth of GDP per components, 1990-2003
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(annual averages, percentages)
A. East Asia (6)
Total GDP Exported GDP N on-exported GDP
1990-1997 7.1 10.9 5.7
1998-2003 2.9 7.6 0.6
1990-2003 5.3 9.5 3.5
B. Latin America (19)
Total GDP Exported GDP N on-exported GDP
1990-1997 3.2 8.3 2.4
1998-2003 1.2 5.4 0.3
1990-2003 2.4 7.1 1.5
C. Chile
Total GDP Exported GDP N on-exported GDP
1990-1997 7.6 10.5 6.9
1998-2003 2.6 5.7 1.7
1990-2003 5.5 8.4 4.6
D. Korea
Total GDP Exported GDP N on-exported GDP
1990-1997 7.2 13.9 5.4
1998-2003 4.0 11.9 0.1
1990-2003 5.8 13.0 3.1
Source: Author's calculations based on national account data in constant prices from ADB 
and ECLAC. "Exported GDP" is an estimate of the value-added in exports of goods and ser­
vices; naturally, it covers only part of “exportables” .
East Asia includes Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand. Latin 
America includes 19 countries.
is more closely associated with the external macroeconomic environ­
ment (and trade policies); the other is the rest of GDP -  or non-exports 
-  whose demand depends more intensively on the domestic macroeco­
nom ic environment. Actually, in the transit from boom  to recession, 
the major share of changes in GDP growth rates has been located in 
non-exports performance, as can be estimated from table 1.2.
Given that in both regions the value-added by exports average less 
than half of GDP (about one-third in EA and one-fifth in LACs), a vig­
orous overall economic growth requires a significant growth of non­
exports output. For instance, in Chile and in the average of the six East 
Asian countries, in the dynamic years 1990-97, non-exports rose about 
6% per year (see Table E2.A and I.2.C), while during recessive years 
(1998-2003) they were nearly stagnant in average. Figures for Chile are 
rather similar to those of East Asia for 1990-97 and for 1998-03. Non-
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exports rose 6.9% in the former period and 1.7% in the latter. Over 
80% of the drop in GDP growth, from 7.6% to 2.6%, was explained by 
the recessive im pact on non-exports. It can be expected that, in these 
situations, the large m ajority of GDP growth slow-down be explained 
by a rise in the actual/potential output gap in non-exports.
d) Toward comprehensive real macroeconomic balances
A comprehensive definition of macroeconomic fundam entals should 
include -  alongside low inflation and a sound fiscal balance -  sustain­
able external deficits and low net liquid external liabilities, reduced 
currency and maturities mismatches, sustained public investm ent in 
hum an capital, high and efficient investment in physical capital, non­
outlier real exchange rate, a crowding-in of domestic savings, and 
strong prudential regulation, supervision and transparency of the 
financial system. It is true that it looks like too m any requirements; 
that is why sustained development is exceptional: few nations achieve 
it.
In boom  periods, authorities should accumulate resources in stabi­
lization funds, improve fiscal balances, increase international reserves, 
prepay external debt, avoid exchange rate appreciation, and regulate 
capital inflows. In recessive periods, it should imply, for instance, 
(i) continued implementation of a structural fiscal balance (recognizing 
that during recession tax proceeds are abnormally low and that, in 
those circumstances, public expenditure should not follow taxes in 
their descending runaway, and vice versa during the boom!), and (ii) a 
strong encouragement to effective dem and,24 with effective switching 
policies when domestic activity is clearly below productive capacity 
(see Ffrench-Davis, 2005, ch. 2).
A severe obstacle to a counter-cyclical policy has been the policy in 
fashion of full, across-the-board, opening of the capital account during 
booms. The predominant role exerted, during the recessive periods, by 
the policy recipe of IFIs and financial agents to pursue restrictive m on­
etary and fiscal policies has tended to prolong the depressed economic 
activity in several EEs, and to generate a significant output gap.
Indeed, a macroeconomics for growth requires effective and efficient 
domestic policies. Certainly, the degrees of freedom in an increasingly 
(but also incompletely and unequally) globalized economy are more
24 Both Korea and Malaysia offer clear cases o f  fiscal and m onetary encourage­
m ent to  aggregate dem and, plus a significant devaluation, to recover econ om ic 
activity after their respective 1998 recessions (Mahani, Shin and W ang, 2005).
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limited than before, but there is still space to choose am ong a wide 
variety of alternative paths to make globalization, and effectively cap­
turing net benefit with it. The cases of passive econom ic approaches, 
like Chile before the debt crisis of 1982, Mexico in the first half of the 
1990s and Argentina during the 1990s, have proved to be extremely 
costly for EEs, because of their high propensity to external crises.
On the other hand, we find that prudential dom estic policies, such 
as the selective capital controls established in Chile and Colom bia in 
the 1990s (see ch. IV, in this volume), can reduce the external vulnera­
bility and allow for counter-cyclical exchange rate and monetary poli­
cies. Furthermore, even once a crisis has taken place, domestic policies 
are also crucial to minimize its negative effects and accelerate eco­
nom ic recovery. Korea and Malaysia, two countries that performed 
comparative quite well after their severe crises, followed different 
policy approaches but both developed active and consistent counter­
cyclical m acroeconomic policies (see Mahani, W ang and Shin, 2005), 
in contrast with m ost EEs, particularly in Latin America; their respec­
tive GDP evolution attest to it.
e) Financial globalization  and governance
There is a growing duality, worrisome for democracy, in the con­
stituencies taken into account by authorities in EEs. The increasing 
complexity and globalization of the economic system is raising the dis­
tance between decision-makers and financial agents vis-à-vis the 
domestic agents (workers, firms and tax proceeds) bearing the conse­
quences. As discussed above, an outcome of the specific road taken by 
globalization has been that experts in financial intermediation -  a 
microeconomic training -  have become determinant, in too many 
cases, for the evolution of the domestic macroeconomic balances and 
their volatility.
The integration of capital markets has remarkable im plications on 
governance, room for domestic policies, and on the constituencies to 
which national governments respond. In fact, many leaders in emerg­
ing countries are living a "dual constituency syndrome" (Pietrobelli and 
Zamagni, 2000; Stiglitz, 2001): on the one hand, political authorities 
are elected by their countries' voters, and promise to implement a plat­
form designed before their election, but on the other hand they also 
seek, after being democratically elected, the support of those who 
"vote" for their financial investments (not necessarily productive 
investments or m ay be at their expense). Recent cycles in financial 
markets have revealed a significant contradiction between the two, in a
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negative-sum game, with large output gaps and discouraged capital 
formation.
In summary, what is "irrational”, and evidently inefficient from the 
perspective of resource allocation and total factor productivity, is that 
the decisions of authorities, which should obviously be taken with a 
long-term horizon, seeking sustainable growth with equity, become 
entrapped with the lobbying and policy recipes of microfinance 
experts, what leads to "irrational exuberance” (to use Greenspan's 
expression). Thus, in the next cycle, economic authorities should 
undertake the responsibility of making macro-fundamentals prevail 
(sustainable external deficit; moderate stock of external liabilities, with 
a low liquid share; reasonable m atching of terms and currencies; 
crowding-in of dom estic savings; limited real exchange rate apprecia­
tion; effective demand consistent with the production frontier), in 
order to achieve macroeconomic balances that are both sustainable 
and functional for long-term growth. That requires them to avoid 
entering vulnerability zones during economic booms-cum-capital surges. 
When placed inside those zones, a much needed counter-cyclical 
policy becomes impossible during the period of dryness or without a 
recessive traumatic adjustment as experienced by Argentina.
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Overcoming Latin America's 
Growth Frustrations: The Macro 
and Mesoeconomic Links
fosé Antonio Ocampo*
Whereas the moderate rates of economic growth of 1990-97 generated 
positive evaluations of Latin America's reform efforts (see Edwards, 
1995; IDB, 1997; and World Bank, 1997), the return to very slow rates 
of growth in 1998-2003 (a phenom enon that ECLAC characterized in 
2002 as a new "lost half-decade") brought an extensive réévaluation of 
these early assessments (ECLAC, 2003a; Kuczynski and W illiamson, 
2003). The new development strategy has been effective in generating 
export dynamism, attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
increasing productivity in leading firms and sectors. In most countries, 
inflation trends and budget deficits have been effectively brought 
under control, and confidence in the macroeconomic authorities has 
increased. Nonetheless, economic growth has been frustratingly low 
and volatile, and domestic savings and investment have remained 
depressed. Overall productivity performance has been poor, largely as a 
result of the growing underutilization of both physical capital and 
labor. Increasing production and labor market dualism has become one 
of the m ost distinctive effects of the reform process, with the expan­
sion of "world class" firms (many of them subsidiaries of m ultination­
als) coinciding with increasing unem ployment and labor market 
informality.
This paper evaluates the poor growth record of the reform period in 
the light of both macroeconomic and sectoral (mesoeconomic) perfor­
mance. Section 1 looks at macroeconomic performance and the links 
between growth and liberalization. Section 2 considers sectoral and
* The valuable com m ents received at tw o international seminars organized at 
ECLAC are acknowledged.
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structural performance. Section 3 suggests a structuralist interpretation 
of this evidence.
1. Macroeconomic performance
The most salient economic advance in the 1990s was the increasing 
confidence in the region's macroeconomic authorities generated by 
improvements in fiscal conditions and reductions in inflation rates. On 
average, central-government budget deficits declined significantly in 
the second half of the 1980s, remained in an average range of between 
1% and 2% of GDP through most of the 1990s, but have increased to 
levels o f around 3% since 1999. Progress in this area has been uneven 
across the region, as reflected in the fiscal crises that some countries 
have experienced in recent years, and the high public-sector debt ratios 
that continue to characterize several countries. Progress in the fight 
against inflation has been more uniform and long-lasting. Average 
inflation in Latin America fell steadily up to 2001, when it reached 
single digits in most countries. Setbacks in 2002, when average 
inflation increased for the first time in a decade, were concentrated in a 
few countries, and were followed by a renewed reduction in 2003.
Nonetheless, the expectation that advances in the fiscal area and 
control of inflation would be reflected in access to stable external 
capital flows, high investment rates and strong economic growth did 
not materialize. Renewed access to international capital markets was 
evident in the early 1990s. As figure II. 1 indicates, there was a sharp 
turn from negative to positive net resource transfers in the early 1990s. 
Financial flows played the key role in the early part of this reversal, but 
it was replaced by FDI since the mid-1990s. The Asian crisis generated a 
return to large negative resource transfers through financial flows, 
indeed in magnitudes similar to those of the 1980s. FDI served as a 
compensatory factor up to 2001, but its sharp fall in 2002-2003 gener­
ated large negative overall net resource transfers for the first time in 
more than a decade.
Although renewed growth had characterized a handful of Latin 
American economies in the second half o f the 1980s, broad-based 
growth only took off in the early 1990s and was closely associated to 
renewed capital flows. Capital flows facilitated structural reforms and 
exchange-rate-based stabilization policies and, in turn, the boom  in 
external financing was facilitated by reforms (through more liberal 
capital account regulations and privatization, which induced larger FDI 
flows, am ong other channels). However, the broad-based deceleration
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13 Total ■  Foreign direct investment □  Financial flows
Figure II.1 Net resource transfers, 1970-2003 (%  o f  GDP) 
Source: ECLAC, on  the basis o f  IMF data.
in growth that took place in 1995 and, particularly, in 1998-2003 indi­
cates the prominent role of capital flows -  especially of financial flows -  
as determinants of swings in economic growth. Thus, although trade 
and domestic factors also played a role, fluctuations in the capital 
account became the m ajor single determinant of the Latin American 
business cycle.
Overall, long-term growth has been frustratingly low. Between 1990 
and 2003 as a whole, the average growth rate, of only 2.6% a year or 
0.9% per capita, was less than half the level experienced by Latin 
America between 1950 and 1980, namely 5.5% per year or 2.7% per 
capita (table II. 1). The demographic transition adversely affected per 
capita trends in the earlier period of State-led (or import substitution) 
industrialization, while the opposite was true in the 1990s, when the 
region benefited from a "dem ographic bonus". This is reflected in 
the fact that the labor force grew in the 1990s at rates quite similar to 
those that characterized the period 1950-1980. Indeed, as table II.1 
indicates, GDP per active worker slowed down more sharply than GDP 
per capita, a fact that is consistent with other measures of productivity 
performance presented below (see section 3).
M acroeconomic policy m anagement has been partly responsible for 
the sensitivity of economic growth to capital flows, for some features 
of the restructuring of the production sectors and for the propensity to 
domestic financial crises. Indeed, a particular feature of the reform 
period has been the building up of automatic destabilizers (Stiglitz, 
2003), associated in particular with private rather than public-sector 
deficits and balance sheets. This has generated tensions between
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Table II.1 Latin A m erica 's grow th  and  volatility , 1950-2003  (% )
1950-1980 1980-2003 1990-2003
Average GDP grow th
W eighted average 5.5 2.0 2.6
Simple average 4.8 2.0 2.9
Large and m edian countries 5.2 2.0 2.7
Small countries 4.5 2.1 3.0
Average GDP per capita  grow th
W eighted average 2.7 0.1 0.9
Simple average 2.1 0.0 0.9
Large and m edian countries 2.4 0.1 1.0
Small countries 1.8 -0 .1 0.8
Average GDP per w ork er grow th
W eighted average 2.7 -0 .7 0.0
Simple average 2.4 -0 .9 0.0
Large and m edian countries 2.7 -0 .9 0.0
Small countries 2.2 -0 .9 -0 .1
GDP grow th  vo la tility
W eighted average 1.4 2.2 1.9
Simple average 3.8 4.1 3.3
Large and m edian countries 3.4 4.6 3.9
Small countries 4.2 3.8 2.9
ICOR
Simple average a/ 3.8 9.5 6.8
Source: ECLAC.
Large and median countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, 
Venezuela.
a/ Excluding Venezuela.
macroeconomic policies and reform objectives. In particular, the 
strong bias in favor of currency appreciation that characterized 
the periods marked by an abundance of external financing was partly 
responsible for the adjustm ent problems faced by tradable sectors in 
several countries, as well as for the speculative attacks and the 
increased risks of domestic financial crises that arose when there was a 
sudden stop in capital flows. Also, the tendency to adopt procyclical 
fiscal and, particularly, monetary and credit policies -  which foster 
lending boom s and drops in interest rates during periods of expansion, 
as well as marked monetary contraction and high interest rates during 
crises -  has been an underlying cause of unstable economic growth and 
national financial crises. About half of the Latin American countries 
experienced domestic financial crises during the 1990s, absorbing con­
siderable fiscal and quasi-fiscal resources, and affecting the functioning
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of financial systems, sometimes for extended periods of time (ECLAC, 
2002b; 2003a, chapter 3; Ffrench-Davis, 2003; Ocampo, 2003b).
Dependence on external financing was also associated with a struc­
tural deterioration in the trade balance/growth trade-off (see below) 
and a high degree of sensitivity in the trade balance to economic activ­
ity. The tendency to substitute foreign for domestic saving, which 
characterizes periods of intense capital inflows, played a similar role. 
More broadly, domestic savings remained depressed in the 1990s, 
m aking investment highly dependent on external savings at the 
margin. Investment rates experienced a partial recovery -  particularly if 
the simple rather than the weighted average is considered, indicating 
that smaller countries did better in this regard -  but this was cut short 
by the interruption of capital flows since the Asian crisis (see figure
II.2). Beyond that, however, the investment-growth link has deterio­
rated, as reflected in the high incremental capital-output ratios that 
have characterized the reform period (see table II. 1 again). This issue 
has not been extensively analyzed, and may reflect the fact that 
volatile growth leads to a high average rate of underutilization of pro­
duction capacity, reducing the productivity of investment (Ffrench- 
Davis, 2005), as well as the significant destruction of capital generated 
by the reform effort and, in som e cases, the high capital intensity of 
some of the leading sectors induced by structural reforms. As we will 
see below, these results also call into question the assum ed link 
between reforms, the investment climate and investment efficiency.
This mixed record indicates that macroeconomic policies should be 
based on a broad definition of stability, that recognizes that there is no 
single correlation between its alternative definitions and that 
significant trade-offs may be involved. Cross-country evidence indi­
cates, indeed, that all forms of macroeconomic instability -  high 
inflation, as well as real instability and the frequency of domestic 
financial crises -  have adverse effects on growth (Loayza, et ah, 2002).
Two lessons of the recent historical period are particularly important 
in this regard. The first is that real instability is very costly. A narrow 
view of inflation targeting may thus be as damaging as past macroeco­
nom ic practices that underestimated the costs of inflation. Recessions 
entail a significant loss of resources that may have long-run effects: 
firms may sustain irreparable losses in terms of both tangible and 
intangible assets (tacit technological and organizational knowledge, 
commercial contacts, the social capital accumulated in the firm, its 
goodwill, etc.); the human capital of the unemployed or the underem­
ployed m ay be permanently lost; and children may leave school and
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Weighted average for Latin America -  -  - Simple average
Figure II.2  Fixed investm ent as a percentage o f  GDP, 1970-2003 (estimated at 
1995 prices)
Source: ECLAC.
never return. The uncertainty associated with variability in growth 
rates may consequently have stronger effects on capital accumulation 
than moderate inflation. Indeed, it encourages "defensive" microeco­
nomic strategies (i.e., those aimed at protecting the existing corporate 
assets of firms that find themselves in an unfriendly environment) 
rather than the "offensive" strategies that lead to high investment rates 
and rapid technical change.
The second lesson is that private deficits are just as costly as public 
sector ones. Moreover, risky private sector balance sheets m ay be as 
damaging as flow imbalances. In financially liberalized economies, 
both may interact in non-linear ways with capital account shocks. The 
lack of strong prudential regulation and supervision typical of the early 
phases of financial liberalization is part, but certainly not the whole of 
the story. Boom-bust cycles are an inherent aspect of financial markets. 
Private spending boom s and risky balance sheets tend to accumulate 
during periods of financial euphoria and are the basis for crises once 
exceptional conditions normalize. During such bouts of euphoria, eco­
nomic agents tend to underestimate the intertemporal inconsistency 
that may be involved in existing spending and financial strategies. 
When crises lead to a financial meltdown, the associated costs are 
extremely high. Asset losses may wipe out years o f capital accumula­
tion. The socialization of losses m ay be the only way to avoid a
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systemic crisis, but this will affect future fiscal (or quasi-fiscal) perfor­
mance. Restoring confidence in the financial system takes time, and 
the financial sector itself becomes risk-averse, a feature that under­
mines its ability to perform its primary economic functions.
These two lessons are basically interconnected, due to the prominent 
role played by financial swings as a determinant of the Latin American 
business cycle. An essential task of macroeconomic policy is thus to 
m anage them with appropriate countercyclical tools, based on the 
com bination of three policy packages, whose relative importance will 
vary depending on the structural characteristics and the macroeco­
nom ic policy tradition of each country. The first is consistent and 
flexible macroeconomic -  fiscal, monetary and exchange-rate -  policies 
aimed at preventing public or private agents from accumulating exces­
sive levels of debt and at forestalling imbalances in key macroeco­
nom ic prices (exchange and interest rates) and in the prices of fixed 
and financial assets. The second is a system of strict prudential regula­
tion and supervision with a clear counter-cyclical orientation. This 
means that prudential regulation and supervision should be tightened 
during periods of financial euphoria to counter the m ounting risks 
incurred by financial intermediaries. The third element is a liability 
policy aimed at ensuring that appropriate maturity profiles are m ain­
tained with respect to domestic and external public and private com ­
mitments. Preventive capital account regulations (i.e., those applied 
during periods of euphoria to avoid excessive borrowing) can play a 
role, both as a liability policy -  encouraging longer-term flows -  and as 
an instrument that provides additional degrees of freedom for the 
adoption of counter-cyclical monetary policies (Ocampo, 2003a and 
2003b; Ffrench-Davis, 2003).
Managing counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies is no easy task, as 
financial markets generate strong incentives for developing countries 
to overspend during periods of financial euphoria and to overadjust 
during crises. Moreover, globalization places objective limits on 
national autonom y and exacts a high cost for any loss of credibility 
when national policy instrum ents are poorly administered. For this 
reason, it may be necessary for counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy 
to be supported by institutions and policy instruments that help to 
provide credibility, including fiscal stabilization funds and indepen­
dent central banks. It also means that an essential role of international 
financial institutions, from the point of view of developing countries, 
is to counteract the procyclical effects of financial markets. This can be 
achieved by sm oothing out boom-bust cycles at the source through
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adequate regulation and by providing developing countries with addi­
tional degrees of freedom to adopt counter-cyclical policies (e.g., ade­
quate surveillance and incentives to avoid the build-up of risky 
macroeconomic and financial conditions during periods of financial 
euphoria, together with mechanisms to smooth out adjustments in the 
event of abrupt interruptions in private capital flows).1
In any case, it must be clear that sharp financial cycles, procyclical 
policies and the resulting macroeconomic volatility are part, but cer­
tainly not the whole explanation for the poor growth record of Latin 
America during the reform period. This fact is highlighted in figure
II.3. There is, indeed, a strong negative association between macroeco­
nomic volatility (as measured by the standard deviation of the GDP 
growth rate) and growth, but this link is associated with the poor 
growth record o f economies with very high GDP volatility (Argentina, 
Uruguay and Venezuela). The rest have lower volatility but still a poor 
average growth record.
Is it the extent of economic liberalization (structural reform, in the 
current terminology) what explains these outcom es? This issue has 
been explored in the recent literature with no conclusive results. The 
mere com parison o f the recent growth record with that achieved 
during the age of the State-led industrialization contradicts the view 
that there is a strong association between economic liberalization and 
growth. Indeed, it is sym ptom atic of the weakness of this association 
that even supporters o f economic liberalization now regard the State- 
led industrialization period as a "golden age", and the growth rates 
achieved during that period as a goal for future Latin American perfor­
mance.2 On the other hand, the evidence presented above on weak 
investment performance and high incremental capital-output ratios 
calls into question any simple association between economic liberaliza­
tion and improved investment climate and efficiency.
Evidence from ECLAC research indicates that links between reforms 
and growth have been, at best, weak: some reforms had positive effects 
on growth but others had negative effects, and these im pacts balance 
out to a statistically insignificant overall net effect. Furthermore, even
1 The negative relationship between volatility and GDP grow th and the causal­
ity from  the form er to  the latter have been  w idely docum ented. See, for 
exam ple, Fatas (2002) and Ramey and Ramey (1995). Hnatkovska and Loayza 
(2003) highlight, in addition, that this effect has becom e considerably larger in 
the last tw o decades.
2 See Kuczynski and W illiam son (2003), pp. 305 and 29, respectively.
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if their long-term effect were neutral or positive, their short-term 
im pact was clearly negative (Escaith and Morley, 2001; Stallings 
and Peres, 2000).3 These results are consistent with those of Lora and 
Panizza (2002) when compared with the earlier evidence presented in 
Lora and Barrera (1998). Whereas the earlier paper estimated strong 
effects of reforms on growth, the latter only calculated weak temporary 
effects.
Although the World Bank has also claimed, based on recent research 
(Loayza, et al., 2002), that reforms had significant effects on long-term 
growth, they measure the effects of some long-term characteristics 
rather than reforms. Particularly, the results of the evidence that they 
present indicate strong long-term effects of hum an capital accumula­
tion and infrastructure on economic growth. They also show som e­
what weaker effects of effective trade openness and financial depth, but 
do not estimate those of trade and domestic financial reforms.
Indeed, there is a significant confusion in the debate derived from 
the tendency to m ix structural reforms aimed at reducing the public 
sector's role in the economy and liberalizing markets with macroeco­
nomic stabilization policies, as well as the tendency to confuse structural 
characteristics with structural reforms aimed at liberalization. Some 
aggressive reformers introduced liberalization together with major sta­
bilization packages (e.g., Chile in the mid-1970s, Bolivia in the mid- 
1980s, and Argentina and Peru in the early 1990s), but this pattern was
3 See also the sensitivity analysis o f  Correa (2002).
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far from universal. The difference is substantial, as macroeconomic bal­
ances can be achieved with large differences in the degree of economic 
liberalization and, conversely, liberalized economies can m aintain 
significant macroeconomic imbalances, as we saw above. Furthermore, 
there is evidence that, whereas macroeconomic balances are essential 
for growth, links between structural reforms and growth are at best 
weak (see, in this regard, Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001). The latter state­
ment is not inconsistent with recognizing the fact that some structural 
characteristics may affect economic growth -  e.g., the accumulation of 
human capital, improved infrastructure, openness and financial depth 
-  but all of them may be achieved with quite different degrees of 
public-sector involvement.
2. Integration into the world economy and restructuring of 
the production sectors
Weak growth performance cannot be attributed to the lack of success 
of economic liberalization in achieving one of their most direct objec­
tives: increased integration into the world economy. Indeed, from 
1990 to 2000, the region posted the fastest growth of export volumes 
in its history (close to 9% per year), much higher than the rate 
achieved by world trade as a whole; the 2001-02 world slowdown obvi­
ously interrupted this process. The strong growth of Mexican exports 
explains much of this strength over the 1990s, but the poor Brazilian 
export record in that period also brought the Latin American average 
down. Most other countries experienced healthy real export growth 
over the 1990s, close to 8% a year on average. Although variable in 
terms of the strategies followed by m ultinationals in different coun­
tries, FDI also boom ed through the 1990s, as figure II. 1 indicates.
According to recent ECLAC analysis, integration into the world 
economy followed two basic patterns of specialization, which approxi­
mately obey a regional "North-South" divide (ECLAC, 2002a; 
Mortimore and Peres, 2001). The "Northern” pattern is characterized 
by m anufacturing exports with a high content of imported inputs (in 
its extreme form, maquila exports), mainly geared towards the United 
States market, and attracts FDI associated with the development of 
internationally integrated production systems. This pattern goes hand 
in hand with traditional agricultural exports and agricultural export 
diversification in Central America, as well as the growth of tourism in 
Mexico and the Caribbean. The "Southern" pattern is characterized by 
the combination of extra-regional exports of commodities and natural-
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resource-intensive manufactures (many of which are also capital-inten­
sive) and diversified intra-regional trade, and mainly attracts FDI asso­
ciated with the search for natural resources or access to domestic 
markets (in services, as well as large domestic and subregional markets). 
In the case of Brazil, this is m ixed with som e technology-intensive 
manufactures and services, and in Brazil and a number of other coun­
tries, with labor-intensive m anufacturing exports. This implies that 
Mexico and some Central American and Caribbean countries have 
been participating to a greater extent in the more dynam ic world 
markets for manufactures, whereas South America has focused on the 
less dynamic commodity markets. Nonetheless, a more detailed break­
down indicates that m ost Latin American countries specialize in goods 
that are not playing a dynamic role in world trade -  i.e., even manufac­
turing exporters concentrate in non-dynamic segments of world trade 
(ECLAC, 2002a and 2002c). There is also a third pattern of specializa­
tion, which is found in Panama and some small economies in the 
Caribbean Basin, in which service exports (financial, tourism and 
transport services) predominate.
The contrast between the dynamic internationalization of the Latin 
American economies and the weak GDP performance is not inconsis­
tent with a strong cross-sectional correlation between export and GDP 
growth in Latin America, as figure II.4.A indicates. So, higher export 
growth has led to faster GDP growth in individual countries, but the 
export-growth link has weakened for all of them. This evidence may be 
interpreted as a sign of the weakening of the links between interna­
tional trade, FDI and domestic production (and, thus, GDP) and, as a 
consequence, it is contrary to the evidence much discussed in the liter­
ature of the 1970s and 1980s on the positive externalities of deeper 
integration into international markets. Indeed, it points out to a reduc­
tion in the domestic production and technological linkages of export 
sectors, which increasingly outsource in international markets, 
together with the simultaneous destruction of the production linkages 
generated by previous import-substitution sectors unable to reconvert 
into export activities, or able to do so only through increased imports 
of intermediate goods and services. Outsourcing by m ultinational 
firms, even in non-tradable sectors (e.g., services), has further con­
tributed to the weakening of their domestic linkages.
Thus, in a significant sense, m any internationalized sectors have an 
increasing "enclave" component: they participate actively in interna­
tional transactions but much less in the generation of dom estic value 
added. Indeed, in this sense, the natural-resource-intensive sectors of
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the "Southern" pattern of specialization may provide more opportuni­
ties for the formation of domestic production and technological link­
ages than the assembly activities characteristic of the "Northern" 
pattern (see ECLAC, 2003b, ch. Ill; World Bank, 2002).
A particular way in which these transform ations have affected 
macroeconomic aggregates has been the deterioration in the 
growth/trade deficit trade-off.4 The trade deficit tended to widen in
1991-97, reaching levels comparable to those of the 1970s, but at
4 See a similar analysis in UNCTAD (1999), w hich  shows that this deterioration 
has occurred throughout the developing world, except in China and som e other 
Asian econom ies.
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Figure II. 5 Trade balance/growth trade-off 
Source: ECLAC.
growth rates that were two percentage points below those registered in 
that decade (see figure II.5). This was the joint effect of structural 
changes in production activities brought about by economic liberaliza­
tion -  including weaker domestic linkages of internationalized sectors -  
and the short-term macroeconomic policy bias towards real currency 
appreciation generated by boom ing capital inflows. Heavy dependence 
on volatile external financing was, in this regard, an effect but also a 
cause of this deterioration. Interestingly, this worsening of the 
growth/trade deficit trade-off is even worse if the point of reference is 
the 1950s and 1960s, when rapid growth was consistent with small 
trade surpluses. This process worsened further during the 1998-2003 
slowdown, when the trade deficit remained stubbornly high despite 
very slow economic growth.
A paradoxical effect of policies aimed at deeper integration into the 
world economy was the relative dynamism of tradable vs. non-tradable 
sectors in m any countries (ECLAC, 2003a, chs. 4 and 5; Stallings and 
Peres, 2000; Katz, 2001). Non-tradables, such as transport, communica­
tions, energy and financial services, as well as construction, were 
indeed dynamic, particularly during the expansionary phases of the 
regional business cycle. Among tradable sectors, manufacturing gener­
ally suffered the m ost in comparison with its own historical record 
prior to the debt crisis. This was especially true in the more traditional, 
labor-intensive industries (apparel, footwear and leather manufactures,
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furniture, etc.), with the exception of those industries associated with 
in-bond assembly (maquila) activities. The m anufacturing sectors that 
performed better include maquila activities, the autom obile industry 
(which is favored, in Mexico, by access to the United States market 
and, in South America, by special protection mechanisms provided by 
current integration arrangements), some natural-resource-processing 
industries, and certain activities geared towards the dom estic market 
during periods o f boom ing demand (such as construction materials, 
beverages and food processing).
The m ix between the growth of tradable and non-tradable sectors 
was diverse across the region through the 1990s and did not follow the 
Northern-Southern divide that characterized trade specialization pat­
terns. The association between specialization patterns and the relative 
dynam ism  of m anufacturing was, on the other hand, quite strong 
(ECLAC, 2003a). Economies specializing in m anufacturing exports 
were characterized by the rapid relative growth of m anufacturing pro­
duction, while the opposite was the typical pattern in economies that 
specialized in natural-resource-intensive exports. Employment trends -  
and, particularly, employment in manufacturing -  were also more pos­
itive under the Northern pattern (ECLAC, 2002a, ch. 10; Stallings and 
Weller, 2001).
It must be emphasized that, contrary to the literature on the "natural 
resource curse" and to the significant evidence of long-term and 
medium-term deterioration of the terms of trade of primary comm odi­
ties over the past two decades (Ocampo and Parra, 2003), neither 
export nor overall GDP growth has been associated with particular spe­
cialization patterns (figure II.4.B). Chile is the outstanding example of 
a country specializing in natural-resource-intensive exports that has 
experienced rapid export and GDP growth in the 1990s. Ecuador and 
Venezuela are opposite cases. Mexico has extracted relatively slow GDP 
growth out of its outstanding export growth and diversification. In this 
regard, Costa Rica and El Salvador, and particularly the Dominican 
Republic, have done better. As was indicated, the high import content 
of manufacturing exports and the tendency to specialize in the techno­
logically simpler tasks within internationally integrated production 
systems may, indeed, result in natural-resource-intensive exports gen­
erating more domestic value added and linkages than m anufacturing 
exports.
Slow GDP growth was associated with poor productivity perfor­
mance, but the causal links involved must be carefully drawn. 
Particularly, the neo-classical link used in most of the literature, which
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assumes that GDP is determined by productivity growth, cannot be 
assumed to be the appropriate one. Even in some of the manufacturing 
sectors where productivity rose, the gap with the industrialized 
economies actually widened in the 1990s. Indeed, in m any countries 
and m anufacturing activities, the productivity gap in relation to the 
United States narrowed more quickly during the 1970s and 1980s than 
during the 1990s, reflecting in part the slower pace of technological 
change in United States manufacturing during those previous decades. 
At the subsectoral level, the closing of the technology gap had more to 
do with the pace of economic growth in a particular sector and 
country than with patterns of technological catch-up induced by the 
reform process (Katz, 2001).
In general, productivity trends reflect a large discrepancy between 
the positive evolution of this variable in a group of successful firms and 
sectors and a poor performance at the aggregate level. Growth in total 
factor productivity (TFP) slowed down relative to its pre-debt crisis pace 
(see table II.2, and Hofman, 2001). Furthermore, an analysis of the 
joint effects of productivity and trade elasticities indicates that 
the reduction in the technological gap vis-à-vis the world frontier was 
not enough to compensate the extraordinary increase in the (gross) 
income elasticity of the demand for imports, with the consequent dete­
rioration of the trade multiplier (the ratio of the technological gap to 
the elasticity for imports), thus generating overall adverse effects on 
growth (Cimoli and Correa, 2005). The slowdown was sharper for labor 
productivity, as the estimates of productivity of the labor force in table
11.1 indicate. Rising unem ployment and, particularly, underem ploy­
ment, largely due to poor overall economic growth, drove aggregate 
labor productivity. More broadly, overall productivity performance 
reflects the fact that labor, capital, technological capacity and, som e­
times, land that were displaced from sectors and firms undergoing 
restructuring were not adequately reallocated to dynamic sectors.
These patterns of productivity performance bring to light one of the 
m ain features of the restructuring of the production processes that 
characterized the region during the reform period: the increased diver­
sity of production sectors and agents within each economy -  i.e. 
increasing dualism (or "structural heterogeneity”, using traditional 
ECLAC terminology). This indicates that the expectations that rising 
productivity in internationalized sectors would spread throughout the 
economy, thereby leading to rapid overall economic growth, turned 
out to be quite optimistic. Productivity did increase in dynamic firms 
and sectors, and external competition, FDI and privatization played an
Table II.2 Total factor productivity, 1950-2002 (annual rates of change)
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1950-1980 1980-1990 1990-1997 1997-2002 1990-2002
Argentina
TFP 1.2 -2 .2 4.6 -4 .5 0.7
DATFP 0.6 -2 .9 3.9 -5 .2 0.0
Bolivia
TFP 1.6 -1 .9 1.3 -0 .2 0.7
DATFP 0.5 -2 .9 0.2 -1 .5 -0 .5
Brazil
TFP 2.6 -1 .5 0.0 -0 .3 -0 .1
DATFP 1.4 -2 .2 -0 .8 -1 .4 -1 .0
Colom bia
TFP 2.4 0.6 1.6 -1 .2 0.4
DATFP 1.4 -0 .8 0.6 -1 .7 -0 .4
Costa Rica
TFP 2.3 -1 .1 1.2 1.0 1.1
DATFP 1.3 -2 .0 0.1 -0 .2 0.0
Chile
TFP 1.6 0.5 4.6 -0 .5 2.4
DATFP 0.9 -0 .6 3.8 -1 .1 1.7
Ecuador
TFP 3.0 -1 .6 0.8 -1 .8 -0 .3
DATFP 1.9 -2 .6 0.0 -2 .5 -1 .0
M exico
TFP 1.9 -1 .4 -0 .2 -0 .5 -0 .3
DATFP 0.5 -1 .9 -0 .7 -1 .7 -1 .1
Peru
TFP 1.8 -3 .7 2.9 -1 .0 1.2
DATFP 0.9 -4 .7 2.5 -1 .4 0.9
Venezuela
TFP 1.9 -1 .4 2.2 -2 .2 0.3
DATFP 0.5 -2 .7 1.4 -2 .7 -0 .3
Latin America 
Simple average
TFP 2.0 -1 .4 1.9 -1 .1 0.6
DATFP 1.0 -2 .3 1.1 -1 .9 -0 .2
W eighted average (2001 
TFP 2.1
GDP at 1995 prices) 
-1 .4  1.1 -1 .1 0.2
DATFP 1.0 -2 .2 0.4 -2 .0 -0 .6
Source: Hofman (2001) and data provided by this author. 
DATFP: Doubly augmented total factor productivity.
im portant role in that process. However, contrary to the expectations 
of reformers, positive productivity shocks did not spread out, but rather 
led to greater dispersion in relative productivity levels within these 
economies.
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3. A structuralist (and, particularly, Schumpeterian- 
Hirschminate) interpretation of restructuring of the 
production sectors underway
As the evidence presented above indicates, understanding why growth 
has been so frustrating in Latin America in the post-reform period 
requires a look at both macroeconomic and structural dynamics. In 
this section, we will concentrate on the latter, drawing upon historical 
variants of structuralism in economic thinking, broadly defined. This 
view emphasizes the close connections am ong structural dynamics, 
investm ent and economic growth. According to this view, economic 
growth is not a linear process, in which "representative firms'' grow or 
new representative firms respond to the "investm ent clim ate" gener­
ated by macroeconomic conditions and structural reforms. It is a more 
dynam ic process in which some sectors and firms grow and move 
ahead while others fall behind, thereby completely transform ing eco­
nom ic structures. This process involves a repetitive phenom enon of 
"creative destruction", to use Schumpeter’s metaphor (1962, ch. VIII). 
Not all sectors have the same ability to inject dynam ism  into the 
economy, to "propagate technical progress", according to the concept 
advanced by Prebisch (1951). The complementarities (externalities) 
between enterprises and production sectors, along with their macro- 
economic and distributive effects, can produce sudden jum ps in the 
growth process or can block it (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Taylor, 1991; 
Ros, 2000) and, in so doing, generate successive phases of disequilibria, 
according to Hirschman's (1958) classic view. Under- or unutilized 
resources are essential to guarantee this dynamics and, thus, economies 
are not assumed to operate under full employment of resources. Since 
technical know-how and knowledge in general are not available in 
fully specified blueprints, the growth path of firms entails an intensive 
process of adaptation and learning, closely linked to production experi­
ence, that largely determines the accumulation of technical, comm er­
cial and organizational know-how, following an evolutionary path.
The central theme of this literature is that the dynamics o f the pro­
duction structures is the basic determinant of changes in the m om en­
tum of economic growth. This dynamics obviously interacts with a 
stable macroeconomic environment, broadly defined (see section 1), 
generating positive feedbacks that result in "virtuous" circles of rapid 
economic growth, but may also lead to the opposite outcome, if either 
dynamic restructuring or macroeconomic stability are absent. A facili­
tating institutional environment, and an adequate supply of hum an
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capital, long-term capital, and infrastructure, also play an essential role 
in this process, but only as "framework conditions" rather than that of 
active determinants of the growth momentum (Ocampo, 2005).
The ability to constantly generate new dynamic activities is, in this 
view, the essence of successful development. In this sense, in the 
context provided by a facilitating m acroeconomic and institutional 
environment, growth is essentially a mesoeconomic process, as its essen­
tial determinant, structural dynamics, is a m esoeconom ic phenom e­
non that summarizes the joint evolution of the sectoral composition of 
production, intra- and inter-sectoral linkages, market structures, the 
functioning of factor markets and the institutions that support all of 
them. Dynamic microeconom ic changes are the necessary building 
blocks, but it is the system-wide processes that matter.
In this regard, the dynam ics of production structures may be visu­
alized as the interaction between two basic forces, namely (i) innova­
tions (the Schum peterial link), broadly understood as new activities 
and new ways o f doing previous activities, and the learning and diffu­
sion processes that characterize both the full m aterialization of their 
potentialities and their spread through the economic system; and (ii) 
the complementarities, linkages or networks (the Hirschm inite link) 
am ong firms and production activities, and the institutions required 
for their consolidation, whose m aturation is also subject to learning. 
As noticed, the elastic supply of factors of production is an essential 
condition for these dynamic processes to unfold their full effects (see 
Ros, 2000). International factor m obility can also contribute to this 
result.
These different mechanism s provide complem entary functions: 
innovations are the basic engine of change; their diffusion and the cre­
ation of production linkages are the mechanisms by which they gener­
ate system-wide effects; learning and diffusion of innovations and the 
development of complementarities generate dynam ic economies of 
scale, which is an essential ingredient o f rising productivity; and 
the last factor determines the elasticity required of the system for the 
former to operate as the driving force of economic growth.
Innovation includes the "creation" of enterprises, production activi­
ties and sectors, but also the "destruction" of others. The particular mix 
between "creation" and "destruction" is critical. The term coined by 
Schumpeter (1962), "creative destruction", indicates that there tends to 
be net creation. This is, of course, essential for growth, but is not neces­
sarily the expected result in any specific location at a certain point in 
time. There may be cases in which there is in fact little destruction, or
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its opposite, large-scale destruction of previous economic activities, or 
a mixed negative case, "destructive creation".
A com m on feature of m ost forms of innovation is that they involve 
the creation of knowledge or, more explicitly, of the capacity to apply 
it to production. They thus stress the role of knowledge as a source of 
market power. Following this approach, success in economic develop­
ment can be seen as the ability to create enterprises that are capable of 
learning and appropriating knowledge and, in the long run, of generat­
ing new knowledge (Amsden, 2001).
In industrial countries, the m ajor incentive to innovate is provided 
by the extraordinary profits that can be earned by the pioneering firms 
that introduce technical, commercial, or organizational changes, or 
which open new markets or find new sources of raw materials. This 
incentive is necessary to offset the uncertainties and risks involved in 
the innovators' decisions, as well as the higher costs in which they 
incur, due to the costs of developing the new know-how, the incom ­
plete nature of the knowledge they initially have and the absence of 
the complementarities that are characteristic of well-developed activi­
ties. In developing countries, innovations are primary associated to the 
spread of new products, technologies, organizational or commercial 
strategies previously created in the industrial centers. These represent 
the "moving targets" which generate the windows of opportunity open 
to developing countries (Pérez, 2001). The extraordinary profits of 
innovators are generally absent and, indeed, production usually 
involves entry into mature activities with thinner or, indeed, thin 
profit margins. Thus, entry costs are not associated to the development 
of new know-how, but to the process of acquiring, mastering and 
adapting it, as well as those associated to generating information about 
and creating a reputation in new markets and, particularly, exploiting 
opportunities to reduce costs to successfully break into established 
marketing channels. Entry costs may turn out to be prohibitive for new 
firms; in this case, possibilities open to developing countries will be 
limited to attracting m ultinationals willing to shift the location of 
production.
All these processes require investment and learning. Innovations are, 
indeed, intrinsically tied to investment, as they require physical invest­
ments, as well as investments in intangibles, particularly in technolog­
ical learning and the design of marketing strategies. Moreover, to the 
extent that innovative activities are the fastest growing of any 
economy, they have high investment requirements. These facts, 
together with the falling investm ent needs that characterize estab­
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lished activities, imply that overall capital formation is directly depen­
dent on the relative weight of innovative activities and on their capital 
intensity. High investment is thus associated to a high rate of innova­
tion and structural change.
On the other hand, innovations involve learning. Technical know­
how must indeed go through a learning and m aturing process that is 
closely linked to the production experience. More generally, to reduce 
the technology gaps that characterize the international economic hier­
archy -  to "leapfrog" in a precise sense of the term -  an encompassing 
research and development strategy, and an accompanying educational 
strategy, would be necessary. The essential insights on learning dynam­
ics have been provided by the "evolutionary" theories of technical 
change.5 These theories emphasize the fact that technology is to a large 
extent tacit in nature -  i.e., that "blueprints” cannot be completely 
spelled out. This implies that technology is incompletely available and 
imperfectly tradable, and that proficiency in its use cannot be detached 
from production experience -  and thus has a strong "learning by 
doing" component.
Given existing dualism -  producers who are at very different stages 
in the organization of production and technology, and who have 
varying degrees of access to information and to factor markets -  devel­
oping countries will always have a considerable mass of underemploy­
ment or informality. There may also be significant endogenous 
elements in investment and domestic savings. Moreover, while devel­
oping countries lag behind in the areas of production, technology, and 
institutional development, there is always the possibility of proactively 
speeding up the learning of technology and the development of insti­
tutions. In such circumstances, the predom inance of creative over 
destructive forces generates virtuous circles of rapid growth; this is 
reflected in the absorption of an increasing number of workers in 
dynamic activities, the existence of significant investment opportuni­
ties, induced creation of savings, and accelerated learning of techno­
logy and institutional development. At the same time, the predominance 
of destructive forces has the opposite effect, giving rise to a vicious 
circle that leads to increased structural heterogeneity as surplus m an­
power is absorbed in less productive activities; the reduction of invest­
ment incentives; the destruction of saving capacity, and the loss of
s See, in particular, Nelson and W inter (1982); Nelson (1996); Dosi, et al. (1988); 
w ith respect to  develop ing countries, see Katz (1987); Lall (1990); Katz and 
Kosacoff (2000).
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production experience, all of which further accentuates the lag in tech­
nology and the weakening of institutions.
At the aggregate level, these processes give rise to changes in produc­
tivity -  labor or total factor productivity -  depending on whether 
dualism increases or decreases and on the performance of this variable 
at the microeconomic level. The fact that some economic agents are 
approaching the technological frontier thanks to the incentives gener­
ated by a competitive environment or to their own learning effort does 
not necessarily mean that aggregate productivity will show the same 
degree of progress. The process itself may cause productive resources to 
be under- or unemployed (thus increasing dualism), and this has a neg­
ative effect on aggregate productivity.
Over the last few decades, positive and negative external forces have 
generated the creation as well as the destruction of production activi­
ties. The technology revolution associated with information science 
and communications, the resulting disintegration of production chains 
in the industrialized countries that has caused assembly activities to be 
exported to developing countries, and the growing demand for services 
in international tourism are among the positive factors. The weakness 
of many raw materials markets and the accompanying deterioration of 
world real comm odity prices is one of the negative factors. However, 
the changes associated with the structural reform process have played 
an equally or even more decisive role.
The impact of these processes has been varied. On the positive side, 
they have led to a number of "innovations" as companies strive to 
become more competitive; equipm ent and inputs have become 
cheaper as a result of tariff reductions; companies have an incentive to 
enter external markets; sources of raw materials have opened up; and 
new market structures have been established in privatized sectors, 
often bringing windfall profits because of the low prices at which these 
assets were sold (i.e., with considerable im plicit subsidies to buyers) 
and the inadequacy of regulatory mechanisms. At the same time, many 
destructive forces have hit the economies. Some branches disappeared 
as they could not compete with imports, producers of internationally 
tradable goods and services suffered as internal funds (undistributed 
profits) became scarce owing to the reduction of protection and real 
exchange rate appreciation, and technological capabilities that had 
been built up during the previous stage were lost as laboratories (of pri­
vatized public enterprises) and technology development centres were 
dismantled. These situations were reinforced by the macroeconomic 
instability that has prevailed over the last two decades.
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The formation of internationally integrated production systems gave 
rise to significant changes in complementarities, as so-called "value 
chains" disintegrated, and production processes that had previously 
been carried out in one location are now carried out in many different 
places. As inform ation and comm unications systems have improved, 
some factors, such as location near suppliers of inputs, became less 
important, but others, especially access to financial, infrastructure and 
other services, became more important. In any case, the fact that the 
trend towards specialization has increased rather than decreased is an 
indication of the fact that complementarities and the related phenom ­
ena of spatial agglomeration of certain activities still play an important 
role.
The weakening of many public and private institutions, which had 
been established to support the development of production sectors 
during the previous stage, further contributed to this process. With the 
rejection of public intervention in production, very little effort was 
made to establish new institutions to replace them. Nevertheless, net­
works were created to prom ote exports and establish free trade zones, 
tourism was actively promoted, regulatory mechanism s in the m ining 
sector were improved, and some governments encouraged the develop­
ment of production clusters, especially at the local level. These devel­
opments serve as foundations upon which countries can build new 
strategies for the future.
As the evidence presented in section 2 indicates, the tendency to 
underestimate the role of policies aimed at supporting production was 
not "neutral" from the standpoint of the development of production 
sectors, economic growth, and their social linkages. This view is also 
reflected in the abundant literature claiming that there is no strict rela­
tionship between "incentive neutrality" and the rates of technological 
change and economic growth.6 Thus, it is essential that production 
development strategies and policies be resumed in order to ensure 
progress towards a dynamic economy. As regards structural change, the 
fundamental objective is to facilitate and instill m om entum  into pro­
duction activities by encouraging innovation, developing the comple­
mentarities needed for them to mature, including institutional 
support; as a counterpart, activities that tend to be displaced need to be 
restructured in an orderly fashion, so as to facilitate the transfer of 
resources to new sectors.
6 See, for exam ple, the studies m entioned  in Helleiner (1992); Roberts and 
Tybout (1996); Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001).
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The macroeconomic environment also played a key role in determin­
ing the relative importance of creative and destructive processes in the 
production sector. The elim ination of hyperinflation was certainly a 
positive factor, as was the improvement of fiscal balances. However, 
other aspects of macroeconomic management tended to accentuate the 
destructive effects and weaken some of the creative ones. The strong 
procyclical behavior of aggregate demand, of external capital flows and 
of key macroeconomic prices -  such as real exchange rates and interest 
rates -  generated tensions that jeopardized the survival of many firms, 
especially small and medium-sized ones. Producers of tradable goods 
and services were particularly threatened, as they lost the protection 
they previously enjoyed (ECLAC, 1998). The sudden elim ination of 
subsidies, as a result of fiscal and credit reform, and the drastic trade 
reforms that were implemented also caused some activities to be closed 
down. If, conversely, changes had been carried out more gradually, 
they would have had a better chance o f reconverting. Instead, there 
was overdestruction. The weakness of the long-term segments of the 
capital market and the exchange rate appreciations that occurred 
in many countries between 1991 and 1994 and during the 1996-97 
biennium, also weakened the positive trends and contributed to 
overdestruction.
Throughout the last century, the rapid growth experienced by the 
developing world occurred in a context of strategies o f structural change, 
which, along with macroeconomic and financial environments that were 
conducive to development, led to dynam ic capital accumulation 
processes (Rodrik, 1999).7 This is clearly illustrated by the rapid rise of 
the Asian economies. The vigorous growth that took place in Latin 
America during the period of State-led industrialization was also the 
product of a strategy of structural change that was based, in some 
cases, on the deepening of im port substitution and, in m ost cases, on 
"m ixed" models com bining import substitution with export prom o­
tion (Cárdenas, Ocampo and Thorp, 2000, ch. 1). Unlike the Asian 
countries, in the Latin American and Caribbean region, there was not 
always an adequate degree of macroeconomic stability, particularly 
after the avalanche of external resources that came in during the 
1970s.
During the current development stage, therefore, structural change 
strategies must be im plem ented that will serve as a framework for
7 This author refers to  what we call here strategies o f  structural change as 
"investm ent strategies".
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dynamic growth in the production sector. Once strategies and policies 
are adopted, they should, of course, be consistent with the new exter­
nal and domestic scenario. In this regard, five basic considerations are 
in order. First, the main emphasis should be on integrating the region's 
economies into the world economy. This means developing regional 
and subregional production chains and clusters within the framework 
of integration processes, and generating activities complementary to 
export activities, with a view to enhancing the value-added of 
exportable goods and services, and their capacity to create momentum 
for other production activities. Second, there must be a proper balance 
between individual initiative, which is decisive for getting a dynamic 
process of innovation started, and the establishm ent of coordination 
systems and public incentives. Incentives should, of course, be in line 
with international rules, especially those of the World Trade 
Organization. Nevertheless, although priority should be given to taking 
advantage of the maneuvering room provided under existing agree­
ments, more opportunities should be available to the authorities of 
developing countries, which were too narrowly restricted after the 
Uruguay Round. In particular, they should be allowed to apply selec­
tive policies and performance criteria to encourage innovation and 
create the complementarities that are essential to development. Third, 
all incentives should be granted on the basis of performance. Fourth, 
public policy should not necessarily be equated with government 
policy. On the contrary, a broad m ix of public and private institutions 
should be considered, with each country developing the combination 
that best suits its own particular needs. Finally, these policies should be 
applied in a m acroeconomic context that is conducive to the restruc­
turing of existing capacity and that encourages productive investment.
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Macroeconomic Stability and 
Investment Allocation of Domestic 
Pension Funds in Emerging 
Economies: The Case of Chile
Roberto Zahler*
Introduction
Growth has been frustratingly slow in Latin America, notwithstanding 
a decade and a half of rather intense reforms (Ocampo, 2005). In this 
period, growth of the region has diverged from that of the major 
economy of the world and has moved slower than the world average 
(Ffrench-Davis, 2005). The macroeconomic environment has been one 
crucial variable underlying both a low capital formation and great 
instability of economic activity.
Significant reforms have been made in financial markets and the 
financing of pensions. Most of the analysis of pension funds take as 
given the macroeconomic environment in which they are inserted, 
and focuses on the microeconomic conditions under which their 
return is maximized and/or their risk minimized. This chapter studies 
macroeconomic im plications of the behavior of dom estic pension 
funds as a m ajor institutional investor, in emerging economies (EEs). 
The paper distinguishes between the long-run savings/investm ent 
implications, and the short-run macroeconomic impact on the foreign 
exchange and/or domestic financial markets.
Section 1 summarizes the main issues associated with the macroeco­
nom ic im plications of capital flows in EEs. This background is im por­
tant since institutional investors, given their size and/or regulation,
* The author is grateful to  Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Esteban Jadresic, Felipe 
Jiménez, Andrés Reinstein, Salvador Valdés and participants in tw o Seminars 
organized by  ECLAC in 2002 and 2003, for their com m ents and suggestions, 
and to Hermann González for his research and statistical support.
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when allowed under certain conditions to invest abroad, could play a 
relevant role in the interrelationship between local and international 
financial and exchange rate markets. And that interrelationship may 
cause significant short-run macroeconomic effects.
Section 2 analyses the long-run macroeconomic im pact of institu­
tional investors in EE. Because of the substantial amount of funds that 
they manage, they play an im portant role in the savings/investm ent 
process and their behavior m ay have significant consequences for the 
economic growth of EEs. Section 3 describes and explains the main 
developments of the Chilean pension fund system (AFP).
Sections 4 and 5, which deal with the potential short-run macroeco­
nomic effects of institutional investors, exemplifying with the Chilean 
experience, constitute the "core" of the paper. Section 4 analyses the 
eventual impact on the local-term structure of interest rates. Section 5 
deals with the effect on the foreign exchange market. Section 6 con­
cludes and proposes macroeconomic policy measures for the regulation 
of institutional investors in EEs.
1. Capital mobility and macroeconomic stability in EEs
The globalization of capital markets has been pushing EEs to dismantle 
balance of payments capital controls and integrate more fully their 
financial systems to those of the rest of the world.
Long-run benefits usually associated with open capital accounts 
relate mainly to the stabilization of income and consum ption paths, 
diversification of risk and complem entation of external and local 
savings.1 In the short term and during the transition, however, a com ­
pletely open capital account can have negative consequences, espe­
cially for small EEs.
In the first place, during the transition process from a closed capital 
account to an open one there could be a significant capital inflow gen­
erated both by higher local interest rates and by the "stock" adjust­
ment of international direct investment and portfolios seeking 
diversification. These capital inflows tend to generate an overshooting 
(appreciation) of the domestic currency, increase the value of local 
assets and create excessive and unsustainable current account deficits 
in their balance of payments. Depending on the length of time during 
which the inflows and (key relative and asset) price adjustm ents take 
place, there could be a substantial disruption in the allocation of
1 This latter benefit requires a stable supply o f  international finance.
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resources in the domestic economy and thus generate the seed of what 
in many occasions has ended up in a foreign exchange and/or financial 
crisis (Zahler, 2003a and 2003b).
The impact of the capital inflows depends importantly on the capacity 
of the economy to absorb domestically and/or reinvest abroad, 
efficiently, the resources coming from the rest of the world. For small 
economies, with quite illiquid capital markets and relatively weak 
banking systems (in many cases due to inappropriate banking supervi­
sion and regulation), the absorption and/or rechanneling of excessive 
inflows is a difficult process, which in many occasions has ended up in 
significant macroeconomic imbalances. That is one of the reasons why 
restrictions on short-term financial inflows are justified. The experience 
and practice of some "well behaved" EEs suggest that when "excessive" 
short-term voluntary foreign financial flows take place, countries should 
apply measures to prevent those inflows from undermining their macro- 
economic objectives as well as the health of their financial system.2
A second effect of an open capital account, depending on the EEs 
exchange rate policy, is a loosening of its autonomy on the design and 
implementation of monetary policy.
A third effect usually associated to open capital accounts is the exces­
sive volatility of exchange rates and interest rates caused by the very 
"sensitive" international markets, which tend to react in a procyclical, 
quick and massive manner to short-term news.
Finally, open capital accounts in EEs tend to am plify the effects of 
two international market imperfections: "currency runs" and "moral 
hazard” . Currency runs tend to be caused by the contagion of the 
balance of paym ents problems in one country to another country. 
Moral hazard is caused by the explicit or implicit official guarantees in 
banking debt, external debt or the exchange rate.
In short, one o f the main problems usually faced by EEs that are in transi­
tion o f becoming fully integrated to international markets, is the massive 
flow o f capital into and out o f  the country that they have to confront in 
relatively short periods of time. Experience shows that those capital 
movements tend to cause serious disruptions on the local financial 
system, the foreign exchange market and the economy as a whole. The 
effects caused by the size and volatility of capital flows depend im por­
tantly on the depth and size of the EEs markets being affected: the 
smaller and less liquid the markets, the greater tend to be the disrup­
tive effects of short-term capital movements.
2 A detailed analysis o f  those measures can be found in  Zahler (2000).
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Given the degree of globalization, it is quite difficult, and in many 
cases undesirable, to isolate EEs from international markets. In recent 
years m any countries have adopted or are adopting more flexible 
exchange rate systems to allow them more maneuverability for their 
national monetary policy and to increase the exchange rate risk. That 
measure though, is usually not enough to prevent the economy from 
the effects of shocks caused by short-term capital flows and in occa­
sions generates a procyclical behavior of the real exchange rate. 
Therefore, together with the above m entioned restrictions on short­
term financial inflows, EEs should develop, deepen and make more 
liquid their capital and currency markets so as to absorb those shocks 
in a less disruptive way.
2. Long-term macroeconomic implications of institutional 
investors
As is well known, in recent years EEs have engaged in deeper financial 
liberalization and reform, including both the domestic financial sector 
as well as financial opening up to the international economy. An 
important part of this development has been the pension fund reform: 
through the transfer of all or part of the state-operated pay-as-you-go 
system to the private sector in a fully funded “individual capitalization 
system ", several EEs have initiated and/or deepened the development 
of markets for long-term financial instruments.
Pension funds, and also more gradually insurance companies, may 
have long-run macroeconomic effects in EEs through two main differ­
ent m echanisms: by channeling im portant am ounts of long-term 
savings to investm ent3 and by creating and developing markets for 
long-term bonds and stocks.
a) Institutional investors and capital markets
International experience indicates that institutional investors, such as 
pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds, are the main
3 However, the direct contribution from  the pension fund system to capital accu­
m ulation is usually overstated since part o f  the financial interm ediation o f their 
funds ends up in consum ption  rather than investm ent. A lthough there is n o  
clear evidence that social security reforms have increased dom estic savings rates, 
they are an im portant factor in explaining the shift in the com p osition  o f  
saving in  EEs towards the lon g  term (M ihaljek et al., 2002). For an analysis o f 
the Chilean case, see U thoff (2001).
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demanders o f bonds. In the United States, country with the m ost 
developed corporate bond market, families hold only 12% of total cor­
porate bonds and 7% of corporate bonds of non-financial companies. 
In Japan families also hold 12% of corporate bonds, and only 1.5% of 
corporate bonds of non-financial firms (Reinstein, 2002). This is due to 
the fact that families and companies prefer to invest through the inter­
mediation o f institutional investors, which specialize in collecting 
information and carrying out financial analysis.
Some institutional investors, such as pension funds, due to the 
nature of their liabilities, are natural candidates to demand long-term 
corporate bonds. As pensions will be paid in the long-term, it is to the 
workers advantage to have their funds invested in long-term instru­
ments and earn the corresponding risk premium. In terms of curren­
cies, from a pure consumer perspective (not from a producer 
perspective), pension funds should seek a currency exposure compara­
ble to the traded goods proportion of the basket consumed by a typical 
pensioner. In principle, in small EEs pension funds should hold a 
higher share of foreign assets than in large, more self-sufficient coun­
tries (Reisen, 1997, pp. 11-12; Reisen and W illiamson, 1996, p. 236). 
However, in EEs long-term insurance for exchange rate differentials are 
weakly developed and, in those "well behaved", the long-run equilib­
rium trend of the real exchange rate is that of appreciation. Therefore, 
if pension funds make "excessive" investments in foreign currency, the 
pensioners may end up carrying the foreign exchange risk.
In the case of (mainly life) insurance companies, the insured have a 
long-term horizon and company commitments are mainly in local cur­
rency, so they should prefer to make long-term investments in local 
currency. Mutual funds usually invest on shorter terms.
Thus, institutional investors generate a demand for long-term corpo­
rate bonds and provide liquidity to that market, which further 
increases the dem and for corporate bonds.4 The lack of liquidity, 
typical of m any EEs, is not only a problem because companies must
4 The liquidity is measured by  the bid-ask spread o f  financial assets: if it is high, 
the liquidity o f  the markets will be low  since investors take a significant loss 
every tim e they change position . That is to say, if an investor buys and soon  
wishes to  sell the instrument, his loss will be proportional to  the bid-ask spread 
o f  that financial asset. Harrison (2002) proposes a m odel where the lack o f  liq ­
uidity o f  an asset consists in a problem  o f  in form ation  about the fair market 
price, w hich gives rise to a "lem ons problem ", in the sense o f  Akerloff (1970). In 
this case, the lem ons problem  is mitigated by  "in form ed" traders, because they 
com pete w ith the others for transactions. Thus, the greater the num ber o f  
inform ed institutional agents, the greater tends to be the liquidity o f  the market.
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pay a higher cost for funds, but it also results in discouraging under­
writers to subscribe issuances.5 Lastly, institutional investors contribute 
to improve corporate governance of companies by requiring stricter 
supervision and regulation of publicly offered stocks and bonds, by 
im posing discipline over the company's m anagem ent and by aligning 
their interests with those of the majority of shareholders, all of which 
facilitates the development of equity and bond capital markets.
In short, institutional investors play a major role in providing long­
term financing to both the private sector and the government. The 
lack of significant institutional investors has been, with the exception 
of Chile and to a lesser extent Brazil (which does not have a reformed 
social security system), a critical lim itation for developing the bond 
market in Latin America. In fact, at the end of 2001, Mexico's pension 
funds had assets am ounting to the equivalent of 3.5% of GDP, while 
for Peru this figure was 7.3%, for Argentina 7.7%, for Brazil 12.4%, and 
for Chile 54%.
b) Indexation of long-term bonds
One of the m ain difficulties in creating a long-term corporate bond 
market has been the high and uncertain inflation rate experienced by 
many EEs. A solution to this problem has been the development of an 
indexed bond market, by which the investor obtains an interest rate 
that is composed of a real return, plus the variation in an established 
price index. The latter could be the consumer price index (CPI), the 
value of a foreign currency or the price of a commodity. The m ost 
attractive in terms of its general use is the CPI, since it provides a better 
overall hedge of the risks to investors and fund suppliers. With bonds 
indexed to foreign currency, investors are exposed to the risk of local 
currency appreciation. In their turn, tradable com panies could hedge 
risk by a bond expressed in the relevant foreign currency.
5 In an issuance underwriters must take the bonds and keep them  in stock, to 
later sell them  to  investors. If there is low  liquidity in  the market, they will have 
a lower incentive to  subscribe them  and, consequently, there will be few bon d  
issuances. W ith  the Russian crisis and the bankruptcy o f  the Long Term Capital 
M anagem ent in  1998, the US corporate b on d  market lost m ost o f  its liquidity, 
trading reduced significantly and there were n o  market prices; therefore, trades 
cou ld  n ot be realized. This liqu idity shock had a significant im pact on  the US 
corporate bon d  market, as well as in the capability o f  com panies to  raise funds: 
corporate b on d  issuance dropped from  150 issuances per m on th  in  May, to 
40 in  September and O ctober o f  1998; and on ly  in  early 2001 did b o n d  issues- 
reach the May 1998 level (Harrison, 2002).
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Even if there already exists a nom inal bond market, indexed bonds 
allow achieving better progress in the completion of financial markets. 
Market completion consists in generating patterns of payment flows in 
different states of nature so that investors or companies m ay hedge or 
bet on the occurrence of certain states in a way that could not be repli­
cated with the financial instruments existing in the market.
Issuing indexed bonds may significantly reduce financing costs of 
firms. Equation (1) shows that the nominal interest rate at which com ­
panies issue their bonds is equal to the real interest rate plus inflation 
expectations plus inflation risk premium. The latter is an "insurance" 
that companies must pay investors for them to assum e the inflation 
risk. For the United States, Campbell and Shiller (1996) estimated that 
the inflation risk premium was between 50 and 100 base points for a 
bullet bond at a 5-year term. In EEs, however, this premium is usually 
much higher. In fact, it is frequently so high that it generates a sort of 
credit rationing in the sense given to the term by Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981), which results in long-term corporate bond markets failing to 
arise. By issuing indexed bonds, companies will only pay the real inter­
est rate plus the actual inflation, while saving the inflation risk 
premium.
(1) it =  rt +  7 4 + S t
where it: Nominal interest rate for period t,
rt: Real interest rate for period t,
rft : Inflation expectations for period t, and,
8t : Inflation risk premium.
Indexed bonds also facilitate companies and the Government to 
issue long-term debt, since high inflation makes very difficult to extend 
the duration of bonds6 (Walker, 1998) and can even cause the disap­
pearance of long-term nominal bond markets.
At present, there are several countries with governm ent inflation- 
indexed bonds. Even countries with low inflation rates have considered 
developing an indexed bond market, as it reduces the cost of the public 
debt. One recent case is the United States, which introduced them in 
January of 1997.
6 Mihaljek, et al. (2002) presents clear evidence that lower inflation is associated 
with longer average maturities o f  governm ent bonds.
Macroeconomic Stability and Investment Allocation o f  Domestic Pension Funds 67
3. The Chilean pension fund system
In Latin America, Chile is the only country with a relatively large 
indexed bond market (Reinstein, 2002). By the end of 2000, 89% of all 
domestic debt issued in Chile was inflation indexed.7 This compares to 
less than 20% in other Latin American countries, less than 10% in 
Central Europe and alm ost nil indexed debt in Asia (Mihaljek, et al., 
2002, table 6).
The main characteristic of the medium- and long-term Chilean fixed 
income market is that it is denom inated in Unidades de Fomento (UF),8 
an account in Chilean pesos, linked to past inflation, which has 
allowed the Chilean economy to have long-term securities denom i­
nated in domestic currency. Another important feature of Chile's fixed 
income market is that banks can use papers with maturities of less than 
90 days to meet technical legal reserve requirements, which strongly 
improves the liquidity for these papers.
a) From 1982 to 1989
In 1982 the Chilean economy confronted a severe balance of payments 
and financial crisis, which translated into a 14% decrease in GDP, a 
nom inal depreciation of the peso of 100% and the intervention of 
22 financial institutions representing 60% of the banking system. To 
restore growth and the functioning of the financial system, a number 
of monetary, fiscal and foreign exchange policies, together with debt to 
equity swaps and financial rescuing mechanisms were implemented. In 
1985 the economy started a recovery path that lasted until 1989, when 
actual output reached the level of the potential output (Ffrench-Davis, 
2002).
In May 1981 Chile abolished its pay-as-you-go pension fund scheme 
and replaced it with m andatory private pension fund managers, 
Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP). At the beginning, AFP 
were allowed to invest mainly in indexed instruments: Government 
debt and Central Bank securities, mortgage backed securities, fixed 
term bank deposits and corporate bonds. No foreign investment was 
allowed and only since 1985 could equities be held by the AFP (table
III.l).
7 Until 2001 there were n o  nom inal papers (denom inated in  Chilean pesos) 
w ith  maturity o f  m ore than on e year.
8 The UF is adjusted daily, and the factor o f  adjustm ent is the previous m onth 's 
change in  the CPI, distributed uniform ly  between the 10th day o f  the present 
m onth  and the 9th day o f  the next m onth .
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Table IH.l Main ceilings on AFP holdings, 1981-92 (%)
Dec-81 Sep-85 May-92
Central Bank Bonds 100 50 45
Time Deposits 50 40 50
Mortgage backed securities (LH) 80 80 80
Bonds 60 40 50
Equities 0 30 30
Foreign Investments 0 0 1,5
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Although the AFP didn't have an obligation to invest in Central 
Bank securities, they did not have many other relevant alternatives, so 
that the restrictive permissible portfolio permitted the government to 
achieve two m acroeconomic goals: (i) the funding of the transition 
from a public pay-as-you-go to a fully funded private system; and (ii), 
the funding of the bankruptcy of the bulk of the Chilean private 
banking system in a relatively mild inflationary way.
The transition from the pay-as-you-go system to a fully privately 
funded one had a big impact on the fiscal accounts. It is estimated that 
the income loss that the new system generated to the fiscal balance 
was equivalent to 5.7% of GDP per year between 1981 and 1999 
(Uthoff, 2001). The funding came mainly through two mechanisms: a 
reduction in fiscal spending and the issuance of indexed bonds by the 
Central Bank that was m ainly bought by institutional investors (table
111.2).9
The financing from the AFP was crucial to stabilize the banking 
system during the crisis of the 1980s. To restore the solvency o f the 
system the Central Bank had to infuse resources for an accumulated 
amount equivalent to 35 % of GDP (Sanhueza, 2001). To absorb excess 
liquidity and keep monetary growth in pace with the general macro- 
economic program and inflation rate objectives, the Central Bank 
issued bonds that were acquired mainly by AFP and insurance com pa­
nies. In fact, Central Bank debt in AFP portfolios grew rapidly (table
111.2).
9 The developm ent o f  insurance com panies, w hich  reserves increased from  2% 
o f  GDP in  1981 to  m ore than 5%  in 1989, was also related to  the new  social 
security system, w hich mandated that the risk o f  disability and death should be 
covered. Insurance com panies initially invested m ainly in  long-term  Central 
Bank debt.
Macroeconomic Stability and Investment Allocation o f  Domestic Pension Funds 69
Table III.2 C hilean  C entral Bank d eb t h e ld  b y  AFP, 1981-2003
Year Central Bank debt 
(m illion  USD)
H eld b y  AFP 
(m illion  USD)
Percentage
1981 310 31 10
1985 2,412 315 13
1990 6,258 2,855 46
1995 18,241 9,494 52
1996 20,928 10,744 51
1997 24,834 11,265 45
1998 21,743 11,689 54
1999 21,449 10,535 49
2000 23,065 11,424 50
2001 20,560 10,400 51
2002 19,537 8,867 45
2003 21,251 9,367 44
Source: Central Bank of Chile and Superintendencia de AFP (SAFP).
The other overall important macroeconomic role of the pension system 
was the provision of long-term financing to the economy. The portfolio 
managed by the AFP grew from less than 1% of GDP in 1981 to 24% in 
1990 (table III.3a). The successful stabilization of the economy and the 
financial system, in combination with incentives associated to huge 
income and wealth redistribution and appropriate key macro prices 
ignited Chile’s economic recovery of the second half of the 1980s.
The banking system started issuing long-term indexed mortgage 
backed securities ("letras hipotecarias", LH) and sold them initially 
mainly to the AFP and later, gradually, to the insurance companies. 
The LH, a bank indexed long-term bond, provided a very im portant 
source of long-term financing that was critical in the dynamism of the 
building sector. These securities went from alm ost non-existent 
beforel98210 to US$ 1.2 billion in 1990 and US$ 3.8 billion in 1995. At 
the end of 2002 their stock amounted to US$ 5.3 billion, equivalent to 
8% of GDP; 76% of them were held in the AFP portfolio.
Although the economy was in a very dire situation, with few interna­
tional reserves and almost no access to voluntary international capital 
markets, the Central Bank was able to m aintain real interest rates at a 
level that contributed to economic growth. In fact, the average real
10 Since 1960 and until the m id 1970s Chile had a similar system to  the LH, 
called Valores Hipotecarios Reajustables (VHR), linked to  the Savings and Loans 
System (Sistema de Ahorro y  Prestamos, SINAP).
Table III.3a P ortfo lio  co m p o s itio n  o f  AFP, 1981-2003  (%  o f  GDP)
Dec-81 D ec-85 D ec-90 D ec-95 D ec-96 D ec-97 D ec-98 D ec-99 D ec-00 D ec-01 D ec-02 D ec-03
Central Bank 
Bonds 0.1 2.2 10.3 15.0 14.5 14.2 15.1 15.3 16.3 16.3 13.7 11.7
LH 0.1 3.8 3.9 6.3 6.7 6.6 6.7 7.4 7.3 7.0 6.3 5.4
Tim e Deposits 0.6 2.2 4.0 2.1 1.6 4.2 5.5 7.9 9.5 9.5 12.0 9.2
Equities 0.0 0.0 2.7 11.7 9.4 8.8 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.4 5.1 8.3
C orporate
Bonds 0.0 0.1 2.7 2.0 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.6 3.3 4.0 4.7
Others 0.2 2.5 0.7 2.7 3.4 3.5 3.8 4.9 5.1 5.5 6.0 7.3
Foreign
Instrum ents 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 2.3 6.5 5.5 7.2 9.2 14.6
TOTAL 0.9 10.7 24.4 40 .0 37.4 39.0 40.3 49.2 51.0 54.3 56.3 61.1








Table III.3b P ortfo lio  co m p o s itio n  o f  AFP, 1981-2003  (%  o f  tota l assets)
D ec-81 D ec-85 D ec-90 D ec-95 D ec-96 D ec-97 D ec-98 D ec-99 D ec-00 D ec-01 D ec-02 D ec-03
Central Bank 
Bonds 10.1 20.3 42.5 37.5 38.8 36.4 37.5 31.0 31.9 30.0 24.4 19.1
LH 9.4 35.2 16.1 15.8 17.9 17.0 16.6 15.1 14.4 12.9 11.1 8.9
T im e Deposits 61.9 20.4 16.3 5.3 4.2 10.7 13.6 16.1 18.7 17.5 21.3 15.0
Equities 0.0 0.0 11.3 29.4 25.1 22.6 14.5 11.9 11.1 9.9 9.9 13.6
C orporate Bonds 0.6 1.1 11.1 5.1 4.5 3.3 2.7 2.8 3.1 5.2 7.1 7.7
Others 18.0 23.0 2.8 6.7 9.0 8.9 9.4 9.9 10.1 11.3 9.8 11.9
Foreign
Instrum ents 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 1.1 5.6 13.3 10.8 13.4 16.1 23.9
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deposit interest rate between 1986 and 1989 was 5.4%. The monetary 
instrument employed was the 90-day "real" interest rate, which was 
fixed through an open window for short-term UF securities issued by 
the Central Bank.
b) After 1990
In 1989, just before a significant change of the political regime and 
government in March 1990, a new Central Bank law became effective. 
The new legislation gave birth to an independent Central Bank, with 
the objective of preserving price stability and the protection of external 
and internal payments. To achieve its goal, the Central Bank was given 
a series o f legal instruments. In relation to pension funds, it was 
given the responsibility of establishing the limits for their investments 
in different types of assets, within the margins given by the law.
From 1990 until 1997 real GDP grew at an average rate of 7.6% per 
year. With the Asian crisis and the Chilean macroeconomic response 
to it, growth slowed quite significantly, to an average of 2.4% from 
1998 until 2002.
In 1990 AFP had US$ 2.9 billion (representing 46%) of Central Bank 
debt in their portfolio; m ost of that debt was short term. The heavy 
amount of debt maturing in the short term put important pressures on 
the Central Bank and could have created instability in the financial 
markets. To lengthen the maturity of its debt, the Central Bank 
intensified its issuing of long-term indexed bonds in 1990. For this 
reason and in order to sterilize significant capital inflows, between 
1990 and 1993 the Central Bank debt increased substantially. The AFP 
were very im portant buyers of this new debt, and thus contributed to 
the Central Bank attaining a better structure for its liabilities.
In 1992 the AFP were for the first time allowed to invest in foreign 
(international) assets (up to 1.5% of their total portfolios).11 Later, in 
the same year this ceiling was increased to 3%; in 1995 to 6% and 9%, 
and in 1997 to 12%. By late 1999 the ceiling was 16%. In 2002 the
11 The regulation and limits applied to  the pension  funds holdings o f  overseas 
assets has caused considerable controversy. See Lee (2000), Reisen (1997) and 
Vittas (1998). Besides the objective o f reducing idiosyncratic risks through diver­
sification, in a relatively mature system as the Chilean one, where AFP accum u­
lated a significant share o f  assets in the dom estic equity market, the increase in 
the lim it o n  foreign  asset h old in g  is also explained b y  the lack o f  diversified 
alternative eligible uses for AFP funds. In this way it m ay contribute to  reduce 
excessive volatility in dom estic asset valuations caused b y  AFP buying and 
selling decisions.
Macroeconomic Stability and Investment Allocation o f  Domestic Pension Funds 73
T able III.4 AFP investm ent overseas, 1993-2003
Actual Lim it
US$ m illio n %  o f  Fund US$ m illion %  o f  Fund
M ay-9 3 5 0.0 377 3
D ec-93 91 0.6 482 3
D ec-94 200 0.9 671 3
Dec-95 51 0.2 2,277 9
D ec-96 149 0.5 2,491 9
Dec-97 353 1.1 3,711 12
D ec-98 1,754 5.6 3,738 12
D ec-99 4,504 13.3 5,436 16
D ec-00 3,869 10.8 5,732 16
D ec-01 4,632 13.4 5,552 16
D ec-02 5,966 16.1 7,272 20
Dec-03 11,692 23.9 12,235 25
Source: Central Bank of Chile and SAFP.









foreign asset ceiling was lifted to 20%, at the same time that a sub-limit 
on the amount of foreign equities was removed (table III.4).
Between 1990 and 1996 Chilean AFP received an annual inflow of 
funds from labor, which, on average, represented 3.6% of GDP, 
peaking in 4.4% (table III.5). That was the direct contribution via AFP 
to national financial savings. Most of these savings flows were invested 
in bank liabilities (LH and deposits), companies stocks and bonds, and 
Central Bank bonds.12 At the end of 2003 AFP assets totaled US$ 48.9 
billion, equivalent to 61% of GDP. Foreign assets represented 24% of
12 As m entioned, AFP have played an increasingly im portant role in  providing 
long-term  financing to the Chilean private sector. In addition to  LH, w hich  has 
contributed to  the building sector dynam ism , between 1995 and 2002 AFP held 
36%  o f  bond s issued by  private firms. Table III.3 contains in form ation  o f  AFP 
holdings o f  different assets as a percentage o f  total AFP assets and o f  GDP.
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total AFP assets, which compares with only 0.7 % at mid 1997, just 
before the Asian crisis erupted (table III.3b)
4 . In s t itu t io n a l in v e s to rs  a n d  lo n g -t e r m  in te re s t  rates
a) C losed e co n o m y
In a closed economy local investors determine the term structure of 
interest rates. One of the m ost im portant determinants of long-term 
interest rates is the expected future short-term spot rate. Arbitrage in 
the credit market makes the relation between short- and long-term 
interest rates to be:
(2) ( i  + t%y = ( i  + 4 )  x ( i  + ft )  x ... x ( i  + ft-i)
where r represents the spot rate and f  is the im plicit forward for the 
one period spot rate. According to the "expectations theory" of the 
term structure of interest rates, f  s equal the expected future spot rates. 
If there is some kind of risk premium, f  can be different from the 
expected spot rate. If investors are short-term oriented, and there is a 
risk premium for long-term assets, then the forward rates will be higher 
than the expected spot rates.
Pension funds and insurance companies tend to favor long-term 
assets. Their development in a modern economy can be a major contri­
bution to reducing long-run risk and the cost of capital, thus stimulat­
ing real investment and improving resource allocation. If pension 
funds "dom inate" the long-term asset markets, the risk premium could 
be zero or even negative, eventually generating a "concavity" at the 
end of the yield curve. This is called the "preferred habitat" theory of 
the term structure. In addition to the effect on the shape of the yield 
curve, the "preferred habitat" of institutional investors can have 
im portant im plications for the volatility of interest rates in EE, given 
that a few big institutions tend to dominate its quite illiquid long-term 
financial asset market.
In Chile the impact of institutional investors on the long-term inter­
est rate market has been an issue of debate. On the one hand, the 
Central Bank is the largest issuer of domestic bonds, by which it regu­
lates base money, while simultaneously determines a benchmark yield 
curve o f significant length for the economy. Since the early 1990s 
Central Bank long-term bonds (with a range of maturities that has 
gone from 8 to 20 years) are issued through predetermined periodic 
tenders and placed directly through a public auction in which only
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banks and domestic institutional investors can participate. On the 
other hand, dom estic institutional investors are the m ain demanders 
of domestic debt.13 And although in a declining fashion, transactions 
in the fixed income market have been dom inated by Central Bank 
bonds.14 In addition, the pension fund industry has become increas­
ingly concentrated, which has created a virtual m onopsony among 
institutional investors, due to the relatively small size of mutual 
funds.15 Finally, it should be m entioned that Chilean pension funds 
regulation16 stimulates them to have similar portfolios and therefore, 
given their significant size, sudden changes in those portfolios could 
alter the domestic yield curve.17
As was seen in table III.2, AFP are the m ajor holders of Central Bank 
securities. Figure III.l shows the holding of Central Bank bonds as a 
percentage of the total AFP portfolio, versus the yield o f those securi­
ties. It can be observed that when pension funds alter their holdings 
there are some effects on the yield of the securities.
b) O pen  e con om y
According to the theory of interest rate parity, in an open economy, 
where local investors can buy international securities and international 
investors can buy local securities, domestic interest rates are connected 
to those of the rest of the world. The more integrated the markets, the
13 By the end o f 2000, dom estic institutional investors (AFP and insurance com ­
panies) held 62%  o f  total dom estic debt issued in Chile. (Mihaljek, et al., 2002, 
table 8, page 29). Significant holdings o f  local dom estic long-term  debt by 
foreign institutional investors w ould reduce the m on opson y  pow er o f  local AFP; 
however, since that market is still quite illiquid, it deters international institu­
tional investors to  participate in  it, generating a sort o f  vicious circle o f  illiquid­
ity and concentration  in the Chilean long-term  fixed incom e market.
14 At the beginn ing o f  the 1990s Central Bank bond s represented 8 0 % -8 5 %  o f 
transactions and by  2000 their share still am ounted to  50%  (Cifuentes, et al., 
2002, page 90).
15 The num ber o f  AFP increased from  12 in 1982 to  14 in 1990 and 21 in 1994 
and fell to  8 in 2000, w hen  the three biggest AFP concentrated m ore than 70% 
o f the system's total funds.
16 AFP are com m itted  to  get a return o n  the portfo lio  they manage o f  at least a 
m inim um  betw een 50%  o f the pension  fund industry-wide average or that 
average minus 200 basis points.
17 This line o f  reasoning has been used regarding AFP investm ent overseas. See 
Fontaine (1996).










Figure III.l AFP investm ents in Central Bank bonds and yield o n  PRC-8 (*),
1992-2003
Source: Central Bank o f  Chile and SAFP.
(*) BCU-10 since September, 2002. (**) As a percentage o f  total AFP assets.
higher should be the correlation of local and international "financial" 
interest rates.18
According to that theory, the integration of local and international 
financial markets in EEs occurs rapidly through the short-term money 
market. Banks tend to tap easier than other agents the international 
market for short-term funds, and open investment accounts abroad. 
Similarly, international banks penetrate rapidly the short-term money 
markets to exploit any differences in the covered or uncovered interest 
rate parities:
(3) Uncovered interest parity (1 + rg)n = (1 + r*g)" x (1 + dSg) x (1 + <5g)
(4) Covered interest parity (1 + rg)" = (1 + r*g)" x (1 + /g)
18 However, as analyzed in Zahler and Valdivia (1987), there is usually a big differ­
ence between the short-term financial interest rate and the rate associated to  the 
productivity o f  capital in EEs, with the significant im plications o f  the characteris­
tic o f  the transition period before and after the EE opens its capital account.
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where rg is the local spot interest rate for the period between dates "0" 
and “n", r'g is the international spot interest rate for the period 
between dates "0 " and “n", dS" is the expected change in the exchange 
rate for the period between dates "0 "  and "n”, $<] is the risk premium 
for the period between dates “0 ” and "n”, fi] is the forward premium for 
the period "n " and S is the spot exchange rate.
If the uncovered interest parity operates, the forward premium 
should equal the expected depreciation plus the risk premium. This 
means that the forward exchange rate is equal to the expected 
exchange rate adjusted by the risk premium; only if the risk premium 
is zero the forward rate will equal the expected exchange rate.
According to that theory, long-term interest rates incorporate the 
short-term interest parities through the expected short-term rates, as 
shown by equation (5):
(5) (1 + rg)" = (1 + f  g) x (1 + dSl0) x (1 + # 0) ... x (1 + r*g_ t) x (1 +
dSl) x (1 + j)
which is equivalent to:
(6) (1 + rg)«= (1 + r*© x (1 + dS"0) x (1 + 5©
Equation (6) states that in an open economy the long-term interest 
rate equals the international long-term interest rate plus the long-term 
expected depreciation of the currency plus the long-term risk 
premium. The long-run expected depreciation should equal the 
expected long-run inflation differential plus the productivity growth 
differential plus the short-term overshooting effects caused by short­
term interest rates movements.
Assuming that the inflation and productivity growth differentials are 
relatively stable in the long run, two quite heroic assum ptions for EE, 
the most volatile effect on the long-run expected exchange rate depre­
ciation is the short-run movement of the exchange rate. This happens 
because of the short-run overshooting effects of expected or actual 
monetary policy (Dornbusch, 1976). These movements, however, are 
reflected only partly on the long-run interest rate because they fade out 
as time passes. In fact, as the price rigidities that cause the overshoot­
ing are concentrated in the short term, the long-term overshooting 
effects tend to be smaller.
The m ain conclusion of the approach outlined above is that in a 
small open economy the movements in the long-run interest rate are
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caused by the movem ents in the international long-term rates. Its 
macroeconomic rationale,19 however, abstracts from some well known 
imperfections of international capital markets and from the very 
significant fact that equilibrium in the real sector in EEs usually 
requires either a huge and extremely rapid increase in investment 
and/or in asset prices, especially o f non tradable financial (i.e., stock) 
and/or "real” (i.e., land) assets (Zahler and Valdivia, 1987, 
pp. 257-277).
Regarding financial markets, the one for long-term securities in EEs 
tends to be illiquid, and thus international investors comm and a high 
liquidity premium to access them. This tends to create a wedge 
between interest rates in these markets and those o f the rest o f the 
world, at least for a period of time. If some sort o f preferred habitat 
theory applies, a short-term disconnection between long-term local 
and foreign interest rates should be observed, if no agents are arbitrag- 
ing them .20 Local institutional investors could, if allowed, quickly 
access international markets if they find them attractive and accessible. 
Thus, they could become the main link between local and interna­
tional long-term securities markets.
c) The Chilean experience
After the balance of paym ents crisis of 1982 the Chilean capital 
account was “de facto" closed: there was very little access to interna­
tional finance and local investors were not allowed to invest abroad. At 
the end of the 1980s and early 1990s the economy creditworthiness 
recovered and foreign investors started to demand Chilean assets. Local 
companies were able to raise bank debt in international markets again, 
FDI increased and the Central Bank started to accumulate international 
reserves at a high speed. There were significant peso appreciation pres­
sures (Ffrench-Davis and Villar, 2005).
19 A ccording to  this approach, in EEs integrated to the international e con om y  
the expected GDP grow th rate is h ighly dependent on  the w orld  econ om ic 
activity. This follow s both  from  the dem and for EEs exports and capital flows 
available to  finance growth.
20 There is the potential arbitrage between the long-term  b on d  market and the 
stock market. In fact, international institutional investors (w hen allowed) tend 
to  be big players in EEs stock markets, and n ot so m uch  in  EEs local b on d  
markets. Then, if  for exam ple, international investors push local stock prices 
higher and expected stock returns lower, arbitrage betw een the stock and the 
b on d  market w ould  push local b on d  prices higher and their long-term  interest 
rate lower. The extent o f  the con n ection  depends on  the degree o f  substitution 
o f  the tw o types o f  assets.
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With the new economic environment, which was costing high quasi­
fiscal losses, the Central Bank encouraged capital outflows by opening 
the capital account for foreign investments by most local agents, 
except for banks and institutional investors, which, for prudential 
reasons, were also allowed to invest abroad but in a more gradual and 
selective way. It also established regulations to limit and reduce the 
speed of excessive short-term capital inflows. The main chronological 
events in the opening of the capital account were the following:21
In 1991 the waiting period for capital remittances for inward invest­
ment under the debt-equity swap mechanism (chapter XIX) was short­
ened from ten to three years; and exporters were authorized to keep 
their foreign currency abroad for a period of 150 days before selling 
them in the domestic formal market. Banks were allowed to hold up to 
US$ 400 million before selling the excess to the Central Bank, versus 
the previous US$ 200 million limit. In 1993 the minimum repatriation 
period for FDI was reduced from three years to one year. In 1994 the 
limit to the holdings of foreign exchange by banks was eliminated and 
exporters were allowed to sell in the "inform al" domestic market up to 
US$ 15 million. In 1995 insurance com panies were allowed to invest 
overseas up to 13%, and mutual funds up to 30% of their respective 
portfolios, and exporters were allowed to sell in the informal market all 
of their exports. In 1996 mutual funds were allowed to invest 100% of 
their funds abroad. In 1997 every person and firm22 was allowed to 
invest abroad freely.
Thus, since 1997 capital outflows have been completely free for 
persons and for companies, with the partial exception of banks and 
institutional investors, which were subject to regulatory limitations by 
their own law, by the Chilean SEC and/or by the Central Bank.
Table III.4 shows the evolution of AFP holdings of foreign assets and 
the limits set by the Central Bank.23 Although overseas investments 
were authorized in early 1992, pension funds did not start using this 
alternative until 1993. However, by August 1 9 9 7  they had invested less
21 Chile 's liberalization and open ing-up  o f  the capital account im plem ented 
between m id 1991 and m id 1996 was carried forward with a pace coherent with 
the objective o f  overall m acroeconom ic equilibrium. See Zahler (1998).
22 Except, for prudential reasons, banks, pension funds and insurance companies.
23 Chilean regulation regarding foreign  investm ents by  AFP distinguished 
between fixed in com e instruments (m ainly bonds) and variable in com e instru­
m ents (m ainly equities). However, this d istinction  is n ot very relevant for the 
m acroeconom ic consequences o f  AFP investm ent abroad.
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than 1% o f  their total assets abroad, a pattern that changed in a rather 
abrupt and significant manner during 1998.
Our hypothesis states that as AFP invested significant amounts of 
their assets abroad, local long-term interest rates increased their corre­
lation with long-term international rates.
We tested the causality between the Chilean 8 year Central Bank UF 
bond (PRC -  8) yield and the 5 year USD Treasury interest rates for two 
periods of time: between June 1996 and September 1998 and between 
October 1998 and January 2002. We used 1998 as a threshold because 
the actual investm ent by AFP abroad "jum ped" from US $ 272 million 
in 1997 (equivalent to 1.1% of their assets) to US$ 1400 m illion in 
1998, equivalent to 5.6% of their assets,24 an am ount which should 
have given the AFP enough freedom to exploit their visions on the rel­
ative value of foreign and local assets.




PRCt = a  +  £  a , x  PRCt_t + X  Pi x  USTt_l
i=i i=i
10  10
USTt = «  + I ( i , x PRCt_i +  X Pi x USTt_l
i = i  i = i
where PRC is the yield on the 8 year Central Bank indexed bond and 
UST is the dollar yield on the 5 year US Treasury bond.
The results were the following:
Pairwise Granger Causality between June 1996 and September 1998 
Null Hypothesis: OBS F-Statistic Probability
PRC does not Grange Cause UST 159 1.80836 0.06445
UST does not Granger Cause PRC 0.89516 0.53957
Pairwise Granger Causality between October 1998 and January 2002 
Null Hypothesis: OBS F-Statistic Probability
PRC does not Grange Cause UST 122 1.06530 0.39597
UST does not Granger Cause PRC 4.85554 1.1E-05
The test shows that there is a clear change of the influence between 
the US Treasury long-term interest rates and the Chilean Central Bank
24 In both  years they cou ld  have invested abroad up to  12% o f  their total assets.
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 TB-5 PRC 8
Figure III.2  Yield on  Chilean PRC-8 and 5 year UST, 1992-2003 (*)
Source-. Central Bank o f  Chile and www.federalreserve.gov 
(*) BCU-10 and TB-10 since September, 2002.
8 year PRC before and after 1998.25 This result can also be seen in 
figure III.2.
During 1998 the local long-term interest rate increased substantially, 
while the 5 year US Treasury yield decreased. This occurred because of 
an extremely tight monetary policy followed by the Chilean Central 
Bank in order to face a significant current account deficit, together 
with an increase in Chile's risk premium (figure III.3) that followed the 
generalized increases in the EEs risk premiums triggered by the Asian, 
and later the Russian crisis. Other than that, the correlation between 
the USD 5 year Treasury bond and the Chilean 8 year PRC increased 
substantially after 1998.
25 It should be noted that we did not attempt a m ore rigorous empirical analysis 
betw een these tw o variables, w h ich  w ould  have required con trolling  for 
changes in  liberalization measures regarding openness o f  the capital account, 
exchange rate regimes, expectations o f  devaluation, AFP regulatory lim its and 
Central Bank’s interventions in the foreign exchange market.
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Figure III.3  Chilean governm ent bond  risk premium, 1998-2003 (basis points) 
Source: Bloom berg data.
 RER ■' ' Invest.Overseas
Figure ¡11.4 AFP investm ents overseas and RER, 1993-2003 (%  o f  funds and 
indice 1986=100)
Source: Central Bank o f  Chile and SAFP.
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The change regarding the linkage between international long-term 
rates and local ones did not occur until around three years after the 
AFP were allowed to invest abroad a rather substantial share of their 
portfolio, and occurred only after they effectively invested quite heavily 
abroad. This can be explained, at least partially, because the capital 
account of Chile was less open until 1997. In fact, most of the m ea­
sures that had been applied until 1996 to graduate the speed of 
financial integration to the rest of the world were removed in 1997 and 
1998, thus augm enting the connection between local and interna­
tional interest rates. In addition, part of the reluctance to move funds 
overseas by AFP reflected stronger domestic return prospects. Perhaps 
more importantly, the trend towards the appreciation of the domestic 
currency (UF) until late 1997 reinforced expectations of appreciation 
during that period and biased AFP investments in favor of peso or UF 
denom inated assets, as shown in figure III.4. Only in 1998 started a 
new cycle of depreciation of the Chilean currency.
5. Institutional investors and the exchange rate
When a closed economy opens its capital account, there should be a 
stock adjustment of the assets of both local and foreign investors. Local 
investors will have a desired demand for international securities, and 
international investors will have a net demand for local securities. It 
should be expected that, overall, the inward flow to EEs should be 
significantly higher than the outward flow from EEs. However, the 
latter movement should be dominated by institutional investors, given 
the expected benefits associated to risk diversification and enhanced 
returns.26
Given their size, the effect of institutional investors on the foreign 
exchange market could be substantial (J. P. Morgan, 2002). This 
should be more intense in a case like the Chilean one, considering 
the already m entioned concentration of the industry as well as the 
AFP regulation regarding their com m itted rate of return. And short­
term expected returns are those that tend to dom inate the decisions 
of investors, institutional ones included. Thus, under quite com m on 
conditions, foreign investment decisions by pension funds will tend to be 
dominated by the short-run expected appreciation or depreciation o f  the 
currency relative to the interest rate differentials. Only through time do
26 These benefits, for the Chilean case, are discussed in  Valente (1988, 1991).
long-run investm ent objectives permeate the policies of institutional 
agents.
a) The Chilean experience
Together with giving the Central Bank the power to determine 
autonomously foreign exchange and capital controls, the Central Bank 
law of 1989 provided a new regulatory framework for foreign exchange 
transactions: it established that all transactions are free, except those 
regulated by the Central Bank. The latter was given the authority to 
regulate balance of paym ents transactions, but not to prohibit a non­
regulated transaction from being done between two agents.
Thus, there coexisted two foreign exchange markets: the formal one, 
composed by the banking system and the Central Bank, where all the 
regulated transactions have to be done, and a legalized informal 
market, where the unregulated transactions are done. This coexistence 
aimed at two objectives: to preserve the stability of foreign payments 
and allow the overall foreign exchange market to be free and legal.
The Central Bank issued a comprehensive set of regulations in its 
"Com pendium  of Regulations for Foreign Exchange Transactions", 
applicable to all transactions in the formal market; in particular, those 
related to foreign investments by institutional investors, the most 
important of which are the AFP.
Initially there were three main concerns regarding international 
investments by AFP: (i) a political concern, related to Chilean compul­
sory savings being invested abroad; (ii) authorities wanted that 
opening-up to be gradual, in order to smoothen the learning process, 
which included the proper evaluation of transaction and information 
costs of overseas investments; and (iii) there was a concern regarding 
the potential destabilisation of the foreign exchange market if the AFP 
were to invest or disinvest a significant portion of their assets abroad in 
a short period of time.
Thus, the strategy was to allow the AFP investments abroad gradu­
ally. And although the microeconom ic benefits of international 
diversification were clear, the size, concentration and the regulation of 
the Chilean AFP industry could cause macroeconomic imbalances if 
allowed to quickly and sizably invest abroad.27 Therefore, some macro- 
economic considerations were taken into account in the regulation of
27 Associated in  general to  financial agents' behavior and tim e-horizon  and, 
m ore specifically, to  the "herd" effect w hich  characterizes the Chilean AFP 
industry, due to  its regulation.
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Figure III.5 AFP net investm ents overseas and RER 
Source: Central Bank o f  Chile.
Minus = AFP net annual inflows; Plus = AFP net annual outflows.
international investments of Chilean pension funds during the first 
half of the 1990s.28
The first capital outflows by AFP occurred in the second quarter of 
1993, for an amount of US$ 90 million (figure III.5), which represented 
only 0.6% of their portfolio and can be interpreted as an initial explor­
ing attempt of overseas investments by AFP.
During most of the 1990s, until the end of 1997, the observed 
nom inal exchange rate was very similar to the floor of the exchange 
rate band (see Ffrench-Davis and Villar, 2005). This situation, together 
with the huge increase in international reserves generated strong 
expectations of persistent real appreciation. These expectations, 
together with a differential of returns favorable to local (bonds and
28 Fontaine (1996) presents the case for m acroeconom ic considerations leading 
to  som e sort o f  regulation o f  AFP investm ents abroad. These relate, on  the one 
hand, to  the fiscal cost associated to  pension  fund reforms and the need to 
develop  a sound and liquid dom estic capital market; and on  the other, to the 
eventual destabilizing effects, especially on  the real exchange rate, o f  sudden 
changes in  their portfolios w hen the country faces severe balance o f  paym ents 
problem s.
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stocks) investments, generated alm ost no AFP investm ent overseas 
until late 1997. In July of 1997, when the Asian crisis was triggered by 
the collapse of the Thailand economy, the AFP had invested abroad 
less than 1% of their total funds, quite below the 12% limit.
During 1996 and 1997 Chile experienced high GDP growth rates, but 
the current account deficit rose significantly while the peso continued 
to appreciate and foreign short-term debt increased. Therefore, the 
country became quite vulnerable to foreign shocks. When those 
shocks, triggered by the Asian crisis, took place from January 1998 
until mid 1999 (Chile's terms of trade declined the equivalent of 3% of 
GDP, and capital outflows by pension funds were equivalent to 4.8% 
of 1998 GDP) the country was forced to engage in a significant macro- 
economic adjustm ent: aggregate demand fell by 10% and GDP by 1% 
(Ffrench-Davis and Tapia, 2001). During 1998 the depreciating pres­
sures on the Chilean peso were alm ost unsustainable. The (nominal) 
price of the dollar increased until near the ceiling o f the band. To 
avoid a more significant depreciation, the Central Bank increased real 
interest real rates sharply. In September 1998 the 90-day real interest 
rate reached almost 18% while the 8 year PRC increased by 100 points.
The combination of foreign shocks and inappropriate domestic poli­
cies were major determinants of peso depreciation expectations, which 
triggered quick and substantial international investments by AFP. 
Figure III. 6 shows that even until mid 1998 AFP had invested overseas 
less than 20% of their ceiling, explained in part by the fact that the 
yield of Chilean long-term bonds, adjusted for effective devaluation, 
exceeded international returns. Similarly, Chilean equities, adjusted for 
effective devaluation, outperformed US stocks until the m id 1990s 
(figure III. 7).
In 1998, as the depreciation pressures on the peso mounted, gross 
outflows of AFP were US$ 1.6 billion, equivalent to 29% of portfolio 
outflows in the capital account (figure III.8). AFP gross international 
investments increased even more in 1999, to over US$ 4 billion in that 
year, equivalent to 36% of portfolio outflows. During 2000, on the 
outset of calmer international markets, AFP started to repatriate some 
of their investments, so that they generated a net inflow of about 
US$ 100 million. Between 2001 and 2003, AFP invested abroad 
US$ 33.1 billion in gross terms and US$ 6.5 billion net.
Figure III.8 shows that AFP have become an increasingly im portant 
agent in the Chilean foreign exchange spot market, as measured by 
portfolio capital flows. In fact, while in 1996-97 total AFP 
flows (inflows and outflows) accounted for 7.5% of total portfolio flows
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Yield D ifferentia l  % of Limit Used
Figure III.6  AFP investm ent overseas and lon g  term b on d  yield differential, 
1993-2003
Source: Central Bank o f  Chile, SAFP and www.federalreserve.gov 
'Twelve m onths m oving average o f  dollar yield o f  PRC -  8 minus TB -  5 (in per­
centage terms).
BUC-10 and TB-10 since September, 2002.
(inflows and outflows), in 1998-99 that percentage increased to 26%, 
and in 2000-03 to 57%. However, information available for 2000-03 
indicates that around 50% of AFPs investments abroad were hedged in 
the forward market, which means that AFPs net pressure on the 
exchange rate market is smaller as compared to their spot position.
This highlights that, contrary to what is usually stated (Turner, 2002, 
p. 6), allowing institutional investors to hold a high proportion of their 
assets abroad (denominated in foreign currency), does not imply that 
EEs will have a buffer against exchange rate volatility. In fact, the 
Chilean experience of 1998-2003 suggest that if no restriction is placed 
on the speed at which the stock adjustment can be made, AFP tend to 
act as a short-term oriented financial agent, seeking for the short-term 
returns of an appreciating currency and/or protection from a depreciat­
ing currency. In the process, AFP behavior may end up increasing foreign 
exchange volatility and exacerbating deviations o f  the real exchange market 
value from its long-term equilibrium, thus complicating and turning more
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 S tock Exch. D iffe re n tia l % of Lim it Used
Figure III. 7 AFP investm ent overseas and stock exchange differential, 
1993-2003
Source: Central Bank o f  Chile and SAFP.
"Twelve m onths m ov in g  average o f  differences in  returns o n  IGPA and D ow  
Jones indexes (in %).
costly overall macroeconomic management, with very probable negative 
effects on pensioners, who expect long-run returns.
Additionally, Chilean AFP accounting is mark-to-market; therefore, 
gains and losses are registered on all their domestic and foreign 
trading. In spite of the development of the Chilean capital market, 
domestic bonds and equities eligible to belong to AFP assets are still 
quite illiquid vis a vis the market for similar bonds and equities in 
developed economies. Therefore, when in need of liquidity or when 
incentives to trade are present, AFP could prefer, ceteris paribus, to trade 
with their overseas holdings rather than with their quite illiquid 
domestic holdings. This easiness to trade foreign currency denom i­
nated holdings apparently also contributed to the significant destabi­
lizing effect on the exchange rate and need for over adjustment by the 
Central Bank's monetary policy in 1998.
In short, in every year from 1997 until 2003 Chilean AFP behaved in 
a procyclical manner regarding the foreign exchange market. As m en­
tioned, given their size, industry concentration as well as its regulation,
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Figure III.8  AFP gross overseas flows, 1996-2003 
Source: Central Bank o f  Chile.
*As percentage o f  gross portfo lio  inflows. ** As percentage o f  gross portfo lio  
outflows.
under quite com m on conditions AFP decisions related to foreign cur­
rency denominated assets will be dominated by the short-run expected 
movements of the currency relative to the interest rate differentials, 
thus exacerbating market pressures, except for their hedging in the 
forward market, on the exchange rate, and very probably requiring a 
higher degree of macroeconomic adjustment than strictly necessary. In 
general, it is not clear that the benefits associated to risk diversification 
associated to institutional investors holding significant investments 
abroad will be higher than the costs associated to the required macro- 
economic over adjustment needed to face the effect of their procyclical 
behavior on the domestic financial and foreign exchange markets.
6. Conclusions and policy implications
Based on recent Chilean experience, this paper analyzed some of the 
macroeconomic implications of privately managed pension funds in EEs.
In the middle and long-run pension funds play a role regarding total 
domestic saving and developing local capital markets. The effect of 
reformed pension funds on overall domestic savings is not clear. On
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the one hand, the transfer from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully 
funded privately m anaged individual capitalization system generates, 
during a quite long transitory period, a substantial fiscal deficit. 
Additionally, the compulsory savings imposed by the reformed system, 
which is expected to achieve higher returns that the old one, could 
generate some kind of inter temporal substitution by individuals, who 
would tend to spend more at present against their pension savings.
On the other hand, development of long-term capital markets in EEs 
is highly and positively influenced by the existence of these new big 
institutional investors which: (i) generate a demand for company 
stocks and long-term corporate bonds; (ii) provide liquidity to the 
equity and bond markets, which increases the demand for these typi­
cally long-term financial assets; (iii) contribute to improve the corpo­
rate governance of companies, which facilitates the development of 
both equity and bond capital markets.
Chile has developed a relevant local long-term bond market in 
domestic currency (UF). That market developed pari passu with the 
growth of reformed pension funds (AFP), which are the main holders 
of corporate and Central Bank bonds, so their influence to this devel­
opment is evident.
But Chilean long-term bonds are indexed to (past) inflation, and the 
question remains as to whether this indexation is an essential part of 
the bond market development, especially in inflation-prone countries 
such as m any of Latin America. Inflation indexed bonds solve a series 
of problems in economies with high and uncertain inflation rates. 
First, they contribute to complete financial markets. With long-term 
indexed bonds the long-term real interest rate can be locked, som e­
thing that cannot be done by rolling over short-term instruments. 
Second, the issuance of indexed bonds may significantly reduce com ­
panies financing costs. Third, indexed bonds also encourage long-term 
issuances, since with high inflation the incentive to extend the m atu­
rity of bonds is low, regardless of the inflation risk premium.
In the case of Chile, indexation has been a major factor in the devel­
opment of the long-term bond market, but without the significant and 
increasing buying power of AFP this market would not have developed 
as much as it did. This can easily be seen by considering that after ten 
years of bond market development, the AFP held more than 50% of 
Central Bank and private sector bonds, and near 75% of the mortgage 
bonds issued by financial institutions (LH).
In terms of the short-run macroeconomic implications of AFP, when 
the economy is relatively closed, we argued that the effect of pension
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funds on the term structure of interest rates could be significant, given 
that they are the main players in the market. In Chile this is reinforced 
because the pension fund industry has become increasingly concen­
trated, which has created a virtual m onopsony am ong institutional 
investors, due to the relatively small size of mutual funds. Additionally, 
since Chilean AFP regulation stimulates them to have similar portfo­
lios, this also contributes to expect that their trading could 
significantly affect the domestic yield curve. However, this hypothesis 
requires further research.
The analysis is then extended to an economy with a more open 
capital account, where institutional investors are allowed to invest in 
foreign securities. In this scenario, theory states that the long-term 
domestic interest rate tends to equal the international long-term rate 
plus the long-term expected appreciation or depreciation of the cur­
rency plus the long-term risk premium. However, as EEs markets for 
long-term securities tend to be quite illiquid, international investors 
command a high liquidity premium to access them. This contributes to 
isolate these EEs long-term markets from those of the rest of the world, 
at least for a period of time. If some sort of preferred habitat theory of 
the term structure of interest rates prevails, there could persist some 
disconnection between long-term local and foreign interest rates, if no 
agents arbitrate them. Local institutional investors, if allowed to invest 
heavily abroad, could quickly access international markets when they 
find them attractive, becoming the main link between local and inter­
national long-term securities markets.
Being aware of the potential distorting adjustm ent m echanism s in 
the typically quite long transition period until the desired stocks of 
dom estic and foreign assets is attained, the empirical evidence of the 
Chilean economy suggests that when financial opening-up is increased 
and when AFP can invest significantly abroad, the movements in the 
long-run "financial" interest rate are quite correlated to the movements 
in the international bonds rates. We tested the abovementioned theo­
retical approach for the Chilean economy during the 1990s. The test 
showed that there is a clear change of the influence between the US 
Treasury 5 year bond and Chile's Central Bank 8 year PRC before and 
after 1998, year when the AFP started to allocate a significant percent­
age of their assets abroad.
One explanation of this change relates to the fact that between mid 
1997 and 1998 most of the measures that had been applied during the 
first half of the 1990s to partially de-link the Chilean interest rate from 
the international one were abolished. However, AFP did not play a role
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as arbitrager until 1998 not only because of the effects of those m ea­
sures but very crucially because until the end of 1997 expected and 
actual exchange rate movements indicated that the peso was underval­
ued. Furthermore, in that period returns on Chile's long-term bonds 
were higher than in the United States and, although to a smaller 
degree, returns in the stock exchange were also higher than in the 
United States.
Since late 1997, financial assets became more profitable in the 
United States than in Chile. Additionally, there was a big shift in 
exchange rate expectations towards a devaluation of the peso, due to 
the direct and indirect effects of the Asian and Russian crises on the, at 
that moment, highly vulnerable Chilean economy. This increased the 
expected return of dollar denominated financial assets. The speed and 
am ount of AFP investm ent overseas allowed for a much greater con­
nection between the local and international rates. That contributed to 
make more acute the peso devaluation pressures and, consequently, 
the Central Bank reaction, and required a highly costly m acroeco­
nomic adjustment process.
Therefore, the analysis, based on the Chilean experience, suggests 
that the importance of institutional investors is such that EEs rules gov­
erning their portfolio decisions should incorporate not only microeconomic 
considerations, but also those regarding macroeconomic stability and growth.
One macroeconomic issue refers to the (usually quite long) transitory 
effects on the fiscal deficit of the transfer from a pay-as-you-go pension 
fund system to a fully funded privately managed individual capitaliza­
tion system (Fontaine, 1996; Reisen, 1997; Uthoff, 2001). Another 
macroeconomic consideration refers to delaying the liberalization of 
outward investment by pension funds as a way to help creating or 
deepening the size and/or liquidity of domestic long-term capital 
market. In other words, institutional investors play a m ajor role by 
filling the gap in the supply of long-term finance that exists in most 
EEs, as well as by facilitating the privatization of state owned enter­
prises (Fontaine, 1996; Reisen and W illiamson, 1996) and improving 
the financial sector regulatory framework.
Chilean AFP, in the process of attem pting to maximize benefits, 
affect and are affected by market perceptions, particularly with regard 
to expectations of changes in monetary policy and exchange rates. 
Furthermore, once developed, given their significant size, AFP end up 
leading market expectations. The 1998-99 Chilean macroeconomic 
recessive adjustment suggests that in the absence of appropriate regula­
tions, AFP desired change in foreign exchange denominated assets took
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place through sudden, abrupt and large changes in flows of overseas 
holdings. This contributed, to the extent that those movements were 
not hedged, to exacerbate actual and expected devaluations, thus deep­
ening the recessive macroeconomic adjustment. This macroeconomic 
outcome, by increasing unemployment, lowering real wages and/or reducing 
AFP domestic profitability affects directly the welfare o f  future pensioners. To 
reduce this undesirable impact, a third macroeconomic policy refers to 
the convenience of establishing, in addition to the stock limitation on 
overseas holding, a regulation that limits the velocity with which pension 
funds can change their portfolios o f  international securities. For example, 
the Central Bank could establish, depending on the overall macroeco­
nom ic policy stance, a limit to the outflow (Fontaine, 1996) or inflow 
of institutional investors per period of time (a month, for example). 
This could be implemented as a function of each investors holding of 
foreign currency or as a fixed amount to be auctioned between institu­
tional investors. This policy should help to reduce the volatility of the 
exchange rate and the depth of the macroeconomic adjustment, when 
required. However, care should be taken not to overburden institu­
tional investors with this sort o f regulation, since there are situations 
when, for example, a quicker response by these investors is needed in 
order to better protect the returns of pensioners.
Finally, a consideration on pension fund regulation aimed at reduc­
ing their eventual negative effect on macroeconomic stability relates to 
their ability to trade. In principle, long-term investors such as pension 
funds or insurance companies do not have the same need for liquidity 
as most other participants in financial markets. To ameliorate excessive 
trading in foreign holdings, regulation could require pension funds to 
record their holdings in either an investment account or a trading 
account. The investment account would be related to a "buy and hold" 
criteria (and not to make liquid those investments in the short run), 
and there could be some incentive to allocate an important part of AFP 
foreign currency holdings in that account. This would induce institu­
tional investors to be less active in trading (not holding) overseas 
instruments, thus contributing to reduce volatility and procyclical 
behavior by domestic pension funds in the foreign exchange market.
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Real Macroeconomic Stability and 
the Capital Account in Chile and 
Colombia
Ricardo Ffrench-Davis and Leonardo Villar*
Introduction
The management of real macroeconomic balances has shown to be a 
significant factor in explaining the growth performance and behavior of 
productive investment in emerging economies (EEs). The environment 
provided by macroeconomic policies to producers, including the "right­
ness" of macro-prices and the consistency between aggregate demand 
and potential GDP, have emerged as significant variables explaining the 
poor recent performance of LACs. Together with fiscal responsibility and 
prudential financial regulation, those variables conform a comprehen­
sive set of real macroeconomic balances. In the present stage of global­
ization of financial volatility, capital flows have played, in emerging 
economies, a crucial role for the sustainability of those balances and 
their interplay with growth (Ffrench-Davis, 2005; Ocampo, 2005). Here 
we examine the macroeconomic policies implemented by Chile and 
Colombia since 1990, the successes and failures achieved, focusing in 
growth performance and macroeconomic sustainability.
In 1995, when contagion from the tequila crisis was spreading to 
several countries in Latin America, Chile and Colom bia were exempt 
from contagion and presented high rates of growth, without significant 
signs of financial distress. Several elements worked to explain this posi­
tive performance. Chile benefited from high copper prices and capital
* W e appreciate the valuable com m ents and suggestions o f  G uillerm o Le Fort, 
Carlos Quenan, Heriberto Tapia, and other participants at tw o ECLAC Seminars 
in Santiago and at a technical m eeting o f  G-24 in Geneva.
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flows to Colom bia were encouraged by the discovery of an im portant 
oil camp. Still, many analysts attribute this positive performance, to a 
large degree, to the fact that both countries had undertaken prudential 
measures in order to avoid "excessive" exposure to short term capital 
flows. In particular, they were at that time using a reserve requirement 
on short-term foreign indebtedness and several other instruments 
addressed to reduce domestic vulnerability to capital flows. Also, 
authorities in Chile and Colom bia had effectively worked against the 
pressures of capital inflows towards excessive real appreciation of their 
domestic currencies.
The parallelism between Chile and Colom bia continued to be 
present after the Asian and the Russian crises of 1997 and 1998. In this 
period, however, the results were not so positive. The central banks of 
both countries had been intervening in the foreign exchange markets 
through crawling currency bands for many years. In 1998, those bands 
became strait jackets from which it was extremely difficult to escape 
from without losing credibility and without exposing the foreign 
exchange markets to destabilizing dynamics. Despite the fact that 
short-term debt represented only a small share of total foreign liabili­
ties in both countries, vulnerability to the international financial crisis 
was significant in those years, real interest rates rose sharply in 1998 
and GDP growth was negative in 1999.
The similarities between Chile and Colombia, however, do not go 
much farther. During most of the decade, Chile presented very high 
fiscal surpluses and saving and GDP growth rates rose significantly, 
while in Colom bia GDP growth was below historical records, the 
public sector deficit increased rapidly, and saving rates followed a 
decreasing trend.
Thus, the macroeconomic outcomes of Chile and Colom bia were 
quite different, but still their response to the international financial 
crises of 1995 and 1998-99 shared several common elements. This may 
be due to the fact that both countries used similar instruments to regu­
late capital inflows and foreign exchange markets. This makes the com­
parative analysis of the two economies particularly attractive.
Section 1 aims to provide an overview of the macroeconomic frame­
works of Chile and Colom bia during the 1990s. Section 2 follows the 
evolution of exchange rate regimes. Section 3 discusses the rationale of 
capital account regulations and analyses the policy instrum ents that 
were adopted in each country to regulate capital flows. Section 4 pre­
sents some concluding remarks.
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1. Macroeconomic environments of Chile and Colombia 
during the 1990s 1
a) Inflation and economic activity
Chile and Colombia had, before the 1990s, a long tradition of relatively 
high inflation rates, which created strong inertia in the price setting 
processes. The CPI annual inflation rates were quite similar in both 
countries during the 1980s. Between 1982 and 1989, they averaged 
20.7% in the Chilean case and 22.5% in Colombia (table IV.1). During 
the 1990s, the central banks -  which were quite autonomous -  adopted 
very similar institutional policies, and tried to avoid shock treatments 
and rather chose a gradual approach to the process of disinflation. The 
large capital inflows that dominated most of the period created pressures 
towards the appreciation of domestic currencies and helped the central 
banks in the process of reducing inflation. However, neither of these 
countries used exchange rate anchoring in order to reduce inflation. In 
the early 1990s, the inflation rate started a steady process of reduction, 
which was more rapid in Chile -  this country reached one-digit inflation 
rates in 1994, while Colombia did it in 1999.
Notwithstanding the similarities in monetary policy, there were deep 
differences in the behavior of economic activity in Chile and Colombia 
during the 1990s. The Chilean economy had suffered a deep crisis in 
1982-83 -  with a 14% drop in GDP and a severe financial crisis -  
which generated a large gap between effective and potential GDP, dis­
couraging capital formation and the growth of potential GDP. In 1986, 
actual GDP started to recover, and the gap initiated a gradual reduction 
trend until it disappeared in 1989. Between 1990 and 1997, both effec­
tive and potential GDP grew vigorously, with an average yearly rate of 
7.6%. Dynamism of the economy slowed down in 1998, and a 0.8% 
drop in GDP was observed in 1999. Since 2000, growth resumed at a 
rate far below the levels that were observed before 1998.2 In any case, 
the yearly average in 1990-2003 was 5.5% (table IV.1) -  it doubled the 
2.9% recorded in 1974-89, the sixteen-year period of the Pinochet 
regime (Ffrench-Davis, 2002, ch. 1).
1 The table in  the Annex shows the relative sizes o f  both  countries: C olom bia 
has a population  and a GDP at current prices 2.9 times and 1.3 times those o f  
Chile, respectively, but a GDP per capita that is on ly  j  that o f  Chile and j  that 
o f  the USA (at W orld Bank PPP prices).
2 It is estim ated that potential GDP grew 7% until the arrival o f  the negative 
shock brought by  the Asian Crisis, and did adjust dow nw ard to  4%  thereafter 
(Ffrench-Davis, 2002, ch. 1). Actual GDP growth averaged 3.1%  in 1999-2004.
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Table IV. 1 Chile and Colombia: CPI inflation and GDP growth rates, 










1974-81 98.9% 3.3% 24.6% 4.6%
1982-89 20.7% 2.6% 22.5% 3.4%
1990 27.3% 3.7% 32.4% 4.3%
1991 18.7% 8.0% 26.8% 2.0%
1992 12.7% 12.3% 25.1% 4.0%
1993 12.2% 7.0% 22.6% 5.4%
1994 8.9% 5.7% 22.6% 5.1%
1995 8.2% 10.6% 19.5% 5.2%
1996 6.6% 7.4% 21.6% 2.1%
1997 6.0% 6.6% 17.7% 3.4%
1998 4.7% 3.2% 16.7% 0.6%
1999 2.3% -0.8% 9.2% -4.2%
2000 4.5% 4.5% 8.8% 2.9%
2001 2.6% 3.4% 7.7% 1.4%
2002p 2.8% 2.2% 7.0% 1.6%
2003p 1.1% 3.3% 6.5% 3.7%
Average
1990-2003 8.5% 5.5% 17.2% 2.7%
Source: Chile: Central Bank of Chile. Colombia: DANE. 
p Preliminary
Colom bia also experienced a boom  by the mid-1990s but it was 
much milder and shorter than in Chile. Colombian GDP growth aver­
aged 5.3% yearly between 1993 and 1995. For the rest of the 1990s, it 
was well below the historical standards. The annual GDP growth rate 
in 1990-2003 averaged only 2.7%. Even during the period of the Latin- 
American debt crisis, Colom bia had attained a higher average growth 
rate. Moreover, the recession in 1999, with a drop of 4.2%, was much 
deeper than in Chile and the recovery in more recent years has been 
slower. As a result, per capita GDP in 2003 was at the level of 1994 and 
5% below 1997, mirroring a significant output gap.
b) Fiscal balances
The outstanding behavior of economic activity in Chile during most of 
the 1990s took place in an environment of fiscal surpluses. Until 1997, 
there was a fiscal surplus of 2% of GDP in average and the central gov­
ernment expenditure as a share of GDP was relatively constant -  at 
around 20% (table IV.2). Since 1998, government expenditure rose
oo




Surplus (+) or Deficit (-)2
Non-Financial Public Sect 
or Surplus (+) or Deficit (-)2
Chile Colombia Chile Colombia Chile Colombia
1990 20.2% 9.8% 0.8% -0.9% 1.2% -0.6%
1991 20.6% 10.9% 1.5% -0.4% 1.5% 0.0%
1992 20.3% 12.6% 2.1% -1.8% 2.5% -0.2%
1993 20.5% 12.3% 1.8% -0.7% 2.1% 0.3%
1994 19.9% 12.8% 1.6% -1.4% 1.9% 0.1%
1995 18.6% 13.6% 2.4% -2.2% 2.4% -0.3%
1996 19.6% 15.7% 2.1% -3.6% 1.6% -1.7%
1997 19.9% 16.3% 1.8% -3.8% 0.8% -3.3%
1998 21.3% 17.0% 0.4% -4.9% -0.6% -3.7%
1999 22.6% 19.2% -1.4% -5.9% -1.5% -4.1%
2000 22.4% 19.2% 0.1% -5.9% -0.6% -4.2%
2001 22.9% 21.3% -0.3% -5.9% -0.6% -4.4%
2002p 22.9% 21.4% -0.6% -5.6% -1.6% -3.6%
2003p 22.4% 21.1% -0.8% -5.0% -2.2% -3.0%
Source: Chile: Dirección de Presupuesto (DIPRES) and Central Bank of Chile. Colombia: DNP-CONFIS (Cash basis) and DANE.
1 GDP figures at current pesos have been adjusted to make old data compatible with the methodology adopted in 1996 and 1994, respectively.
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gradually by three percentage points of GDP, reflecting increases in 
social expenditure as well as a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Even so, 
the deficits of both the central government and the consolidated non- 
financial public sector were very moderate, notwithstanding the tax 
revenue foregone due to a gap between effective and potential GDP 
and a depressed price of copper.3
In contrast with Chile, the poor performance of economic activity in 
Colom bia along the 1990s coincided with an unprecedented increase 
in government expenditure and fiscal deficits. Central government 
expenditure, that before 1990 had been close merely to 10% of GDP 
for more than three decades, increased to 21% in 2001-03 (similar to 
the Chilean level). Several analysts have attributed this unprecedented 
increase in public spending to the Constitutional reform of 1991, 
which accelerated the process of fiscal decentralization and incorpo­
rated into the Constitution new citizens rights that should be covered 
with public resources. In addition, the transition from the pay-as-you- 
go system towards a pension regime based on individual capitalization 
accounts implied, as it had done in Chile in the 1980s, a huge increase 
in government expenditure as measured by cash flows, although it 
contributed to reduce the actuarial debt. The absence of an equivalent 
increase in public revenues implied that the central government fiscal 
deficit rose from less than 1% of GDP in the early 1990s to alm ost 6% 
of GDP between 1999 and 2002. In turn, the consolidated non- 
financial public sector, which had a surplus until 1994, presents a 
deficit close to 4% of GDP since 1999.
c) Savings and investment
The contrasting performance of economic activity and fiscal accounts 
in Chile and Colombia implied a very different behavior of savings and 
investment (table IV.3). With an economy persistently operating at full 
employment of installed capacity, high rates of GDP growth and out­
standing fiscal surpluses, savings and investment rates in the Chilean 
case were in the 1990s notably above historical standards. Fixed capital 
formation reached historical peaks in the 1990s, averaging 28.5% in 
1991-98 (in 1986 prices). This figure contrasts with 19.9% during the 
last quinquennium  of the Pinochet era (1985-89) and with an even 
lower average in the prior years. Although the crisis of 1999 implied a
3 Since 2000 the governm ent has been w orking w ith a schem e o f  structural 
fiscal budget, estim ated w ith  a "n orm al" price o f  copper and tax proceeds as if 
actual GDP were equal to  "potential" GDP.
Table IV.3 Chile and Colombia: investment and savings, 1985-2003 (Shares of GDP)
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 
(Shares of GDP at constant prices)
GROSS NATIONAL SAVINGS 
(Shares of GDP at current prices)








1996 31.0% 26.4% 21.2% 23.1%
1997 32.2% 27.4% 21.6% 23.1%
1998 32.2% 27.0% 21.2% 21.8%
1999 26.9% 22.2% 21.8% 21.0%











Table IV.3 Chile and Colombia: investment and savings, 1985-2003 (Shares of GDP) (continued)
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 
(Shares of GDP at constant prices)
GROSS NATIONAL SAVINGS 
(Shares of GDP at current prices)




1992 13.9% 17.9% 19.0%
1993 18.0% 21.8% 19.5%
1994 20.7% 23.3% 18.6% 23.0%
1995 20.2% 22.3% 16.9% 23.0%








Source: Chile: Central Bank of Chile and IMF-IFS. Colombia: DANE-DNP 
p Preliminary.
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significant decline in investment, fixed capital formation between 1999 
and 2003 was still well above its average level in the 1980s.
Fixed investm ent in Colom bia presented large swings, with a 
significant increase until the m id-1990s and a rapid decline there­
after. However, even during the boom  period, between 1993 and 
1995, the C olom bian ratios of fixed capital form ation were m uch 
lower than in Chile. After the crisis, since 1999, fixed investm ent 
experienced a dram atic drop and stayed below 15% of GDP. These 
low levels of investm ent will make it m uch more difficult for 
Colom bia to recover high and sustainable rates of econom ic growth 
in the near future.
The Colom bian savings rates plum meted dramatically during the 
1990s. They went down by about four percentage points of GDP 
between the late 1980s and mid-1990s and by nearly eight additional 
points during the second half of the decade. In the Chilean case, in 
contrast, in the 1990s the savings ratios were systematically higher 
than in the 1980s.
d) Financial sector
An outstanding contrast between Chile and Colom bia during the 
1990s has to do with the behavior of the financial sector. In Colombia, 
the reduction in domestic saving rates and the rise in investment 
during the first half of the decade were accompanied by an impressive 
financial boom , which was to a large degree fed with capital inflows 
(Barajas and Steiner, 2002). Outstanding credit of the financial sector 
rose from around 24% of GDP at the beginning of the decade to 40% 
in 1997. During the subsequent crisis this figure went down dram ati­
cally, back to 25%, while the quality of the portfolio of the financial 
system deteriorated substantially (table IV. 4).
In the Chilean case, the degree of financial depth was much higher 
than in Colom bia since the beginning of the 1990s and continued to 
be so after the crisis. In addition, in contrast with m ost other Latin 
American countries, the index of credit/GDP behaved counter- 
cyclically.4 This helped to explain the fact that the deterioration of 
quality of the loan portfolio during the crisis was extremely mild. 
While non-performing loans as a share of outstanding credit reached
4 In a com parative study for the eight largest Latin American econom ies, Barajas 
and Steiner (2002) show  that the Chilean case was exceptional in  this respect.
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T able IV.4 C hile and  C o lom b ia : financia l sector, 1990-2003
O utstanding C redit/G D P N on-perform ing Loans 
O utstanding C redit
C hile C o lo m b ia 1 C hile C o lo m b ia 1
1990 52.4% 24.8% 2 .1% 4.0%
1991 48.7% 22.7% 1.8% 4.2%
1992 51.5% 24.4% 1.2% 3.1%
1993 55.7% 28.4% 0 .8% 2 .1%
1994 52.8% 31.9% 1.0% 2.4%
1995 55.4% 35.5% 0.9% 3.7%
1996 59.5% 37.3% 1.0% 5.1%
1997 64.3% 39.6% 1.0% 5.2%
1998 66.8% 37.8% 1.4% 8.7%
1999 69.2% 33.9% 1.7% 11.5%
2000 69.2% 27.1% 1.7% 9.4%
2001 69.7% 25.5% 1.6% 8.6%
2002 68.2% 24.8% 1.8% 8.0%
2003 67.2% 25.0% 1.6% 5.7%
Source: Chile: Central Bank of Chile, Banks and Financial Institutions Superintendence. 
Colombia: Banco de la República.
1 Outstanding credit data does not include leasing transactions.
11% in Colom bia in 1999, they did not surpass 1.8% in Chile.5 One 
main reason behind this strength of the Chilean financial system is the 
strict prudential supervision, built after the generalized collapse of the 
banking sector in 1983-86 as a result of the debt crisis.
In summary, the cycle in foreign capital inflows was leveraged in 
Colom bia by the behavior of dom estic credit, which was not the case 
in Chile. Together with the stricter supervision of the financial sector 
in the Chilean case, two other factors may have contributed to these 
contrasting results. First, in Colombia the boom  of capital inflows coin­
cided with a reform in the financial sector, which implied that the 
central bank undertook an important reduction in the reserve require­
ments on domestic deposits between 1991 and 1998. Thus, as stressed 
by Carrasquilla and Zárate (2002), domestic financial regulation in 
Colom bia was highly procyclical. Second, the higher degree of 
financial depth m ay have worked in the Chilean case as a buffer 
against the capital inflows shock. This hypothesis would endorse the
5 There is heterogeneity in the defin ition  o f  non-perform ing loans. In Chile it 
refers to  the installments o f  loans overdue for m ore than 90 days. In C olom bia, 
the definition changed several times along the 1990s.
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idea that foreign capital account regulations are even more im portant 
when the domestic financial system is less developed.
e) Foreign savings and the current account
In the Chilean case, probably as a consequence of very active regula­
tions on capital inflows, the current account deficit was kept under 
control during the first half of the decade. In 1993, due to a sharp drop 
in the copper prices, the deficit went up to 5.4% of GDP. However, the 
current account deficits were below 3% of GDP, averaging 2.3% 
between 1990 and 1995 (see table IV.5 below). After the tequila crisis, 
the current account deficits rose to less sustainable levels, close to 5% 
of GDP between 1996 and 1998. As shown later, this coincides with 
the period in which the regulation of capital inflows became less 
active.
In Colom bia, in contrast, the deterioration of the current account 
was particularly acute during the first half of the decade. Between 1991 
and 1994 -  coinciding with a process of trade opening, currency appre­
ciation and capital flows liberalization -  a current account surplus of 
4.9% of GDP was transformed into a deficit of 4.5%, level around 
which it remained until 1998.
The drop in international liquidity after the Asian and the Russian 
crises im plied drastic adjustm ents in the current account deficits. In 
1999, such adjustm ents represented 5.0% and 5.7% of GDP in Chile 
and Colombia, respectively. As shown in the next section, the paths 
followed by the current account balances of Chile and Colom bia 
during the 1990s were matched by the behavior of their real exchange 
rates.
2. Exchange rate regimes
During most of the 1990s, the exchange rate regimes of Chile and 
Colombia were dominated by the currency bands, which in both coun­
tries were dism antled and replaced by floating regimes only in 1999. 
Those regimes shared many common elements.
a) Chilean exchange rate regime
After the crisis of 1982-83, and much earlier than Colombia, Chile 
introduced a minor width currency band. Since the beginning, the 
upper and the lower bounds of the band were devalued daily, accord­
ing to an estimate of net inflation. Discrete nom inal devaluations, 
however, were added at various junctures, serving to achieve the
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notable real depreciation of 130% between 1982 and 1988. In 1989 the 
band was widened to ±5%, allowing for an orderly and not traumatic 
depreciation of the peso, which was required to compensate for the rise 
in imports associated to a sharp increase in economic activity in 
1988-89.
The evolution of the foreign exchange regime since 1990 reflected 
the purpose of the central bank to regulate the surge in capital inflows. 
Since June 1991, as we will see in the next section, an unremunerated 
reserve requirement was established on foreign loans, and a tax on 
domestic loans applied to up to one year of each operation was 
extended to foreign loans. In January 1992, the currency band 
was widened to ±10%. In contrast with what had happened three years 
earlier, the widening of the band in this case was addressed to allow for 
some additional appreciation of the peso. In June 1992, the dollar was 
replaced by a basket of currencies as the standard for the exchange 
rate. Replacing the dollar with the basket meant greater stability for the 
real exchange rate as perceived by producers of tradables, and intro­
duced greater uncertainty in the peso-dollar exchange rate, thereby 
reducing incentives for interest rate arbitrage and short-term capital 
movements (Ffrench-Davis and Tapia, 2001, p. 87). Remember that, by 
this time, capital inflows were very large and it was already clear that 
the Chilean economy was booming. As we will see in the next section, 
the objective of deterring interest rate arbitrage was being sim ultane­
ously addressed through the reserve requirement on capital inflows, 
thus providing space for an active counter-cyclical monetary policy. In 
the following years capital inflows continued, and the real exchange 
rate experienced a moderate appreciation (averaging 1% yearly 
between 1989 and 1995).6 Naturally, that appreciation contributed to 
reduce inflation. However, it was an equilibrating, sound, real appreci­
ation. Consistently, as said, the current account deficit between 1990 
and 1995 averaged only 2.3% of GDP. 7
6 Central Bank figures provide a higher estimate o f  appreciation -  an annual 
average o f  2.5%  -  because it uses wholesale price indexes for measuring external 
in flation  and CPI for dom estic in flation. W e use figures o f  ECLAC that also 
measure external inflation on  the basis o f  CPI. This procedure is consistent with 
that o f  C olom bia.
7 Appreciation o f  the real rate was "equilibrating" in the sense that it was c o n ­
sistent w ith the net increases o f  productivity in Chile, as the sustainable exter­
nal deficit suggests. Keeping a low  current account deficit was am ong the 
explicit objectives o f  the exchange rate policy  o f  the Central Bank in  that period 
(see Zahler, 1998).
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Figure IV.1 Chile and Colom bia: real exchange rate index, 1987-2003 
Base average 1987-90 = 100 
Source-. ECLAC figures.
Average real exchange rate w ith m ain trading partners, com puted  w ith  CPI. 
A higher real exchange rate indicates a m ore depreciated dom estic currency.
Following the tequila crisis, the behavior of the Chilean economy 
was so strong that expectations of appreciation and capital inflows 
were greatly reinforced after 1995. The central bank kept accumulating 
significant amounts of international reserves with the exchange rate at 
the then appreciating bottom  of the band, until the end of 1997. 
Several parameters of the band were adjusted during that period in 
order to allow for some additional appreciation of the peso and to 
reduce monetary pressures from the accumulation of foreign reserves. 
Since November 1995, the rate of nom inal depreciation of the band 
was designed to allow for a 2% real appreciation per year, based on the 
assumption that Chilean productivity growth would be faster than that 
of its trading partners. In addition, the external inflation used to calcu­
late the referential exchange rate was overestimated, which generated 
considerable additional revaluation. Furthermore, in early 1997, the 
band was broadened from ±10% to ±12.5% as a m echanism  to allow 
for further appreciation of the peso and served to reduce inflation (see 
Ffrench-Davis and Tapia, 2001, pp. 95-96). As a consequence, the peso
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appreciated 20% in real terms between March 1995 and October 1997, 
notably faster than before the tequila crisis (figure IV. 1).
When the exchange rate expectations shifted to depreciation, in late
1997, following the Asian crisis, the Central Bank started to sell abun­
dant reserves to avoid a depreciation of the exchange rate even within 
the lower half of the exchange rate band in order to prevent a rise in 
inflation. The anti-inflationary bias of the Central Bank interventions 
in the foreign exchange market became even more evident in mid-
1998, when the band was drastically shortened, right at the moment of 
greatest uncertainty, in order to send a signal that the authorities 
would not give in to market pressures towards devaluation. This 
measure implied that the macroeconomic adjustment process that was 
needed as a consequence of the drastic decline in the terms of trade 
and of the shortage of capital flows had to be led by interest rate hikes 
and monetary contraction.8 Then, the strategy chosen by the authori­
ties of the Bank was more consistent with a fixed exchange rate regime 
than with a currency band system. Naturally, credibility in the new 
band rapidly deteriorated. The band was widened again at the end of 
1998 and then suspended in September 1999 in order to allow for the 
exchange rate to adjust freely, now in the context of strongly depressed 
domestic absorption.
Given the significant appreciation recorded in 1996-97, it was clear 
that the center of the band had become an "outlier" price, leaving no 
space within the band to make feasible the necessary exchange rate 
adjustm ent (Ffrench-Davis and Larrain, 2003). Actually, m ost of the 
depreciation in the real exchange rate in Chile in recent years took 
place after the dism antlem ent of the currency band in 1999. Between 
August 1999 and July 2003 the real exchange rate depreciated by 30%.
b) Colombian exchange rate regime
As in Chile, the Colombian currency experienced a notable real devalu­
ation during the 1980s, which was required by the shortage of foreign 
savings. The devaluation of the peso was m anaged within the tradi­
8 The authorities o f  the Central Bank stated that an adjustm ent in  the exchange 
rate w ould have caused both  pressure on  prices and costs associated to  currency 
m ism atches in  large non-tradable firms. Ffrench-Davis and Tapia (2001) po in t 
out that these effects were overrated and im plied an over-adjustment in the pro­
ductive sector. C orbo and Tessada (2002) estim ate a VAR m od el for Chile and 
conclude that i) the defense o f  the exchange rate in  January 1998 was well justi­
fied by  potential inflationary costs and, ii) however, a devaluation in m id-1998 
w ould  have not represented an inflationary risk.
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tional crawling-peg regime that had been introduced since 1967 and 
lasted until 1991, and that, in contrast with Chile, avoided any discrete 
jum p in the exchange rate. Even in 1985, when nom inal devaluation 
was alm ost 50%, it was instrumented through small and continuous 
daily movements.
In 1989, Colom bia decided to depreciate its real exchange rate even 
further, in order to compensate for the decline in coffee prices after the 
collapse of the International Coffee Agreement and to prevent negative 
effects of the sharp opening up of the trade balance on the domestic 
production of tradables (Ocampo and Villar, 1992). However, this strat­
egy rapidly proved to be inconsistent with the contractionary m one­
tary policy that the central bank was trying to undertake in order to 
curb inflationary pressures. As in Chile, large capital inflows and pres­
sures towards appreciation of the peso dom inated during m ost of the 
1990s, until mid-1997. Most of the adjustments in the Colom bian 
exchange rate regime were introduced in order to manage those 
pressures.
In June 1991, the traditional crawling-peg regime was modified. The 
Banco de la República would exchange dollars for "Certificados de 
Cam bio" (dollar-denominated bonds) that could only be redeemed at 
the "official exchange rate" after a given maturity. The exchange rate 
would be determined by the secondary market for those bonds. The 
new regime, which was in place until January 1994, implied a nominal 
appreciation of the peso, which marked an im portant shift in the 
policy strategy that had been in place during alm ost a quarter of a 
century. During this period, there was a drastic relaxation in monetary 
policy addressed to reduce dom estic interest rates and to discourage 
foreign capital inflows attracted by interest rate arbitrage. However, 
between 1991 and 1994, the real depreciation of the peso that had 
taken place in 1989 and 1990 was entirely reversed (see figure IV.1 
above). In January 1994, the Banco de la República decided to discon­
tinue the mechanism of the “Certificados de Cam bio" and introduced 
an explicit exchange rate band system (Urrutia, 1995). The amplitude 
of the band was set at ±7% and the center was increased every day at a 
predetermined crawling rate. In December 1994, however, the 
exchange rate band was shifted downwards as a consequence o f the 
actual increase in long-term capital flows and of the expectations of 
additional inflows associated to the development of recently discov­
ered oil camps.
The currency band established in December 1994 was kept without 
important changes until September 1998. During more than three and
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a half years, therefore, it helped to reduce the medium-term instability 
of the exchange rate in an effective manner. For instance, the upper 
limit of the band helped to avoid an extreme depreciation during the 
first half of 1996, when there were speculative pressures related to 
the process against President Samper for allegedly illegal resources in 
his presidential campaign. Also, few m onths later, the lower bound of 
the band helped to avoid extreme appreciation of the peso when it 
became clear that President Samper would stay pi office and large 
inflows were coming into the country, associated with the privatiza­
tion of important public companies.
After the Asian crisis had exploded, in the final m onths of 1997 and 
during the first half of 1998, the role of the currency band was much 
more controversial. The exchange rate had depreciated and was hitting 
the upper limit of the band, so the central bank was forced to sell large 
amounts of foreign exchange while implementing a highly contractive 
monetary policy. Nonetheless, due to the slope and of the amplitude of 
the band, the depreciation of the Colom bian peso was quite substan­
tial. The peso price of the dollar by mid-1998 had depreciated by about 
8% in real terms, without any change in the currency band m echa­
nism. The upward shift in the currency band was decided in September 
1998, when a new government was in office and the macroeconomic 
program for 1999 had gained some credibility. After a short-lived over­
shooting, the new currency band worked sm oothly during the last 
quarter of 1998 and the first quarter of 1999. The Central Bank stopped 
losing reserves and the domestic interest rate experienced a relatively 
rapid downward trend.
In the second quarter of 1999, the financial crisis, the deeper than 
expected recession and the further deterioration of the fiscal accounts, 
damaged the credibility in the macroeconomic program and new pres­
sures towards devaluation appeared. In June, the band was again 
shifted upwards and its amplitude was widened from +7% to ±10%. 
Simultaneously, the government and the central bank announced that 
they had agreed to design an IMF backed program in order to recover 
confidence from the international financial community. By late 
September, immediately after the agreement with the IMF was reached, 
the currency band was dismantled. Having been shifted twice in less 
than a year, its credibility had eroded. Also, at the international level, 
the initial success of other Latin-American countries with their new 
floating regimes (notably Brazil in February and Chile in early 
September) had created strong pressures against the band system, both 
in the market and in the multilateral financial institutions. This facili­
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tated the appearance of speculative attacks. Most analysts however 
considered at that time, that the real exchange rate was already close to 
its long-run equilibrium level. Interestingly enough, this was verified ex 
post de facto. Since the currency band was abolished, the exchange rate 
fluctuated inside the dism antled band during more than two years, 
despite a very rapid decline of the domestic interest rate.
Therefore, the real depreciation of the peso that took place as a con­
sequence of the crisis was instrumented within the currency band 
system.9 Subsequently, between September 1999 and May 2002, the 
real exchange rate fluctuated around the levels reached by the third 
quarter of 1999. After May 2002, the contagion from the Brazilian 
crisis and a higher degree of uncertainty on the sustainability of the 
Colom bian foreign debt, led to an additional real depreciation 
of the peso, which was reinforced by the end of that year with the 
effects of the Venezuelan crisis.
Since the last quarter of 1999, Colombia has a floating exchange rate 
regime. Although this type of regime does not allow the central bank 
to target any specific nom inal or real exchange rate, it contemplates 
two transparent and publicly known mechanism s for central bank 
intervention:
(i) The central bank can buy or sell international reserves through put 
or call options that are auctioned in limited am ounts of foreign 
exchange at the end of each m onth. This m echanism  has been 
used mainly to buy international reserves and to recover the inter­
national liquidity indicators that Colombia had before the 1998/99 
crisis. Since February 2003, however, given the rapid pace of depre­
ciation, the Banco de la República has also used the call options in 
order to mitigate pressures on the exchange rate that may risk the 
attainment of the inflation target.
(ii) The second m echanism is addressed to reduce extreme short-run 
volatility of the exchange rate and consists of additional auctions 
of put or call foreign exchange options which are triggered when­
ever the market rate deviates in an "unusual" manner from its own 
20-day m oving average.10 In practice, short-run volatility of the 
exchange rate has been low and these trigger conditions only took
9 By the third quarter o f  1999, before the currency band was dism antled, the 
real exchange rate had recovered the levels o f  the late 1980s.
10 An "unusual” deviation was initially defined as 5%  and since Decem ber 2001 
was redefined as 4%.
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place in the second half of 2002, when contagion from the 
Brazilian crisis implied a rapid depreciation of the peso.
c) Common and contrasting elements of the exchange rate regimes 
in Chile and Colombia
From the above description, it is possible to highlight som e com m on 
and some contrasting features of the exchange rate regimes that Chile 
and Colombia had in the 1990s:
(i) During m ost of the 1990s, central bank interventions in both 
countries implied large amounts of international reserve accumula­
tion. In this sense, the currency bands worked as limits against 
appreciation of the exchange rate and not as anti-inflationary 
devices.
(ii) As accumulation of international reserves, led by the capital surges 
to emerging economies, created monetary pressures and (short- 
run) quasi-fiscal costs of sterilizing monetary intervention, it 
became more difficult for the central banks to resist the market 
pressure for appreciation. Giving up to those pressures would con­
tribute to keep inflation under control, so the currency bands were 
widened and shifted downwards in several opportunities, allowing 
for a sizeable appreciation of the real exchange rate during most of 
the decade in Colombia and in the second half in Chile.
(iii) The degree of flexibility of the foreign exchange market in the 
inner part of the bands proved to be much lower in Chile, where 
the Central Bank, with intramarginal intervention, was more active 
in trying to stabilize the exchange rate market than the Colombian 
one. This is mirrored in the fact that both the accumulation of 
international reserves during the boom  and the losses during the 
crisis were much larger in Chile (see table IV.5 below).
(iv) In both countries, the limits of the currency bands seemed to be 
more effective to control pressures towards currency appreciation 
than towards currency depreciation. As the bands have an explicit 
or implicit pre-announcement of their limits, the exchange rate 
regime loses credibility when those bands are shifted or widened. If 
that happens in response to a speculative attack against the upper 
limit of the band, the credibility in the anti-inflationary com m it­
ment of the Central Bank is also damaged. It is interesting that 
currency bands in Chile and Colombia disappeared almost simulta­
neously, in September 1999, when there were strong pressures 
towards depreciation. However, the simultaneity in the dism an­
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tling of currency bands may also say a lot about IMF preferences 
and fashions in the international financial community.
(v) The floating regime introduced in Chile and Colom bia after dis­
mantling the currency bands does not imply absence of Central 
Bank intervention.11 What they have in com m on is the assum p­
tion that the Central Bank cannot target specific levels of neither 
the nom inal nor the real exchange rates. Still, Central Banks have 
some room  to alter the short-term foreign exchange market 
through their interventions, which in turn may be discretionary or 
follow publicly known rules. While Chile has exerted discretion in 
intervening the market, Colombia is following strict rules since 
1999. In any case, the experiences of both countries show that the 
optimal exchange rate policy is far from leaving the exchange rate 
determination to the short-termist markets.12
3. Capital account regulations13
a) The rationale for capital account regulations
The rationale for capital account regulations arises from the hypothesis 
that full liberalization of the capital account in a developing economy, 
is likely to "trap" dom estic policies into short-term bias and non- 
sustainable macroeconomic equilibrium (Ffrench-Davis and Ocampo,
2001).
The exchange rate regimes of Chile and Colom bia provide a clear 
example of the difficulties created by foreign capital flows to macroeco­
nomic policies. Capital flows greatly reduce the autonom y of domestic 
economic authorities to jointly manage the real exchange rate, the real 
interest rate, and aggregate demand, even in the short and medium 
run. Large capital inflows tend to reduce both the exchange rate and 
the interest rate, and to increase aggregate demand, while capital 
outflows tend to increase both macro-prices and to reduce economic
11 C olom bia  accum ulated US$ 2.2 b illion  since it entered the floating regime. 
Chile accum ulated reserves in  2000 and 2002 but lost US$ 600 m illion  in 2001 
and US$ 400 m illion  in 2003 (table 5).
12 Ffrench-Davis (2003, p. 12). See also Edwards (2002), w h o  argues that "it is 
perfectly possible that the optim al policy  ... is one where the central bank inter­
venes from  tim e to  tim e" (p. 17). Those interventions, also, m ay be consistent 
with an inflation targeting regime without im plying a "fear o f  floating".
13 Revised and updated version o f  a paper presented in a Geneva m eeting o f  the 
G-24, September 2003.
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activity. As far as capital flows to developing economies have been 
proved to be highly procyclical, the real exchange rate, the real interest 
rate and aggregate demand become highly procyclical too.
As a general rule, the capital account regulations that have been used 
both in Chile and in Colombia are oriented to:
(i) Enhance the ability of monetary and exchange rate policies to act 
in a counter-cyclical way. When capital inflows are very large, they 
push the domestic demand into a boom and lead to a deficit in the 
current account. Under those circumstances, the capital account 
regulations are addressed to discourage capital inflows in order to 
mitigate pressures towards lower real interest rates -  which would 
artificially reinforce the aggregate demand boom  -  and towards a 
real appreciation -  which would increase the current account 
deficit.
(ii) Reduce the vulnerability of the domestic economy to sudden 
changes in the international financial environment. This explains 
the emphasis of those regulations in reducing the share of short­
term and liquid liabilities in total capital flows, and in im posing 
limits on the net uncovered foreign exchange positions of the 
domestic economic agents.
(iii) Improve the capacity of a country to use foreign savings as comple­
mentary to domestic savings and not as substitute. Again, this 
explains the emphasis of those regulations in reducing the share of 
short-term capital, which tends to finance consum ption, vis-à-vis 
long-term capital, which usually finances productive investment.
b) Reserve requirement on capital inflows: A price-based capital 
account regulation
The m ost famous m echanism  of capital account regulation used in 
both Chile and Colom bia during the 1990s is the reserve requirement 
on capital inflows. As we will see, the height of the requirement and 
several details of its operation changed along time and were different 
in each country. The regulations used in both countries, however, 
shared three very important characteristics: (i) they were not quantita­
tive controls but price-based regulations, (ii) they affected capital 
inflows and not capital outflows, and (iii) they were designed to have 
more impact on short-term than on long-term capital flows.
As with any price-based mechanism , the reserve requirement 
on capital inflows was not intended to block the way for those 
inflows, but to discourage them at the margin, placing sand in their
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wheels.14 In order to make capital inflows more costly under a large 
external supply, two key elements were present as complements to the 
reserve requirement: (i) restrictive policies on any type of dollarization 
of deposits in the dom estic financial system, and (ii) strict prudential 
regulations on the net foreign exchange position allowed to financial 
intermediaries. These two elements together guaranteed that the 
domestic financial intermediaries could provide foreign exchange 
denom inated loans only when they were funded with foreign credit 
and subject to the reserve requirement. At the same time they inhib­
ited the domestic financial system from becoming a m ajor actor in the 
speculation in favor or against the peso.
The introduction of a non-remunerated reserve requirement in Chile 
in June 1991 was explicitly addressed to soften appreciatory pressures 
and provide more breath and autonom y to monetary policy (Zahler, 
1998, p. 69). The deposit of the reserve requirement was initially equiv­
alent to 20% o f foreign loans and had to be kept for a m inim um  of 
90 days and a m axim um  of one year, according to the term of the 
operation. In order to increase its effect, in May 1992, it was raised to 
30% and the term of the deposit was raised to one year, independent 
of the maturity of the loan, which increased the bias against short-term 
capital inflows. In July 1995 it was extended to the purchase of Chilean 
stocks (secondary ADRs) by foreigners.
Although the objective of regulating capital flows continued to be 
present in Chile after 1996, the attitude of policy-makers was much 
less proactive. Despite the fact that there was a significant surge of 
capital inflows in 1996 and 1997, and that the effectiveness of any reg­
ulation tends to decline with time, the authorities did neither accom ­
modate the height of the reserve requirement to the increased supply 
of funding nor generalized its scope.15 The surge clearly weakened the 
fundamentals of the Chilean economy: the current account deficit
14 As any kind o f  regulation or tax, the reserve requirement implies som e effi­
ciency costs at the m icroeconom ic level. Forbes (2004) stresses some o f  those costs 
and argues that, m ore than "sand in the wheels", capital controls are "m ud in the 
wheels o f  market discipline". However, prudential regulations, o f  w hich 
the reserve requirement is one, are directed to reconcile the interests or freedom  
o f all agents, discouraging negative externalities and time inconsistencies.
15 Le Fort and Lehmann (2003) argue that in order to mitigate elusion, it w ould 
have been required to  elim inate exem ptions to  direct suppliers credit and to 
som e investm ent inflows, but these measures faced strong opp osition  from  the 
private sector and the previous coherent consensus w ithin the public sector had 
been weakened.
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increased, the exchange rate appreciated much faster and the stock of 
liquid foreign liabilities grew. When the Asian crisis contagion arrived, 
therefore, these fundam entals of the Chilean economy were much 
weaker than they had been during the tequila crisis of 1995. This fact 
contributed to increase the magnitude of the crisis of 1998 and 1999 
when, as we will see, private capital outflows were quite large, includ­
ing funds of the domestic private pension system (see Zahler, 2005). 
The reserve requirement was reduced from 30% to 10% in June 1998 
and then to 0% in September.
Inspired by the Chilean experience, the Colom bian reserve require­
ment on capital inflows was decreed in September 1993, coinciding 
with the final steps of the process of dismantling administrative capital 
controls that had started in 1991. The size of the reserve requirement 
was high enough to make it prohibitive in practice. Exemption made 
for trade financing, the requirement applied to any "short-term" 
foreign loan. "Short-term" was initially defined as less than 18-month 
maturity: this term was raised in March and August of 1994 to three 
and five years, respectively.16 In 1996, when the exchange rate was at 
the m ost depreciated limit of the currency band and the central bank 
was loosing reserves, the minimum maturity of the foreign loans to be 
exempted from the reserve requirement went down to three years.
After the huge increase in international reserves that took place in 
the last part of 1996, the Colom bian government issued a State-of- 
Emergency Decree, which, am ong other measures, established an 
explicit Tobin tax on all capital inflows (trade financing included) in 
addition to the reserve requirement regulated by the Central Bank. The 
Decree was declared unconstitutional in March 1997 but the central 
bank rapidly increased the reserve requirement again.
In May 1997, the Colom bian Central Bank introduced several 
changes in the reserve requirement system, making it simpler and 
more similar to the Chilean one. A flat deposit in local currency 
(instead of a dollar denom inated deposit) was required for all loans, 
independently of the maturity. The minimum maturity was thus aban­
doned but, as in the Chilean case, the new m echanism  implied that 
the tax equivalent of the deposit was lower the longer the maturity of 
the loan. Initially, the size of the reserve requirement was 30% of the 
foreign loan and had to be kept during 18 m onths. These numbers 
were reduced in January and again in September 1998 as a response to
16 A history o f  the reserve requirem ent on  capital in flow s in C olom bia  is sum ­
marized in O cam po and Tovar (2003).
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the weakened capital inflows. Between September 1998 and May 2000, 
the reserve requirement was only 10% o f the foreign loan and had to 
be kept during 6 m onths. In June 2000, the reserve requirement was 
reduced to zero. Colom bian authorities stated, however, as had done 
the authorities in Chile, that this was not the end of the mechanism, 
but only a resetting of the parameters, and the m echanism  could be 
used again if needed to confront renewed capital surges.
Besides the similarities am ong the Chilean and the Colom bian 
reserve requirement instruments to deter capital inflows, it seems clear 
that Chile used them more proactively during the first half of the 
1990s than after 1995. In contrast, Colom bia used them more proac­
tively in the second half of the decade.
c) Non-FDI private capital flows and the effectiveness of private 
capital account regulations
The behavior of non-FDI private capital flows shows significant 
comm on elements in Chile and Colom bia (see table IV.5, column e). 
Those flows were highly positive for several years until 1997 and 
became highly negative in both countries during the crisis of 1998/99.
In Chile, these flows averaged US$ 2.4 billion yearly between 1990 
and 1996 and did not have extreme swings during that period. Even in 
1995, when the tequila crisis was taking place, they amounted to US$ 
2.0 billion. In contrast, between 1998 and 1999 they implied a net 
outflow of US$ 8.4 billion. Capital outflows had a pause in 2000 but 
were high again since 2001.
In Colombia, private non-FDI capital inflows became important only 
after 1992. During the initial years of the decade, net capital flows were 
negative, reflecting perhaps the existence of direct controls which were 
more effective to discourage inflows than to restrain outflows. As 
already mentioned, those controls were dismantled between 1991 and 
1993. Private non-FDI capital flows averaged US$ 2.7 billion per year 
between 1993 and 1996. As in Chile, they were high even in 1995, 
when they amounted to US$ 2.5 billion, despite the tequila crisis. The 
reduction in this type of inflows took place in 1997, probably because 
of an increase in the costs of the reserve requirement im plemented at 
the beginning of that year, before the Asian crisis started. In 1998 they 
became very small but still positive, and starting in 1999 they turned 
highly negative (see table IV.5).
Based on these figures, it appears easy to doubt the effectiveness of 
the reserve requirement that was used to regulate capital inflows. Both 
in Chile and in Colombia, net capital inflows were highest precisely
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during the periods in which that regulation was being used. However, 
the coexistence of large capital inflows and the reserve requirement 
may reflect a policy reaction function in which the introduction of 
capital regulations is caused by the large supply of capital inflows.17 
That was, evidently, the actual sequence in both cases.
In any case, it is clear that the regulations on capital inflows used in 
Chile and Colom bia were not able to avoid the large net capital 
outflows that took place in the final years of the 1990s and the begin­
ning of the new century. Our hypothesis may be summarized as 
follows: the reserve requirement was useful and effective as a tem po­
rary policy tool during the boom  of capital inflows. Its effectiveness 
may be seen from two different perspectives. First, as a short-run macro- 
economic policy, it enhanced the ability of the domestic authorities to 
act in a counter-cyclical way and to deal with the trade-offs between 
exchange rate and monetary policies. Second, as a liability-flows policy, 
it was effective in reducing the short-term com ponent of capital i 
inflows. Thus, the reserve requirement enhanced the absorptive capac- J  
ity of a given total inflow, by raising the share of funds more associated 
to productive investment and, consequently, reduced the vulnerability 
to sudden stops; by contributing to resist appreciating pressures on the 
exchange rate, it contributed to increase the share of tradables in GDE^
On the other hand, however, the reserve requirement and, more* 
generally, the set of policies adopted by Chile and Colombia, were not 
fully effective to deal with a major and lasting crisis as the one j 
observed after 1997. This is not a reason to discard the temporary use 
of this type of policies under new capital surges, but to stress the need ; 
of other complementary regulations. The experiences of Chile a n d ,J  
Colombia since 1998 highlight the need for more strict controls on the 
behavior of the stocks of foreign exchange denominated assets and lia- \ 
bilities. For example, as we will argue later, there should be financial ! 
regulations addressed to discourage large currency mismatches in the J 
balance sheets of firms in the non-tradable sectors. Also, there should : 
be regulations on the ability of institutional investors to manage port- j 
folios in foreign currency. Opening the way for outflows of domestic ! 
capital in periods of abundance proved to be ineffective in reducing ) 
the excess supply, while in periods of scarcity of external supply led to j
17 Cardoso and G oldfajn (1998) successfully test this hypothesis for the Brazilian 
case.
Table IV.5 Chile and Colombia: capital flows and current account financing, 1990-2003 (USS Millions)






d. Net Foreign 
Credit to Public 
Sector1
e. Other Flows 
of Private 
Capital = b-a-c-dUS$ Millions Shares of GDP
A. CHILE 
1990 -485 -1.5% 2,121 654 -222.0 2,174
1991 -99 -0.3% 1,049 697 -955.1 1,406
1992 -958 -2.2% 2,344 538 42.2 2,723
1993 -2,553 -5.4% 173 600 -357.0 2,483
1994 -1,585 -2.9% 2,919 1,672 -313.8 3,146
1995 -1,345 -1.9% 741 2,205 -2,085.5 1,967
1996 -3,083 -4.1% 1,122 3,681 -1,540.3 2,064
1997 -3,660 -4.4% 3,320 3,809 -125.7 3,297
1998 -3,918 -4.9% -2,194 3,144 430.0 -1,850
1999 99 0.1% -738 6,203 429.0 -7,469
2000 -897 -1.2% 337 873 -85.3 446
2001 -1,100 -1.6% -596 2,590 481.1 -2,567
2002 -885 -1.3% 199 1,594 886.2 -1,397






Table IV.5 Chile and Colombia: capital flows and current account financing, 1990-2003 (USS Millions) (continued)






d. Net Foreign 
Credit to Public 
Sector1
e. Other Flows 
of Private 
Capital = b-a-c-dUS$ Millions Shares of GDP
B. COLOMBIA 
1990 544 1.2% 610 484 -45 -373
1991 2,347 4.9% 1,763 437 -347 -675
1992 876 1.5% 1,274 745 -56 -292
1993 -2,221 -3.4% 464 865 -158 1,978
1994 -3,669 -4.5% 199 1,298 -1,224 3,795
1995 -4,524 -4.9% 2 712 1,388 2,425
1996 -4,642 -4.8% 1,721 2,784 856 2,723
1997 -5,751 -5.4% 277 4,753 1,146 129
1998 -4,858 -4.9% -1,390 2,032 1,469 -34
1999 671 0.8% -315 1,392 647 -3,025
2000 628 0.9% 870 2,069 614 -2,441
2001 -1,250 -1.5% 1,217 2,509 1,484 -1,525
2002p -1,580 -1.8% 138 1,258 388 73
2003p -1,389 -1.8% -184 837 469 -101
Source: Central Bank of Chile, IMF, Banco de la República. 
p Preliminary.
1 Chile: Includes Central Bank’s operations and excludes operations by the state-owned commercial bank (Banco del Estado). Colombia: 
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an extremely procyclical outcom e.18 In the Colom bian case, it is clear 
that the large growing fiscal imbalances that took place since the mid- 
1990s implied a rapid increase in foreign exchange liabilities and made 
it much more difficult to manage the crisis.
d) The reserve requirement as a macroeconomic policy tool
In evaluating the effectiveness of the reserve requirement on capital 
inflows as a macroeconomic policy tool, most analysts have focused on 
the effects of this regulation on the volume of total capital inflows. 
Empirical results on this topic are mixed.
Some econometric studies for both Chile and Colombia failed to find 
effects of the reserve requirement on the total volume of capital 
inflows, even though they found an effect on the com position of 
flows.19 Those studies argue that there is a high substitution between 
capital inflows of different maturities, which implies a compensatory 
increase in long-term inflows when the reserve requirement induces a 
reduction in the short-term ones. From there, they conclude that this 
type of price-based regulation does not have an im pact on net capital 
flows.
Other recent studies, however, obtain very different results. Le Fort 
and Lehman (2003) and Ffrench-Davis and Tapia (2004) show that, in 
the Chilean case, the reserve requirement did have an effect on the 
total volume of private capital inflows, once the effects of interest rate 
differentials and the evolution of the supply of funds are well taken 
into account. Gallego et al. (2002), find a significant effect of the 
reserve requirement on capital inflows when actions taken by 
the Central Bank to close loopholes are considered, highlighting the 
need for an active approach as a necessary condition for succeeding in 
the use of capital controls.
18 It is interesting to  underline that Korea, assumed to  be at present a case o f  
open  capital account (evidently, it was the opposite in its period o f  "m iracu­
lous" growth), still applies restrictions on  outflows o f  dom estic savings.
19 Critical evaluations are developed in  Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998) and 
Cárdenas and Barrera (1997) for the Chilean and the C olom bian  cases, respec­
tively. De G regorio, Edwards and Valdés (2000) also con clud e that the 
Unremunerated Reserve Requirement (URR) did n ot affect net capital inflows in 
Chile, but they find that it allowed for a larger interest rate differential w ith the 
rest o f  the world, providing room  o f  maneuver to m onetary policy.
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Similarly, Ocampo and Tovar (2003) find that the reserve require­
ments in Colom bia "were effective in reducing the volume of capital 
inflows, both due to the increased costs of short-term borrowing and to 
the discrete effects of regulations, associated to the imperfect substitu­
tion of borrowing at different maturities" (p. 29).
Villar and Rincón (2003) argue that the econometric results on the 
effectiveness of this type of regulation on the volume of capital inflows 
do not solve the simultaneity problem that arises from the fact that 
those regulations affect the domestic interest rates, which in turn affect 
capital inflows. The papers m entioned in the previous paragraphs 
obtain partial equilibrium results: given the differential between 
domestic and foreign interest rates, a tax on capital inflows reduces 
their volume. The tax, however, should increase the domestic interest 
rate and it is likely that its total effect on the volume of capital inflows 
will be ambiguous when this channel is taken into account.
Following Villar and Rincón, the effectiveness of the reserve require­
ment as a macroeconomic policy tool should be evaluated also from 
the perspective of its impact on the domestic interest rates and the real 
exchange rate. Their econometric work show indeed that, in Colombia, 
the reserve requirement was a useful macroeconomic policy tool in a 
period characterized by large capital inflows, excess aggregate demand, 
pressures towards domestic currency appreciation and large current 
account deficits. This tool facilitated a counter-cyclical policy, allowing 
the domestic authorities to increase the domestic interest rates vis-à-vis 
the foreign rate, and hence reducing aggregate demand while avoiding 
additional pressures towards domestic currency appreciation.
Chile, in 1992 offers one quite illustrative case of the contribution of 
the reserve requirement to macroeconomic stability. Then, the USA, 
with a rather low interest rate, was further reducing it in order to face 
dom estic recession, while Chile experienced some overheating and 
large supply of external funds. The response of Chile was to increase 
the reserve requirement, thus making space for monetary policy to 
raise its domestic interest rate with net stabilizing effects on aggregate 
demand. The effectiveness of capital controls to make room for m one­
tary policy is supported by all econometric studies (see De Gregorio et 
al., 2000; Edwards, 1999; Ffrench-Davis and Tapia, 2004; Gallego et al.,
2002). Thus, the Central Bank could induce a policy of mini adjustments 
to avoid maxi adjustments.
We can conclude, therefore, that the reserve requirement was a 
useful macroeconomic policy tool. However, as any other m acroeco­
nomic policy addressed to affect interest rates and the exchange rate, it
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is essentially a short-term policy instrum ent,20 and to be used only in 
periods of an “excessive" supply. It is a counter-cyclical policy tool.
e) On microeconomic effects of capital controls
While the positive effects of the reserve requirement have been 
acknowledged by academic circles and authorities of institutions such 
as the BIS, IMF and the World Bank, some research on microeconomic 
effects has appeared. Although this chapter focuses on m acroeconom ­
ics, we have included this brief section on m icroeconom ic effects 
because of the notoriousness that this research, particularly related to 
the Chilean case, has gained recently.
Forbes (2003) finds that the reserve requirement affected more inten­
sively "sm all" firms by im posing financial constraints. Gallego and 
Hernández (2003) conclude that the reserve requirement affected the 
financial structures of the Chilean firms reducing their leverage, 
increasing their reliance on self-generated funds (retained earnings), 
and increasing the maturity profile of their debt. Both microeconomic 
works use as a sample a group of listed companies in stock markets.21
Without discussing now the specifics of those two studies, it is 
evident that any tax imposes some cost to taxpayers and, in doing so, 
changes relative prices. The crucial point is what is the net effect of 
capital controls on overall welfare, after contrasting both their eventual 
microeconomic costs and their macroeconomic benefits. As m en­
tioned, overall, evidence show that in Chile capital controls worked 
well, despite the existence of loopholes and a progressive elusion, 
which was not monitored by authorities as they had done system ati­
cally in 1991-95. In fact, at least in terms of its intermediate objectives, 
the reserve requirement was able to open space for monetary policy, 
contributed to reduce the stock of foreign liabilities and improved their 
maturity profile.
From the point of view of investment and growth, the impressive 
growth performance of the 1990s seems to support the idea that the 
positive effect of the whole approach, including the capital controls 
and their management, was much stronger than any associated micro­
20 As already discussed, the "short-term ", in this respect, can refer to  several 
years, associated to  the extent o f  the capital surge.
21 M ost listed com panies in Chilean stock markets are am ong the biggest in  the 
econ om y, therefore conclusions from  these works can not apply directly to 
SMEs.
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economic costs. Actually, the investment ratio of Chile in the 1990s 
was the highest recorded in its history. In this sense, "financial con­
straints" as defined and reported by Forbes (2003) were not im pedi­
ment for expanding the productive capacity.22 Moreover, the 
microeconomic switch from debt to retained earnings in the financial 
structure, as well as the shift toward longer-term liabilities of "sm all” 
firms, found by Gallego and Hernández (2003) can be considered as a 
positive by-product of Chilean capital controls. Indeed, the main 
source of private savings in EEs, tends to be non-distributed profits and 
depreciation reserves of firms.
On the other hand, the Chilean economy became one of the less vul­
nerable in the region, escaping from the contagion of the Mexican 
crisis. In the case of the Asian crisis, the negative effect was rather 
moderated and, according to Ffrench-Davis and Tapia (2004), was 
mostly linked to policy errors like careless liberalization of outflows by 
residents during the boom  phase. The reserve requirement, in turn, 
contributed to reduce the stock of liabilities and to improve its profile 
(both from a micro and macro perspective). According to most interna­
tional research these two factors determine strongly both the probabil­
ity of crises and its associated costs. In other words, the Asian crisis 
would have had a stronger negative effect on the Chilean economy if 
the capital controls had not been there.
Finally, evidence appears to be strong in the direction that access to 
financing and spreads of SMEs are more intensively affected than large 
firms during crises. Avoiding crises via discouraging capital inflows 
during the boom  stage tends to imply for SMEs paying higher interest 
rates during the boom, but contributes to avoid sharp increases during 
the eluded bust and the corresponding actual financial constraints that 
they face during recessions.
f) The reserve requirement as a liability policy: Flows policies vs. 
stock policies
Empirical studies in both Chile and Colombia coincide in showing that 
the reserve requirement on capital inflows contributed to keep a rela­
22 Forbes (2003) defines "financially constrained” firms as those that depend on  
their ow n  sources o f  financing to  invest. This defin ition  is quite disputable, as 
reflected in the literature on  the issue (see, for exam ple, Kaplan and Zingales, 
1997).
126 Seeking Growth under Financial Volatility
tively longer maturity of private foreign liabilities in the 1990s.23 From 
this point of view, this was an effective tool as a liability policy. With a 
long-term maturity of foreign debt stock, a sudden stop in the supply 
of capital flows towards emerging markets has a much lesser impact on 
those markets as far as the refinancing needs are lower. In those con­
junctures, what matters are gross financing needs rather than net 
needs. When the tequila crisis spread over most Latin-American coun­
tries in 1995, the m aturity structure of foreign debt in Chile and 
Colombia was perceived as a significant strength of these economies 
and helped to make them almost immune to the crisis.
However, a high average maturity of private foreign debt is not a 
sufficient safeguard against a strong and long-lived shortfall in the 
supply of inflows. The experiences of Chile and Colom bia in 1998-99 
suggest that, when the economy receives that type of shock, what was 
originally contracted to be long-term debt may become shorter-term 
debt by the decision of debtors. They, indeed, buy dollar-denominated 
assets to hedge their positions. Also, under the pressure of weak eco­
nomic activity and expectations of devaluation, they may be allowed 
to prepay their foreign currency liabilities before maturity, as actually 
happened in Colom bia.24
Table IV. 6 presents the evolution of the stocks of foreign debt in 
Chile and Colom bia. The figures help to highlight the very rapid 
increase in the private sector foreign debt that took place during the 
second half of the 1990s, though from moderate initial levels. The 
rapid process of private debt accumulation marked a deep contrast 
between the period of the tequila crisis and the 1998-99 crises. At the 
end of 1994, when the tequila crisis was starting, total private debt was 
US$ 12 billion in Chile and US$ 8 billion in Colombia. Only four years 
later, at the end of 1998, these numbers had more than doubled (to 
US$27 billion in Chile and to US$18 billion in Colom bia). Although 
the short-term com ponent of these debts continued to be low, the
23 For the C olom bian  case, see Cárdenas and Barrera (1997); O cam po and Tovar 
(2003). For the Chilean case, see Agosin and Ffrench-Davis (2001); De Gregorio, 
Edwards and Valdés (2000); Le Fort and Lehmann (2003); Gallego et al. (2002).
24 Since 1997, the Banco de la República o f  C olom bia allowed private debtors to 
prepay long-term  liabilities (w hich  had n ot deposited the reserve requirem ent 
on  short-term capital in flow s), provided that half o f  the original maturity had 
elapsed.
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huge increase in total private debt made the foreign exchange balance 
sheet much more vulnerable to the crisis.25
Behind the behavior of private foreign debt during the 1990s there is a 
rapidly growing currency mismatch in the private sector balance sheets. 
Both firms and households increased their foreign exchange denomi­
nated liabilities without a corresponding increase in foreign exchange 
denominated assets. Households and firms producing in the non-tradable 
sectors increased their indebtedness in foreign currency during the period 
in which the peso was expected to appreciate, which suggests that the 
reserve requirement on capital inflows was not binding enough. Only 
when the crisis of 1998-99 exploded and the Chilean and the Colombian 
peso started to depreciate, the private sectors started to look eagerly for 
hedging instruments, which reinforced the pressures towards depreciating 
the domestic currencies.26 The regulations in both Chile and Colombia 
were not strong enough to discourage the financial intermediaries passing 
currency mismatches through to their clients. As a consequence, when 
the peso actually depreciated, they had to pay a significant cost. In the 
Colombian experience, to some degree, the financial crisis of 1999 was 
explained by the sudden increase in the peso value of foreign liabilities 
due to the peso depreciation. Prudential regulation should have pre­
vented this from happening by reflecting these risks in the balance sheets 
of the banks that used to lend to clients with this type of currency mis­
match. In the case of Chile, the devaluation that was needed, because of 
the too appreciated exchange rate reached in 1996-97, was delayed thus 
giving time to private firms to reduce foreign debt with cheap dollars, at 
the expense of the Central Bank balance sheet and a costly monetary con­
traction: the delayed correction of the exchange rate was compensated 
with a sharp increase in the interest rate.
One main problem with the regulations that were used in Chile and 
Colombia is that they act on the flow of new foreign exchange liabilities
25 Bleakley and Cow an (2002) use m icroevidence at firm  level for several Latin- 
Am erican countries to  show  that the detrim ental effect o f  the depreciation o f 
dom estic currencies during the crisis (balance sheet effect) was ou tw eighed by  
the effect o f  the in com e elasticity o f  firms to  the exchange rate. This result sug­
gests that firms in the tradable sectors had higher foreign debt ratios than those 
in the non-tradable ones. However, in  the C olom bian  case, there is evidence 
that the increase in  private foreign debt was m ore acute in  firms o f  the n o n ­
tradable sectors. See Banco de la República (2002), p. 27.
26 In 1998-99, the Central Bank o f  Chile issued dollar denom inated bonds for 
an am ount equivalent to  2%  o f  GDP, at an exchange rate evidently overvalued, 
to  enhancing hedging operations.













1990 1,398 4,235 11,792 17,425 6,710
1991 1,135 4,675 10,554 16,364 7,638
1992 3,027 5,592 9,623 18,242 9,742
1993 2,999 7,167 9,020 19,186 10,252
1994 3,339 9,004 9,135 21,478 13,740
1995 2,816 11,419 7,501 21,736 14,783
1996 2,823 17,438 6,011 26,272 15,805
1997 1,438 22,126 5,470 29,034 18,274
1998 1,712 25,087 5,792 32,591 16,292
1999 1,198 27,571 5,989 34,758 14,946
2000 2,694 28,464 6,019 37,177 15,110
2001 2,051 30,363 6,124 38,538 14,400
2002 2,324 31,154 7,478 40,956 15,351







Table IV.6 Chile and Colombia: international reserves and debt stocks, 1990-2003 (US$ Millions) (continued)
Foreign Private Debt Foreign Public Debt Total Foreign Debt1 International
----------------------------------------------- Reserves
End of: Short term2 Long Term
B. COLOMBIA
1990 1,409 1,113 15,471 17,993 4,595
1991 1,184 981 15,171 17,335 6,500
1992 1,612 1,250 14,416 17,278 7,728
1993 2,587 2,046 14,254 18,887 7,932
1994 3,213 4,806 14,718 22,737 8,104
1995 3,920 6,880 15,540 26,340 8,453
1996 3,151 11,572 16,394 31,116 9,939
1997 3,436 14,191 16,785 34,412 9,908
1998 3,002 14,891 18,787 36,680 8,740
1999 2,267 14,267 20,199 36,733 8,103
2000 2,315 13,207 20,610 36,132 9,006
2001 2,802 12,838 23,471 39,111 10,245
2002p 3,063 11,492 22,785 37,340 10,844
2003p 3,210 10,455 24,531 38,197 10,921
Source: Central Bank of Chile, Banco de la República, 
p Preliminary.
1 Colombia: Includes financial leasing transactions.
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and not on the stock of liabilities. Thus, liability-flows policies should be 
complemented with liability-stock policies. These stock policies should 
be primarily based on prudential regulation and supervision, imposing 
very stringent regulatory provisions to the banks lending to house­
holds and firms with large foreign currency m ismatches (Villar and 
Rincon, 2003).27 In addition, as suggested in Ocampo (2003), they 
could be reinforced with tax provisions applying to foreign currency 
liabilities. For instance, deductions for interest paym ents on interna­
tional loans could be restricted to firms with foreign exchange rev­
enues.
g) Foreign portfolio investment
While foreign direct investment (FDI) was entirely free in both Chile 
and Colom bia since the beginning of the 1990s,28 these countries 
m aintained restrictions on foreign portfolio investment as a com ple­
mentary policy to the reserve requirement on foreign loans.
Chile kept a one-year minimum stay for foreign portfolio investment 
(except ADRs) up to May 2000. Also, as already mentioned, since 1995 
the reserve requirement was applied to the purchase of Chilean stocks 
by foreigners (secondary ADRs). Still, foreign portfolio investment in 
equity played a very pro-cyclical role, as can be seen in table IV. 7. 
Colombia applied a less restrictive regulation. ADRs were not subject to 
the reserve requirement on capital inflows and foreign investment in 
equity was freely allowed, provided that it was done through special 
purpose funds administered by financial institutions with residence in 
Colombia. Moreover, in order to accelerate the process of deepening 
the domestic capital markets for public debt, Colom bia facilitated 
foreign investment in fixed interest securities in 1996. This purpose 
was certainly met during 1996 and 1997, before the crisis exploded. 
The stock o f foreign investment in domestic public debt went from 
zero in 1995 to US$400 million by March 1998. Less than one year 
later, however, this am ount had gone back to alm ost zero. Therefore, 
foreign portfolio investment in public securities, which was liberalized 
in order to facilitate public financing, reinforced the procyclicality of 
foreign investment in equity.
27 Ffrench-Davis and O cam po (2001) argue that the m ain problem  with this 
option  is that non-financial agents may borrow  directly abroad; actually, restric­
tions solely on  banks tend to encourage that direct borrowing.
28 In the Chilean case, however, there was a one-year m inim um  stay before 
capital repatriation o f  FDI was allowed, and loans associated to  FDI were subject 
to the reserve requirement.
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Table IV. 7 Chile and Colombia: net flows of foreign portfolio investment 
in equity, 1990-2003 (liabilities)1 (US$ Millions)















Source: Central Bank of Chile, Banco de la República. 
1 ADRs and Investment Funds, 
p Preliminary.
h) The role of domestic institutional investors in the foreign 
exchange markets
The stronger im pact that the crisis of the final years of the 1990s had 
on the Chilean and the Colom bian economies, compared with the 
impact of the tequila crisis, may be explained in part by factors already 
m entioned: the more appreciated exchange rates, the stronger and 
longer reduction in the supply of funds, the higher stock of debt 
and the higher exposure to volatile portfolio investment. An additional 
relevant factor may have been the role that major dom estic institu­
tional investors started to play in the foreign exchange markets during 
the second half of the 1990s.
Initially, the restrictions on the activity of domestic institutional 
investors in the foreign exchange markets were an essential part of the 
policy framework in which Chile and Colombia introduced the reserve 
requirement on capital inflows. However, the trend towards financial 
liberalization that dominated the international economy in the 1990s 
implied that some of these restrictions were gradually relaxed in the 
second half of the decade. This relaxation made it more difficult to 
avoid sudden capital outflows and portfolio reallocations as the ones 
that took place between 1997 and 1999, when the Asian and the 
Russian crises exploded. The effectiveness of the reserve requirement
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on capital inflows to reduce the financial vulnerability was therefore 
diminished by such relaxation.
The clearest example of this process of relaxation was related with 
the investment regime applied to the private pension funds. These 
funds became very important actors in the domestic capital markets in 
both countries. Paradoxically, their role in the foreign exchange 
markets was prom oted during the second half of the 1990s, when the 
authorities in both Chile and Colom bia considered that the effects of 
foreign capital inflows could be partly compensated by capital outflows 
originated by these institutional investors. They were then allowed to 
invest larger shares of their portfolios in foreign currency, expecting 
that they would play a counter-cyclical role. In practice, however, the 
role of these funds was highly procyclical. They did not invest much 
abroad during the period prior to the Asian crisis, in which there were 
expectations of domestic currency appreciation. Instead, after the crisis 
exploded, they took advantage of their more relaxed regulation in 
order to rapidly reallocate huge amounts of their portfolios abroad, 
thus reinforcing the demand for foreign currency and the pressures 
towards depreciation.
Hence, as argued in Ffrench-Davis and Tapia (2001), the attem pt to 
use a more relaxed regulation on the pension funds proved not to be 
successful in order to encourage capital outflows during the boom. On 
the contrary, that attem pt induced a higher degree of vulnerability 
of the foreign exchange markets and a reduction in the degrees of 
freedom of domestic monetary policies during the downturn (see also 
Ocampo, 2003; Zahler, 2005). Actually, the main source of the reces­
sive adjustment experienced by Chile in 1998-99 was associated to 
capital outflows by the private social security agents; their net outflow 
was equivalent to nearly 5% of GDP.
i) Public capital flows and FDI
As mentioned in section 1, the behavior of fiscal accounts in the 1990s 
was entirely different in Chile and Colombia. Chile kept an average 
fiscal surplus of nearly 2% of GDP. Colombia, instead, experienced 
large and growing fiscal deficits during the last part of the decade. This 
implied that public financing was not an issue in Chile, while it cer­
tainly was in Colombia.
Table IV.5 (above) highlights the contrast between Chile and 
Colombia on this matter. Until 1994, both countries could use their 
fiscal surpluses counter-cyclically, reducing their public external debt 
in a period of large private capital inflows. In the Chilean case, this
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continued to be true in the following years. Most notably, in the bien­
nium 1995-96, net public foreign borrowing was negative in US$ 3.6 
billion, partially countervailing private inflows.
In Colombia, in contrast, there were net inflows of foreign credit to 
the public sector since 1995. Due to the size of the public sector deficit 
in Colombia, those flows became quite large, averaging US$ 1.1 billion 
between 1995 and 2001. Between 1995 and 1997, those flows acted 
procyclically, reinforcing the pressures created by private capital 
inflows towards the appreciation of the Colombian peso.29
The impact of the Colom bian fiscal deficit on capital flows did not 
only show up through foreign credit to the public sector. We already 
m entioned that foreign portfolio investment in Colom bia was closely 
linked with the development of a public debt market, which in turn 
was urgently needed to finance the government deficit. In addition, 
the behavior and the characteristics of FDI in Colom bia were largely 
influenced by the size of that deficit. This im plied an im portant con­
trast with Chile.
Net flows of FDI were higher in Chile than in Colombia. The 
yearly averages between 1990 and 2003 were US$ 2.1 billion and US$ 
1.6 billion, respectively (table IV.5). The difference between the two 
countries in terms of FDI in greenfield projects was even larger than 
suggested by these figures, which implies that the contribution of FDI 
to increase domestic capital formation and productivity was much 
higher in Chile. Indeed, until 1998, there was a clear positive relation­
ship between FDI and gross capital formation in that country. Such 
relationship was lost in 1999, when m ost FDI became related to 
mergers and acquisitions (see Ffrench-Davis, 2002, p. 15). Still, it is 
interesting to notice that FDI played a counter-cyclical role in Chile in 
1999 as compared to other private capital flows.
In contrast with Chile, FDI in Colombia corresponded mostly to pri­
vatizations and to investment in the oil sector. This im plied that its 
relationship with domestic capital form ation in the country was 
extremely week and that FDI played a procyclical role. The period in
29 Paradoxically, after 1997 net in flow s o f  foreign  credit to  the public sector 
behaved again as stabilizers o f  total foreign  financing. They, indeed, help to 
explain the fact that in 1998 the reduction  in international reserves was m uch  
smaller, and that in the follow ing years the recovery o f  those reserves was m uch 
faster in  C olom bia  than in Chile. In that sense, the existence o f  larger fiscal 
deficits in  C olom bia, provided that they were financed abroad, helped to  reduce 
the vulnerability o f  the C olom bian  econ om y  to the changes in the m o o d  o f  
international financial markets.
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which FDI was highest -  1996 through 1998, according to table IV.5 -  
corresponds with a rapidly declining ratio of capital formation as a 
whole (see table IV.3). Actually, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
accounted for 58% o f total gross FDI in that period (UNCTAD, 2003). 
A large part of FDI in Colombia was in practice an instrument of public 
deficit financing. This source of financing alm ost disappeared after
1998. Also, the natural cycle of investment in the Cusiana oil well 
implied a rapid decline of that source of FDI after 1998.
4. Concluding remarks
Chile and Colom bia seemed to have done things right when the 
tequila crisis arrived in 1995, as far as they kept growing and had no 
signs of financial distress. After the Asian and the Russian crises, 
however, both Chile and Colom bia were heavily affected. Does this 
mean that the capital account regulations that these countries had in 
place did not work? Was this the result of a badly designed exchange 
rate regime? Of course, any single answer to these questions would be 
extremely simplistic. From the analysis above we can extract the fol­
lowing conclusions:
(i) The type o f capital account regulations that were used both in  
Chile and Colom bia did work successfully in reducing the share 
of the short-term component of total capital inflows.
(ii) Also, they allowed monetary policy to increase the domestic 
interest rates relative to foreign interest rates, without strengthen­
ing the pressure to overvalue the domestic currencies. This was a 
positive outcome in the period of the boom  of capital inflows, as 
far as it allowed monetary policy to behave counter-cyclically, 
and contributed to more sustainable real m acroeconomic bal­
ances.
(iii) Some liberalization of the rules applied to both foreign portfolio 
investment and investment of domestic institutional investors in 
foreign securities, during the second half of the 1990s, created a 
more procyclical environment for the management of the crisis of 
1998-99.
(iv) The comparison between the Chilean and Colombian experiences 
illustrates the importance of fiscal austerity in periods of large 
capital inflows. The ability of governments to undertake counter­
cyclical fiscal policies critically depends on what they do during 
the boom  periods. The government can partially outweigh the
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effects of private capital inflows by reducing -  counter-cyclically -  
its public debt during boom s, as Chile actually did until 1997. 
Also, if there is a developed market for domestic public debt, sub­
stitution of domestic debt for foreign debt may be a good mecha­
nism to reduce pressures towards appreciation in periods of large 
capital inflows.
(v) Still, what Chile suffered in the crisis of 1998-99 shows that fiscal 
restraint is not enough and that private capital flows (particularly 
of outflows of domestic capital in that biennium) may introduce 
too much vulnerability, even in presence of capital controls. In 
fact, the capital account regulations on inflows used in Chile and 
Colombia were not enough to avoid that critical risk. Even with a 
low exposure to short-term debt, capital outflows may be very 
large when the domestic residents are able to invest abroad and 
long-term debtors can pre-pay their liabilities. This vulnerability 
may be mitigated with controls on the net foreign exchange posi­
tion of the financial intermediaries, of the main institutional 
investors (like private pension funds) and of households and 
firms. Prudential regulation of the financial sector should require 
banks to reflect the risks that are im plicit in lending to house­
holds or firms with important currency mismatches between their 
assets and their liabilities. Those m ismatches could also be dis­
couraged through tax provisions.
(vi) The exchange rate management may have played a role in aggra­
vating the effects of the reversal in capital flows that took place in 
1998-99. The exchange rate bands that were in place in Chile and 
Colombia were useful arrangements along most of the 1990s. The 
crawling bands, however, were more efficient to deal with pres­
sures towards currency appreciation than with pressures towards 
currency depreciation. The credibility problems that were created 
by the bands led the authorities to restrict the exchange rate flexi­
bility and to undertake very contractionary monetary policies 
during the crisis. The lack of exchange rate flexibility during the 
crisis was much more evident in Chile than in Colombia.
(vii) During the 1990s, the experiences of Chile and Colom bia with 
domestic credit were entirely different. In Colombia, the impact 
of foreign capital flows was leveraged by domestic credit, thus 
reinforcing their procyclical behavior. In Chile, the index of 
domestic credit/GDP behaved in a counter-cyclical way. Two 
lessons arise from these contrasting experiences. First, that a 
higher degree of financial depth and a stricter financial super-
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vision m ay work as buffers against the shocks of foreign capital 
flows, as probably did in Chile. Second, that dom estic financial 
regulation should not reinforce the procyclical behavior of capital 
inflows, as actually happened in Colom bia with the reduction of 
reserve requirements on domestic deposits before 1998.
Annex IV. 1 Comparative Economic Size of Chile and Colombia, 2002
Population GDP (current prices) GDP (PPP) Gross export
TOTAL Per capita TOTAL Per cap ita  o f  goods and
(m illion) (US$ (US$) (USS (US$) services (% o
billion) billion) current GDP
Argentina 38 102 2,694 402 10,594 27.7
Brazil 174 452 2,593 1,312 7,516 15.8
Chile IS 64 4,244 149 9,853 34.1
Colombia 44 82 1,879 265 6,068 19.6
Mexico 101 637 6,314 879 8,707 27.2
Latin  America (19) 512 1,640 3,200 648 6,962 23.4
Malaysia 24 95 3,915 217 8,922 113.8
Republic of Korea 48 477 10,006 784 16,465 40.0
East Asia (6) 449 1,215 2,707 2,893 6,444 52.0
South Africa 45 107 2,352 449 9,922 33.3
United States 288 10,417 36,123 10,138 35,158 9.4
World 6,201 32,252 5,201 47,426 7,648 24.4
Source: Based on figures from ADB, ECLAC, IMF and the World Bank.
East Asia includes Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand. 
Latin America includes 19 countries.
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Macroeconomic Adjustments and 
the Real Economy in Korea and 
Malaysia Since 1997
Zainal-Abidin Mahani, Kwanho Shin, Yunjong Wang*
Introduction
The financial crisis that broke out in Thailand in July 1997 and then 
spread to other parts of East Asia brought about a deep recession, 
causing a sharp decline in living standards, rising unemployment, 
industrial breakdown, and social dislocation in the region (Park and 
Wang, 2002). In 1997-98, five East Asian countries -  Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand -  experienced deep currency 
and banking crises. Although a few other East Asian countries were 
affected to a limited extent, the Asian financial crisis was region-wide.1
Korea and Malaysia have m anaged impressive recoveries at remark­
able speed, as compared to other emerging economies (EEs). These 
economies started to bottom  out in the second half of 1998 and then 
showed a remarkable turnaround in 1999. While the real GDP growth 
rates of Korea and Malaysia were -6.7%  and -7.4%  in 1998, they 
rebounded to 10.9% and 6.1%, respectively, in 1999.
* The authors gratefully acknowledge Ricardo Ffrench-Davis for detailed com­
ments on the earlier and revised draft. We would also like to thank Ariel Buira, 
Roy Culpeper, José de Gregorio, Barry Herman, Manuel Montes, José Antonio 
Ocampo, Arturo O'Connell, John Williamson, Heriberto Tapia, and other par­
ticipants of two seminars organized by ECLAC, for their useful suggestions and 
comments on the revised version.
1 The Singapore and the New Taiwan dollar experienced a relatively small depre­
ciation. During the crisis, no significant devaluation took place in China, which 
remained relatively insulated from world financial markets.
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This chapter reviews the post-crisis macroeconomic adjustm ent 
and the im pact o f policy responses on the real econom y in Korea and 
Malaysia. Both countries suffered under the Asian financial crisis, 
and initially both applied the orthodox crisis solution measures; subse­
quently, their policy responses were quite different in several aspects. 
Korea sought liquidity assistance from the IMF, which obliged it to 
comply with the IMF's structural adjustment program, while Malaysia 
was able to m aintain policy independence in the process of crisis reso­
lution. Korea and Malaysia adopted policies at opposite extremes with 
respect to capital flows and the exchange rate during the crisis. For 
example, Korea drastically liberalized capital inflows and adopted a 
floating exchange rate regime (although m aintaining several restric­
tions on outflows by residents, and with huge accumulation of reserves 
during recovery). Contrariwise, Malaysia implemented stringent capital 
controls with a return to a fixed (but devalued) exchange rate. Despite 
the different policy stances in terms o f capital account and exchange 
rate regime, a swift change toward a vigorously expansionary macro- 
economic policy stance helped the two economies recover notably 
faster than other EEs. There was a positive role of counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies, including sharp fiscal and monetary positive 
shocks. Their effectiveness shown for the post-crisis economic recovery 
raises the question of whether the initial sharp tightening of monetary 
and fiscal policy was kept for too long and, as a consequence, deepened 
the crisis in both Korea and Malaysia.2
This case study highlights the dynamics of the macroeconomic 
adjustments that came with responses such as monetary, fiscal, and 
exchange rate policies and their effects on variables such as capital for­
mation and output, of the real economy. This comparative analysis 
will provide policy im plications to the question of what policy 
responses will be most effective in dealing with future crises.
Section 1 focuses on post-crisis macroeconomic adjustments in Korea 
and Malaysia. Section 2 reviews their policy responses for crisis resolu­
tion. Section 3 assesses the adjustment process and compares both 
country cases. Section 4 concludes with some remarks on policy 
implications.
2 As an initial response to the crisis, Malaysia followed the orthodox IMF policy 
prescriptions without the IMF involvement -  namely, tightened fiscal and mon­
etary policies, introduced measures to redress the balance of payment weakness, 
and floated the exchange rate.
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1. Post-crisis macroeconomic adjustments in Korea and 
Malaysia
a) Korea
i. W hat caused the crisis?
The crisis in Korea was certainly unexpected. As late as June 1997, the 
World Economic Forum had classified Korea as the fifth m ost secure 
place to invest in the world (Agosin, 2001). At the onset of the 
financial crisis, notwithstanding that macroeconomic fundam entals 
appeared to be sound, the Korean miracle was suddenly unraveled. 
Actually, Korea became vulnerable because of its large exposure to 
short-term external liabilities (Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Rodrik and 
Velasco, 2000).
Korea’s external debt increased dramatically over the three-year 
period 1994-96. The m ajor portion of the increase in external debt 
involved the financial sector. For instance, foreign currency liabilities 
of Korean banks nearly tripled in that period, to US$ 104 billion. Two 
sources contributed to the increase in the financial sector's external 
debt: one was debt securities that were issued abroad, while the other 
was external borrowing by the domestic financial institutions. Out of 
the total increase in external debt during the three years, the financial 
sector accounts for about 70%. The remaining 30% corresponded to 
corporate sector liabilities.
In fact, short-term foreign currency liabilities of the domestic 
financial institutions were much larger than those recorded in capital 
inflows. As part of the liberalization measures, banks were allowed to 
open and expand operations of overseas branches. By exploiting the 
foreign capital channeled through overseas branches, banks actively 
engaged in foreign currency denominated business. Overseas branches 
handled about half of the foreign currency operations of the banking 
sector and, therefore, their transactions were not reflected in domestic 
m onetary indicators (see table V .l). Moreover, the m anagem ent of 
foreign currency liquidity risks at the individual bank level was not 
adequate enough to forestall the liquidity crisis, either.
A relevant part of excessive short-term external liabilities can be 
explained by asymmetric regulations on short-term borrowing vis-à-vis 
long-term borrowing. The government boosted incentives for short­
term debts by making it m andatory to provide detailed information 
and obtain permission from the regulatory authorities in the case of 
long-term borrowing, whereas short-term borrowing was regarded as 
trade related financing and therefore not strictly regulated under the
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Table V .l Korea: Short-term foreign currency liabilities o f the financial 
sector, 1992-97 (US$, billion)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Short-term external 11.3 11.4 19.4 29.7 39.2 27.4
debt
Short-term liabilities 18.5 21.1 28.0 33.4 39.0 20.3
of overseas branches
Total 29.8 32.5 47.4 63.1 78.2 47.7
Foreign reserves 17.1 20.2 25.6 32.7 33.2 20.4
Source: Bank of Korea
Foreign Exchange M anagement Law. Thus, banks and firms had been
operating on  a long-term  basis with short-term foreign borrowings, 
leading to a significant discrepancy in the maturity structure (Kim, 
eta l., 2001).
Furthermore, the maturity mism atch was m ore severe for m erchant 
banks.3 For example, the liquidity ratio in foreign currency for mer­
chant banks was on ly  3 to 6% for all the period up to the financial 
crisis. Thirty merchant banks became heavily engaged in offshore oper­
ations by borrowing cheap short-term Japanese funds from  Hong Kong 
to finance m ostly long-term investment projects. W ith 80%  short-term 
debts put in to 70% long-term  assets, the maturity m ism atch blew  up 
w hen Korea's credibility plum m eted. Pressured to obtain foreign cur­
rency to repay their debts, merchant banks ultimately ended up buying 
foreign currency on  the spot market with w on-denom inated call loans 
from  com m ercial banks. Furthermore, those merchant banks were not 
properly supervised. Neither unified accounting standards nor stan­
dards for classifying non-perform ing loans existed, and supervision 
had been perfunctory at best. This lax supervision allowed m erchant 
banks to en joy freedom  without any discipline. W hen Korea embarked 
on  the IMF structural adjustment program, m erchant banks were the 
first to go through restructuring because their volum inous short-term
3 Most merchant banks in Korea started as investment banks after 1972, to 
provide legitimate channels to utilize black market funds. Later in 1994 and 
1996, the 24 existing investment banks were allowed to become merchant 
banks, joining the six existing ones. Several merchant banks, owned by chae­
bols, served as important vehicles for raising the funds required for the chae­
bols' voluminous investments; these affiliate banks failed to conduct adequate 
loan assessments of their parent companies.
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external debts and imprudent investments were inconsistent with the 
customary practices of the world financial market.4
ii. Overall macroeconomic and sectoral performance
The im pact of the financial crisis on the real economy became appar­
ent in the first quarter of 1998 as GDP contracted by 4.6% on a year- 
on-year basis. Throughout 1998, the deterioration of macroeconomic 
conditions far exceeded the expectations of both Korean policy makers 
and IMF economists. For example, the second IMF agreement forecast 
that real GDP would fall by 1% or less in 1998, but it actually shrank 
6.7%.
In 1998, private consumption, investment, and imports dramatically 
declined (see table V.2). Non-tradable sectors, such as construction, 
were hit harder than the m anufacturing sector, which is more trade- 
oriented. As output contracted, unemployment quickly increased from 
2.1% in October 1997 to 8.7% in February 1999. The real wages of 
workers in the manufacturing sector fell by 11% in 1998.
After a sharp contraction, the Korean economy started to bottom out 
in the first quarter of 1999. In 1999, real GDP growth recorded 10.9%. 
Due to the strengthening of the economy, the unem ployment rate 
sharply declined from the record level of 8.7% in February 1999 to 
4.4% in November 1999, while inflation remained low, notwithstand­
ing significant depreciation.
The sharp contraction and the rapid recovery of Korea's growth are 
broadly consistent with the V-shaped adjustment patterns observed in 
cross-country analyses. However, the 6.7% decline in 1998 and the 
10.9% recovery of GDP in 1999 are far greater than predicted by the 
cross-country evidence. Malaysia also experienced a huge jump in GDP 
growth from a 7.4% decline in 1998 to a 6.1% recovery in 1999.
One fundam ental question relates to whether the output reduction 
after the Asian crisis was a temporary deviation downward from the 
trend level, which was to be reversed as output reverted to trend, or 
alternatively, whether the level of output tended to shift down perma­
nently. Cerra and Saxena (2003) find that the recovery phase is pre­
dom inantly characterized by a return to the normal growth rate of an 
expansion. Thus, the level of output is permanently lower than its 
initial trend path. A perm anent loss is associated with a downward 
shift of potential output.
4 The Korean government suspended the operations of the 14 unhealthiest mer­
chant banks in December 1997.
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Table V.2 Korea: Selected economic indicators, 1996-2002
Indicators/year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Growth o f GDP (%) 6.8 5.0 -6.7 10.9 9.3 3.0 6.3
Growth by final 
demand category (%)
Consumption 7.2 3.2 -10.1 9.4 6.7 3.7 6.2
Private 7.1 3.5 -11.7 11.0 7.9 4.7 6.8
Government 8.2 1.5 -0.4 1.3 0.1 1.3 2.9
Gross fixed capital 7.3 -2.2 -21.2 3.7 11.4 -1.8 4.8
formation
Growth by sector (%)
Agriculture, forestry 3.3 4.6 -6.6 5.4 2.0 1.9 -4.1
and fishing 
Industry 7.0 5.8 -6.1 11.0 9.8 3.8 6.7
Mining and -0.1 -0.9 -24.0 5.3 2.5 0.5 3.9
quarrying
Manufacturing 6.8 6.6 -7.4 21.0 15.9 2.1 6.3
Construction 6.9 1.4 -8.6 -9.1 -3.1 5.6 3.2
Services 7.5 6.5 -4.7 10.0 8.7 5.0 8.6
Unemployment rate 2.0 2.6 6.8 6.3 4.1 3.7 3.1
Inflation rate (%)
Consumer price 4.9 4.4 7.5 0.8 2.3 4.1 2.8




Government 10.2 10.1 11.0 10.4 10.1 10.4 10.6
expenditure as % of 
GDP
Budget surplus 0.3 -1.5 -4.2 -2.7 1.3 1.3 4.1
(central government) 
as % of GDP 
Total public debt as 8.8 11.1 16.1 18.6 19.5 20.8
% of GDP
Money and credit 
(end o f period)
M3 growth (%) 16.7 13.9 12.5 8.0 7.1 11.6 13.6
Annual average bank 11.2 11.8 15.2 9.4 8.6 7.7 6.7
lending rate (%) 
Overnight rate 12.4 13.2 15.0 5.0 5.2 4.7 4.2
Non-performing 4.1 6.0 7.4 8.3 6.6 2.9 2.3
loans as % of total 
loans b/
KOSPI index i833.4 654.5 406.1 806.8 734.2 572.8 757.0
(continued)
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Table V .2 Korea: Selected e c o n o m ic  indicators, 1996-2002  (continued)
In d icators/year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
External
transactions
M erchandise exports 130.0 138.6 132.1 145.2 175.9 151.3 162.6
(US$, FOB billion) 
M erchandise im ports 144.9 141.8 90.5 116.8 159.1 137.8 148.4
(US$, FOB billion) 
Current account -23 .0 -8 .2 40.4 24.5 12.2 8.2 6.1
balance (US$, billion) 
Current account -4 .4 -1 .7 12.7 6.0 2.7 1.9 1.3
balance as %  o f  GDP 
Direct investm ent -2 .3 -1 .6 0.7 5.1 4.3 1.1 -0 .7
(US$, b illion) 
Portfolio investment 15.1 14.4 -1 .2 9.2 12.2 6.7 -0.1
(US$, billion) 
Other investm ent 11.1 -21 .9 -7 .2 -1 .1 -3 .6 -4 .6 2.7
(US$, billion) 
Foreign reserves 34.0 20.4 52.0 74.0 96.1 102.8 121.3
(US$, billion)
Total external debt 31.4 33.4 46.8 33.8 28.5 27.5 27.5
as %  GDP 
Short-term foreign 57.1 39.9 20.6 28.6 36.4 33.3 38.0
debt as %  o f  total 
debt
Short-term foreign 274.2 312.5 59.1 53.0 42.7 48.5 41.0
debt as %  o f  foreign 
reserves
Sources: The Bank of Korea, M onthly Bulletin ; Ministry of Finance and Economy, Fina n cia l 
Statistics Bulletin ; Financial Supervisory Commission, IMF, International F in a n cia l Statistics. 
a/ End of period.
w Non-performing loans of domestic commercial banks.
Important structural factors driving the speedy adjustm ent in Korea 
were flexibility and openness (Park, 2001). With a relatively large trade 
sector oriented towards exports, Korea was able to benefit from a sub­
stantial depreciation of the real exchange rate and fall in real wages. As 
a consequence, after the manufacturing sector recorded a large decline 
of 7.4% in 1998, it quickly rebounded to record a growth of 21.0% in
1999.
iii. Exchange rate
Thailand's sudden decision to float the baht in July 1997 subjected all 
regional currencies to extremely high depreciation pressure. However,
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the Korean won remained relatively stable until it began to slide in 
October 1997. Following futile attempts of currency defense, the 
Korean government widened its won trading band from 2.25% to 10% 
on November, and finally abolished its band, allowing the won to float 
on December. With a free floating regime in place, the sudden collapse 
of investor confidence and concom itant capital outflows caused the 
nominal exchange rate to overshoot during the crisis.
Large support packages by the IMF did make some contribution to 
restoring the confidence of foreign investors. The funding helped 
to reduce the short-term liquidity constraints and provided financial 
resources to contain the exchange rate depreciation. The Korean gov­
ernment expected that its agreement with the IMF, reached on 
December 3, 1997, would stop the outflow of foreign capital. However, 
foreign banks withdrew their short-term credit at an accelerated pace, 
thereby worsening Korea's foreign reserve position (see table V.2). In 
response to this unfavorable development, the Korean government 
asked the major creditor countries, including the US and Japan, to use 
moral suasion to influence their creditors to refrain from retrieving 
their short-term credit, and cooperate in reaching an agreement to 
lengthen the maturity of short-term foreign loans. Only when foreign 
creditors were convinced that they would be repaid with handsom e 
returns, were the debt-extension agreements signed and finalized on 
March 1998.5 Thereafter, the exchange rate came to stabilize at around 
1,300-1,400 won per US dollar.
iv. Equity market
After hitting its highest level (1,138 points) on November 8, 1994, the 
Korean stock price index (KOSPI) started sliding before the crisis broke 
out. This was one of the earliest signs of trouble. During 1996, stock 
prices (in domestic currency terms) fell by more than 20% in Korea. 
Several o f the largest chaebols posted losses in 1996 and 6 of the top 
30 chaebols went bankrupt in 1997. The crisis aggravated the situation 
and severely undermined investor confidence in the stock market. As a 
result, the stock price index fell to 376 points by the end of December
1997.
Having hit the bottom , the KOSPI quickly recovered by early 1998, 
with the aid of purchases by foreign investors. However, after peaking 
at 574 points on March 1998, the KOSPI once again began to slide
5 The Korean governm ent was able to  issue US$4 b illion  in bonds, in  interna­
tional capital markets, im m ediately follow ing the debt-extension agreement.
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downward. Following the sudden weakening of the Japanese yen, the 
KOSPI plunged below 300 points on June. Again, foreign investors left 
the Korean market, and more bankruptcies were predicted while corpo­
rate and financial restructuring proceeded. Stock prices remained stag­
nant until the end of September, while the won-dollar exchange rate 
stabilized remarkably. During the post-crisis period, starting in October 
1998, foreign portfolio investm ent boosted stock prices in 1999, but 
stock prices sharply dropped in mid-2000 and 2001 (over 50%). With 
respect to exchange rates, appreciation was limited because of evident 
intervention of the BOK.6
v. Current account balance
The current account deficit averaged less than 1% of GDP in 1992-95. 
In real effective terms, the exchange rate had been around the equilib­
rium level until 1994, but was somewhat overvalued on the eve of the 
1997 currency crisis.7
A remarkable feature of Korea's economic performance following the 
crisis has been the large turnaround in the current account balance. It 
improved from deficit to surplus after one year, changing from -4.4%  
of GDP in 1996 (US$23 billion) to 12.7% in 1998 (US$40 billion). The 
current account balance was the only component that made a positive 
contribution to GDP in 1998. Imports of goods and services were 
severely compressed due to the sharp depreciation of the Korean won 
and the sharp domestic contraction.8
6 The Korean governm ent took  drastic measures to  liberalize capital markets as 
well as adopting an officially flexible exchange rate system since the crisis set in. 
Thus, it w ould  be natural to conjecture that if the Korean governm ent truly has 
a hands-off po licy  in  the foreign exchange market, there must be som e close 
interaction betw een stock prices and exchange rates. However, Park, et al. 
(2001) find that em pirical results d o  n ot support that con jecture during the 
post-crisis period. This puzzling evidence indirectly hints that the Korean g ov ­
ernm ent heavily intervened in  the foreign exchange market against volatile 
foreign  portfo lio  investm ent flow s. This was strongly supported by  the huge 
accum ulation o f  reserves by  the BOK.
7 Our calcu lation  based on  a trade-weight, consum er prices index, shows that 
the real effective exchange rate appreciated b y  around 5%  betw een January 
1993 and July 1997.
8 To help m eet the urgent need for foreign exchange, a national drive to export 
second-hand goods and recycled go ld  jewelry was initiated in  early 1998. 
Financial institutions collected  gold  products, refined and exported them , and 
then sold the foreign  exchange proceeds to  the Bank o f  Korea. The drive 
en joyed  widespread national support, and is estim ated to  have contributed 
about US$4.2 billion  to total exports in 1998.
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External demand, particularly in Asia, remained weak in 1998 and 
hampered the response of Korean exports to the real depreciation. 
Reflecting the disparity in economic conditions between regions, 
exports to China, Japan, and Southeast Asia in 1998 fell by 17% in 
value terms, while exports to the US and the EU rose 6.5%. The strong 
US economy was a significant source of growth for Korean exports in 
1998, in particular for both light and heavy industrial products. Much 
of the decline in exports of industrial products to Japan  (mainly in 
electronics and metal goods) was redirected to the US and to a lesser 
extent the EU.
vi. Capital flows
The capital account adjustment was also sharp. Immediately following 
the onset of the crisis, the capital account switched from a surplus to a 
deficit as a result of the large outflow of portfolio investment and cur­
tailment of short-term bank loans. The capital account showed a deficit 
of US$64 billion in 1998.
By the first quarter o f 1999, the capital account registered a surplus 
led by strong inflows of portfolio and foreign direct investment, a 
decline in overseas investment by Korean companies, and a slight 
pickup in short-term trade financing related to the economic recovery. 
In particular, FDI picked up sharply in 1998 as companies began to rely 
increasingly on foreign capital to finance their corporate restructuring 
efforts. During the pre-crisis period including 1997, net FDI recorded a 
deficit. But, there was an impressive turnaround in the net balance of 
FDI as a com ponent of the capital account. This was due to the 
increased mergers and acquisitions of Korean firms by foreign firms -  
supported by the government policies aimed at selling liquidity con­
strained ailing domestic firms to foreigners.9
With regard to portfolio investment, private equity flows picked up 
markedly in the first half of 1999 after international credit rating agen­
cies raised Korea's sovereign rating to investment grade. International 
spreads also came down to near pre-crisis levels after a period of 
extreme volatility. With this development, Korean com panies could 
raise capital from the international financial markets by issuing global 
depository receipts (GDRs).
9 To induce FDI, all institutional restraints on  mergers and acquisitions o f  
dom estic firms by  foreign investors were com pletely abolished on  May, 1998.
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vii. Foreign reserves and external debt
After having fallen to a low of US$3.9 billion on December 18, 1997, 
foreign reserves increased steadily, reaching US$52 billion by the end 
of 1998. The increasing trend continued in 1999-2000: foreign reserves 
stood at US$96 billion by year-end 2000. During the early period of 
crisis resolution, the front-loaded disbursements from the ADB, IMF 
and World Bank, successful maturity-extension agreement in March 
1998, and issuance of global bonds in April 1998 contributed to the 
sizable reserve accumulation. Nonetheless, the most important increase 
in foreign reserves closely corresponded to the current account surplus, 
absorbed by sterilized interventions of the Bank of Korea.
Consequently, Korea’s external debt position did significantly 
improve. The ratio of short-term debt to foreign reserves decreased 
from 313% in 1997, to 53% in 1999, im plying that short-term debt 
could be covered by official foreign reserves (see table V.2). Total exter­
nal liabilities during 1999 decreased by US$13 billion from the previ­
ous year, while external assets increased by US$22 billion. In terms of 
debt maturity, the ratio of short-term debt to the total stood at below
0.3 in 1999. With the strengthening of reserve and external asset/liabil­
ity positions, Korea accelerated its repayments to the IMF to fully settle 
its loans ahead of schedule.
viii. Financial market
Prior to the crisis, there was some concern over the persistent expan­
sion of domestic credit to the private sector at double-digit rates. 
Domestic credit increased from 57% of GDP in 1994 to alm ost 70% in
1997. It is possible that the credit supply has grown as usual while 
profitability of the real sector was declining for reasons such as delayed 
adjustm ents of non-performing companies. In the pre-crisis period, 
there was easier access to bank credit for firms associated with chae­
bols, while non-chaebol firms' access to bank credit was more 
influenced by market considerations (Borensztein and Lee, 2000). The 
relatively small chaebols (those ranked 11th to 30th) were significantly 
under-performing even during the 1994-96 boom  period. When the 
terms-of-trade shock arrived in April 1996, the situation of the highly 
leveraged corporate sector was aggravated and the number of defaults 
increased significantly far ahead of the crisis. As large chaebols went 
bankrupt, the financial sector began to bear a substantial burden.
Following the decline in the Hong Kong stock market in October 
1997, and the downgrade of Korea's sovereign risk, financial markets in
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Korea came under increasingly severe pressure. As in the other Asian 
crisis countries, with reserves essentially depleted, the choice was made 
to raise interest rates to restore market confidence and stabilize the 
exchange market. By December, the Bank of Korea had dramatically 
raised short-term interest rates, which had fluctuated around 12% prior 
to the crisis, to over 30% in order to engineer a rapid stabilization of 
the exchange rate. However, there were a number of m alignant side 
effects accompanying the high interest rate policy along with financial 
sector restructuring.
The contraction in bank loans was extremely severe as a combined 
result of both monetary conditions and structural changes in the 
financial sector. Borensztein and Lee (2000) explain several factors, 
which affected the pattern of credit allocation after the crisis broke out. 
First, financial institutions became more reluctant to extend loans to 
enterprises because of the new financial sector regulations (enhanced 
financial standards) and high credit risks. In particular, some banks did 
not meet capital adequacy ratios and could not raise equity capital in 
times of financial difficulties. Thus, they started to curtail credit to 
firms by a larger magnitude. Second, the higher level of interest rates 
further weakened the situation of borrowers' balance sheets. In particu­
lar, highly leveraged corporate firms were more vulnerable to the inter­
est rate hikes. The level of non-performing loans rose from 13% of GDP 
in December 1997 to 22% by June 1998.10 Third, the fiscal deficit 
increased from a small surplus in 1997 to a deficit of over 4% of GDP. 
Consequently, the traditional "crowding-out" effect reduced credit 
available to the private sector as the government had to tap domestic 
financial markets to a large extent. Fourth, as foreign credit lines dried 
out, banks had to repay their short-term foreign debts by curtailing 
domestic credit.
Once the immediate task of stabilizing the exchange rate market was 
accomplished in early 1998, the stance of monetary policy was cau­
tiously eased. Since small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were 
hit harder by the credit squeeze compared to larger firms, the Korean
10 In July 1998, there was a m ajor revision o f  loan classification standards and 
provision  requirements, w h ich  classified loans in  arrears o f  three m onths or 
m ore as substandard or below , and loans in  arrears o f  on e to  three m onths as 
precautionary loans. Asset quality classification standards were further im ple­
m ented in 1999 by  adopting the forw ard-looking criteria (FLC), w hich  includes 
expected future perform ance in to account as a criterion. Before July 1998, n o n ­
perform ing loans included loans in arrears o f  six m onths or more.
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government took a number of steps to ease the financing constraint for 
SMEs.11
b) Malaysia
i. W hat caused the crisis?
In mid-1997, like the other affected economies, Malaysia did not 
expect to encounter a severe crisis although the economy was consid­
ered "overheated" due to the high growth registered during the 1990s. 
In June 1997, Michael Camdessus, then M anaging Director of the IMF, 
drew attention to the soundness of the Malaysian economy: "Malaysia 
is a good example of a country where the authorities are well aware of 
the challenges of m anaging the pressures that result from high growth 
and of m aintaining a sound financial system, amid substantial capital 
flows and a boom ing stock market."
Inflows of short-term capital (mainly portfolio investment) started to 
become significant in 1993, am ounting to US$9.5 billion (14% of 
GDP), exceeding FDI inflows (US$5 billion). Those inflows generated 
the super bull run of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. The capital 
inflows also financed the current account deficit: at its peak in 1995, 
the current account deficit was 10.4% of GDP. By 1997, the current 
account deficit was still significant at 5.4% of GDP, although this did 
not directly put a downward pressure on the ringgit exchange rate. 
Rising services account shortfalls and higher capital goods imports 
were the reasons for the persistent deficits. The large inflow of portfolio 
investment had created a window of vulnerability for the Malaysian 
economy in the event of a sharp, quick and large outflow. The stock of 
portfolio capital had increased from US$4.6 billion in 1990 to US$36 
billion in 1997, which meant that a large and uncontrolled withdrawal 
would do serious damage to the economy and to the ringgit.
Another vulnerable point for Malaysia was the seemingly stable 
ringgit exchange rate. The large weight of the US dollar in the currency 
basket (estimated at about 70%) had indirectly created a de facto
11 SMEs are defined as enterprises em ploying less than 300 workers in  the m anu­
facturing sector and 20 workers in services. In order to  ease financial difficulties 
o f  SMEs, the Bank o f Korea raised the ceiling o n  total loans from  KRW 3.6 tril­
lion  (in N ovem ber 1997) to  KRW 5.6 trillion (in February 1998). Further, the 
Bank o f  Korea overhauled the 90-day maturity clause on  com m ercial bills, 
w hich  qualify for discount (beginning May 1998). In addition, the governm ent 
gave an extension o f  maturity o f  loans to SMEs.
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nominal peg regime for the ringgit. Even with the large capital inflow 
in the second half of the 1990s, the ringgit was traded within a very 
narrow band at around RM2.5 for one US dollar. This exchange rate 
stability had given the impression that there was no risk associated 
with the flows of funds and subsequently attracted large short-term 
capital into Malaysia without the fear of possible exchange rate losses.
With sufficient international reserves to meet foreign exchange 
demand, there was little concern that Malaysia would confront an eco­
nomic crisis when the baht was floated in July 1997.12 In 1997, 
Malaysia's international reserves of US$28 billion were sufficient to 
cover the short-term debt of US$14 billion in 1997 (table V.3). 
However, from another perspective, this level of reserves was 
insufficient to meet the demands of liquid capital, which was com ­
posed o f a com bination o f short-term foreign debts and portfolio 
capital. Hence, the loss of market confidence in the regional economies 
that resulted with the floating of the baht, in particular about the 
sufficiency of the international reserves, triggered a massive outflow of 
capital from the Malaysian stock market. The outflow of private short­
term capital reached US$4 billion in 1997 and became even larger in 
1998 at US$5.3 billion.
This outflow caused steep ringgit depreciation. Equally severe were 
the effects of ringgit depreciation on the banking sector. Malaysian 
banking had been relatively strong compared to the banking sectors in 
other countries in the region -  in the mid-1990s, the average capital 
adequacy ratios for all banks in Malaysia remained above 10% 
(Athukorala, 2001) and the level of non-performing loans was 3.7% in 
1996. Despite this strong position, the rapid credit growth had created 
areas of weakness because of the concentration of loans in selected non­
tradable sectors, in particular, to the real estate sector and for share pur­
chases. This credit growth had a significant link to stock market boom as 
shares were used as collateral for these loans. Thus, when the value of 
the shares decreased as the stock market collapsed, many loans turned 
non-performing. When faced with the prospects of a more fragile 
financial position, many banks began withdrawing loan facilities or
12 Due to  the prudential measures exercised by  the Bank Negara Malaysia 
(Central Bank), there was n o  massive build-up o f  short-term foreign borrowings. 
Malaysian com panies are required to  have a natural foreign  exchange hedge 
before being allowed to  borrow  overseas. By natural hedge it was meant that the 
com panies w ould  have foreign currency incom e to service loans.
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Table V .3 M alaysia: E nd-of-year stock  o f  vo la tile  capital an d  fore ign  
exch an ge  reserves, 1990-97
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997c/
M obile capital,a/ 6.3 6.5 12.4 23.9 27.7 31.9 38.9 50.1
USS billion
C om position  o f 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
m obile capital (%)
Short-term debtb/ (%) 26 40 41 28 20 20 26 28
Banking sector (%) 26 40 41 28 14 14 18 22
N on-bank private (%) 0 0 0 0 6 6 8 6
Portfolio investm ent (%) 74 60 59 72 80 80 74 72
International reserves, 10 11 19 30 26 26 28 28
US$ billion
Reserve/mobile 158 171 149 124 94 80 72 56
capital ratio (%)
Source: Athukorala (2001). 
a/ Short-term debt plus portfolio investment. 
b/ Debt with a maturity of one year and less. 
c/ First half of the year.
demanding more collateral. As a result, businesses faced a credit crunch 
and higher cost of funds, which culminated in a recession.
ii. Overall macroeconomic and sectoral performance
Although the Asian crisis began by mid-199 7, its im pact on the 
M alaysian economy was felt only in late 1997. GDP grew at a com ­
mendable rate of 7.3% in 1997 but the economic contraction was very 
deep at -7.4%  in 1998 (table V.4). This severe contraction was due to a 
com bination of several factors: the recessive force of the regional eco­
nom ic slowdown, massive capital outflows, public sector expenditure 
reduction and a tight monetary policy.
This economic contraction brought about a severe collapse in private 
investment (-57.8%) and consumption (-10.8%). The public sector also 
experienced a decline but at a lesser rate -  for example, public invest­
ment fell 10% and consumption 7.8%. The drop in private investment 
was caused by a lack of liquidity in the banking system due to 
the introduction of a tighter monetary policy in late 1997. Prior to the 
crisis, credit grew on average about 28% annually between 1994 and 
1996 and the Bank Negara Malaysia introduced a credit plan to curb 
the excessive lending especially to the non-productive sector such as 
real estate and loans to buy shares. In addition to a credit growth target 
of 25% by year-end 1997 and 15% by year-end 1998, the plan also dis-
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Table V .4 M alaysia: Selected e c o n o m ic  indicators, 1996-2002
Indicators/Y ear 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
G row th  o f  GDP (% ) 10.0 7.3 -7 .4 6.1 8.3 0.4 4.2
G row th  b y  final
d em a n d  category  (% )
Consum ption  (59.3) 4.9 4.9 -10 .3 6.7 10.5 5.8 8.8
Private (45.6) 6.9 4.3 -10 .8 3.1 12.5 2.8 4.2
Public (13.7) 0.7 7.6 -7 .8 16.3 3.0 17.6 13.8
Gross dom estic fixed
investm ent (46.8) 9.7 8.4 -44 .9 -5 .9 25.7 -2 .8 0.3
Private (34.2) 13.3 8.4 -57 .8 -18 .5 32.1 -20 .6 -6 .1
Public (12.6) 1.1 8.6 -10 .0 11.7 19.9 15.5 4.6
G row th  b y  sector (% ) 
Agriculture, forestry and
fishing (9 .8 )a/ 4.5 0.7 -2 .8 0.5 2.0 1.8 0.3
Industry (41.5) 11.0 10.5 -6 .5 5.4 14.2 -4 .2 4.0
M ining and quarrying (7.7) 2.9 1.9 -0 .4 6.9 1.9 1.6 4.5
Manufacturing (29.1) 18.2 10.1 -13 .4 11.7 19.1 -6 .2 4.1
Construction (4.4) 16.2 10.6 -24 .0 -4 .4 1.0 2.3 2.3
Services (48.7) 8.9 9.9 -0 .4 4.5 5.7 5.7 4.5
G row th  o f  m an ufactu rin g
ou tpu t (% )b/ 12.2 12.4 -10 .2 12.9 25.0 -6 .6 4.5
Export-oriented (weight: 72) 11.0 13.2 -5 .1 13.5 25.8 -10 .4 5.1
Dom estic-oriented (weight: 28) 15.6 10.4 -23 .5 11.1 22.1 5.9 3.5
imports o f  capital goods
(growth o f  value) -6 .5 17.1 -17 .4 -9 .9 38.6 -0 .9 10.6
Manufacturing capacity
utilization index 81.2 83.2 59.5 80.7 84.2 78.8 83.5
U nem ploym ent rate 2.5 2.6 3.2 3.4 3.1 3.6 3.2
In flation  rate (% )
Consum er prices 3.5 2.7 5.3 2.8 1.6 1.4 1.8
Producer prices 2.3 2.7 10.7 -3 .5 3.1 -5 .0 4.4
Local goods 2.8 2.5 11.2 -3 .9 3.6 -6 .1 5.7
Imported goods 0.1 2.8 9.2 -0 .6 1.1 -6 .3 -0 .7
Total external debt as %  GDP 38.7 43.9 42.6 42.1 46.1 50.7 51.7
Short-term foreign debt as
%  o f  total debt 25.7 25.2 19.9 14.3 11.1 13.7 17.2
Short-term foreign debt as
%  o f  reserves 36.9 53.7 33.2 19.1 17.7 19.9 24.5
External debt service ratio 6.6 5.5 6.7 5.9 5.3 5.9 6.2
Sources: Malaysia, Treasury Economic Report, Ministry of Finance, Kuala Lumpur, various 
issues and Bank Negara Malaysia, BNM Annual Reports, Kuala Lumpur, various issues. 
a/ The sectoral share in GDP in 1996 is given in brackets. 
b/ Based on manufacturing production index (1993 = 100). 
n.a = Data not available.
MIER = Malaysian Institute of Economic Research
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allowed credit for "unproductive" sectors. Higher interest rates added 
further pressure to the funding costs o f companies and had caused an 
immediate slowdown of business activities.
The Malaysian economy began to recover in the second quarter of
1999. This recovery came sooner than expected, with GDP registering a 
strong expansion of 6.1% in 1999 and 8.3% in 2000. The revival of 
domestic consumption, particularly from the public sector, contributed 
significantly to recovery. Aggregate consumption expanded by 6.7% in 
1998 and 10.5% in 1999. Public consum ption led this expansion with 
an increase of 16.3% in 1999.
Although the public sector pum ped up its investment expenditure 
(11.7%) in 1998, total domestic investm ent still declined (-5.9%) due 
to the 18.5% contraction of private sector investment. In 2000, there 
was a significant improvement in domestic investment, which grew by 
25.7%, led by the private sector, which expanded its investment by 
32.1%. However, private investm ent retreated once again (-20.6%) 
under an adverse external environment in 2001. In contrast, public 
sector investment m aintained an active role in leading the recovery 
with an increase of 11.7% in 1999 and an even higher jum p of 19.9% 
in 2000. In view of the global economic slowdown in 2001, public 
investment was expanded 15.5% to ensure that the Malaysian 
economy did not enter into a recession again.
It was not surprising that the construction sector suffered the most 
during the crisis: the sector had over-invested during the period of 
high growth (1987 to 1997), which resulted in a massive excess capac­
ity. Sectoral GDP shrank by 24% in 1998. Manufacturing also recorded 
a large decline of 13.4%. On the other hand, the agriculture sector 
experienced a relatively m ild contraction (-4.5%) while the services 
sector declined -0.4%.
The m anufacturing sector was the engine of recovery in 1999 and
2000. Malaysia benefited from the global recovery of demand for semi­
conductors, which resulted in double-digit growth for the manufactur­
ing sector -  11.7% in 1999 and 19.1% in 2000. The construction sector 
only m anaged to grow marginally in 2000 (1%) after a dism al perfor­
mance (-4.4%) in 1999.
Hi. Exchange rate
At the onset of the crisis, when regional currencies were under pressure 
to devalue, Malaysia tried to defend the ringgit but found this strategy 
unsustainable and costly. In July, the ringgit was floated and it depreci­
ated sharply during the second half of 1997 -  the ringgit exchange rate
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slipped from RM2.50 per US dollar to its lowest level of RM4.88 in 
January 1998. After showing some signs o f stability during February 
and March 1998, unlike the currencies of the other crisis-hit 
economies, the ringgit continued to deteriorate with wide volatility 
in the following m onths until it was fixed at RM3.80 per US dollar in 
September 1998. The sharp depreciation and volatility of the ringgit 
was associated with large capital outflows and strong market reaction 
to Malaysia's vocal stand on currency speculation.
iv. Equity market
The equity market, not surprisingly, was among the worst hit sectors in 
the crisis; the Kuala Lumpur Stock Market lost 80% of its market valua­
tion between February 1997 and September 1998, when selective 
capital controls were finally imposed. The price/earnings ratio of the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Com posite Index (KLCI) dropped from 
22.6 in June 1997 to 11.8 twelve months later.
The stock market slide was much earlier than the ringgit deprecia­
tion, beginning in February 1997. The credit plan issued by Bank 
Negara Malaysia (BNM), which was concerned about the overheating 
economy and large credit expansion to the real estate sector, had 
caused investors to sell their banking and property shares. By late April, 
the KLCI had dropped 10%. In August 1997, the BNM im posed a 
RM2 million limit on non-trade ringgit swaps to reduce currency spec­
ulation. As a result, investors liquidated their holdings in the stock 
market and repatriated these proceeds. To stop the free fall of its 
market, the KLSE made an unprecedented move, classifying the 100 
stocks of the KLCI as designated stock, which meant that investors had 
to have the scripts in their central depository account before they 
could be traded. The KLCI plum meted an additional 10% before the 
ruling was lifted in September 1997.
The government also instituted other measures to shore up the stock 
market; for example, it allowed companies to buy back their shares to 
overcome steep share price deterioration. Concerns about the unsettled 
trading losses of stockbroking houses also fuelled negative speculations 
and pushed the market downwards.
The Malaysian stock market was also characterized by the existence 
of an active offshore securities market in Singapore, known as Central 
Limit Order Book International (CLOB). This over-the-counter market 
was created when the Malaysian government announced its plans to 
de-list Malaysian companies from the Singapore Stock Exchange in 
1990. These CLOB shares were about 3% of the total KLSE capitaliza­
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tion, as of September 1998, and trade was carried out in Singapore 
dollars through Singapore brokers.
Although the domestic stock market stabilized in the first four 
m onths of 1998, the slide recommenced after May and reached its 
bottom of 262 points (and a total 80% drop) on September 1998, when 
the selective capital control was introduced. The stock market 
rebounded strongly in 1999 -  the KLCI rose to a high of 991 points on 
February 2000, but declined thereafter.
v. Current account balance
During the initial phase of the crisis, exports decreased as the troubled 
East Asian economies (50% of Malaysia's export market) massively cut 
their demand for imports. In 1998, merchandise exports fell 6.9% (in 
US dollar terms) but actual export ringgit revenues increased because of 
the steep currency depreciation. When the ringgit was pegged (at 
RM3.80 per US dollar), other regional currencies appreciated, increas­
ing M alaysia's relative price competitiveness. This price competitive­
ness allowed Malaysian exporters to take advantage of the robust US 
export demand. In nom inal ringgit terms, total exports grew by 30%. 
The larger ringgit export revenue was an im portant contributor to 
higher domestic liquidity.
M alaysia's large merchandise balance of US$18 billion in 1998 was 
achieved not only from large export proceeds but also from the col­
lapse of imports. Capital and intermediate goods dom inate the 
M alaysian import structure, including inputs for exports. In contrast, 
consumer goods only constituted about 10% of total imports. Thus, 
when investment activities and export volume dampened, the demand 
for imports also declined -  merchandise imports decreased by 26%.
Due to the strong performance of the merchandise account balance, 
the balance on goods and services reversed from the deficit trend that 
had prevailed during the 1990-97 period (on average about 5% of 
GDP) into a surplus of US$12 billion in 1998. As a result, the perennial 
current account deficits were transformed into a surplus of 13% of GDP 
in 1998.
The trade balance registered an unprecedented surplus of US$19 
billion in 1999. This surplus came from the 15.7% m erchandise 
export growth in 1999. Although im ports also rebounded strongly 
(12.5% in 1999), the current account surplus reached a record level of 
15.9% of GDP in 1999 and remained around a healthy 8 to 9% in 
2000- 02 .
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vi. Capital flows
Capital inflows were important in financing the current account deficit 
as well as in generating new investments. Prior to 1993, capital inflows 
into Malaysia m ainly took the form of FDI but thereafter short-term 
capital, primarily portfolio flows, also became significant. Large portfo­
lio inflows in 1993 followed the regional pattern of financial inflows 
into local stock markets.
After the Asian crisis, there was a reduction in FDI inflows into 
Malaysia, declining from US$9 billion in 1996 to an annual average of 
US$3 billion in 1998-2001. The slowing down of FDI inflow is due to 
both internal and external factors. The crisis has resulted in production 
over-capacity, thus discouraging new investments into the region. In 
addition, China tends to attract most of FDI flows to the region. Unlike 
other crisis-hit economies, Malaysia has been cautious in prom oting 
foreign purchases o f distressed assets from the crisis through mergers 
and acquisitions, and this has inhibited the opening of another 
channel of larger FDI inflows.
Not unexpectedly, the short-term capital account showed a sub­
stantial net outflow of US$5 billion and US$6 billion, in 1997 and 
1998, respectively, due to the decline in net external liabilities of the 
comm ercial banks and the liquidation of portfolio investm ents by 
foreign investors. The lower net external liabilities by comm ercial 
banks were in response to the stagnation in dom estic dem and and 
the unw inding of trade-related hedging activities. The outflow 
became larger in 1999 (US$9.9 billion), to some extent reflecting the 
reluctance o f m any foreign investors because o f concerns about 
the re-im position of regulations on capital flows and uncertainty 
about the exchange rate peg.
vii. Foreign reserves and external debt
The strong performance o f the external sector contributed to the 
improvement in the international reserves position. In August 1998, 
Malaysia had reserves of US$20 billion, which increased to US$31 
billion at year-end 1999, equipping the country to finance five months 
of imports. However, the level of international reserves did not change 
much in 2000 and 2001, even though Malaysia continued to record 
trade surpluses. This is partly explained by pre-payments of external 
debt and portfolio outflows.
Malaysia's total external debt increased from 44% of GDP in 1997 to 
51% in 2001. This increase is attributed to higher long-term debt from
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both the public and private sectors. Public sector external debt is 
financed m ostly through sales of sovereign bonds. In contrast, the 
share of short-term foreign debt in total debt burden was substantially 
reduced from 25% in 1997 to 14% in 2001. The international reserves 
were more than adequate to cover the short-term foreign debt -  the 
ratio of short-term foreign debt to international reserves was on 
average below 20% during the 1999-2001 period.
viii. Financial market
The crisis placed a strain on the banking system. The high interest rate 
and collapse of the stock market increased the non-performing loans 
(NPLs) of financial institutions to a level considered seriously threaten­
ing. As Malaysia had a very high ratio of domestic debt to GDP (152%), 
the interest rate hike quickly turned many loans into NPLs. Prior to the 
crisis in 1997, the level of NPLs at financial institutions was 4%, but by 
August 1998, this figure had jum ped to 16%. The higher cost of 
financing and tighter liquidity discouraged private investment. The 
cost of funds for investment increased substantially when the base 
lending rate rose from 10.3% in June 1997 to 12.3% in July 1998: in 
some cases, the effective interest rate reached a high of 20%.
2. Policy responses for crisis resolution
Concerning macroeconomic policies, the swift change in policy stance 
from tightening to easing supported the quick recovery of the crisis-hit 
economies. In Korea, although fiscal and monetary policies differed in 
the points at which the policy stance changed (fiscal stim ulus first, 
m onetary easing more cautiously), the policy target under the IMF 
program shifted from stabilization of the foreign exchange market to 
economic recovery around April 1998. In Malaysia, although indepen­
dent macroeconomic policies could be adopted from the beginning of 
the crisis, counter-cyclical policy measures only became fully effective 
from August 1998 due to internal politics.
The positive role of counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies in the 
post-crisis recovery raises the question of whether the initial tightening 
of monetary and fiscal policy was kept high for too long, in effect 
deepening the crisis. In the case of Korea, the IMF initially prescribed a 
tight monetary policy together with fiscal austerity. But, Malaysia also 
initially adopted the orthodox approach without IMF involvement. 
There is also the question of whether the tight monetary and fiscal
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policy with or without the IMF involvement was inevitable in the early 
resolution o f the crisis. Radelet and Sachs (1998) asserted that the aus­
terity measures were unnecessary because the Asian crisis countries 
were suffering from a liquidity problem. They implied that the tradi­
tional IMF policy prescriptions might have done more harm than good 
as they drove m any highly leveraged but viable firms out of business, 
thereby deepening the downturn of the economy. Feldstein (1998) 
further criticized the IMF for moving beyond its traditional macroeco­
nomic adjustm ent role by including a large number of structural ele­
m ents.13 The contribution of initial IMF austerity programs and the 
presence of structural elements in the IMF programs still remain con­
troversial. However, it is generally agreed that the swift change toward 
a more expansionary macroeconomic policy stance helped these 
economies to recover quickly.
a) Policy responses in Korea
i. Early resolution
The macroeconomic policy goals at the outset of the IMF program for 
Korea had been to stabilize the foreign exchange market and build up 
foreign reserves through contractionary aggregate demand policies. In 
particular, the high interest rate policy prescribed by the IMF for Korea 
and other Asian program countries has generated immense public and 
academic debates. Proponents argued that i) higher interest rates tend 
to slow capital outflows by raising the nom inal return to investors 
from assets denominated in domestic currency, ii) higher interest rates 
make speculation more expensive by raising the cost of going short on 
the currency, iii) tight monetary policy reduces expectations of future 
inflation and therefore of future currency depreciation, and iv) m one­
tary tightening -  by lowering expectations of currency depreciation -  
reduces default risk for those with unhedged foreign currency debt 
exposure (IMF, 2000). By contrast, critics contended that although it 
may have been necessary to increase interest rates initially, they were 
kept high for too long, plunging the economy into a vicious cycle of 
declining output, increasing bankruptcies, and further weakening
13 In the East Asian crisis countries that received IMF assistance, short-run policy  
goals were n ot necessarily consistent w ith m edium -run structural reform  ob je c ­
tives. A wide array o f  reform  packages w ould entail m edium - or long-run devel­
opm ent goals, w hich  cannot be easily achieved in  a short span o f  tim e. If 
pursued aggressively w ithout due consideration  o f  im plem entation  difficulties 
and adjustment costs, even if desirable, structural reforms cou ld  delay econom ic 
recovery or w ould  end up being perfunctory gestures (Park and W ang, 2002).
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of the financial sector -  all of which served to weaken rather than 
shore-up investor confidence (Furman and Stiglitz, 1998). A number of 
studies have tried to assess empirically whether high interest rates have 
been useful in supporting the exchange rate. In general, the empirical 
evidence is inconclusive.
During the early period of crisis resolution, several other measures 
were also simultaneously im plemented to stabilize the exchange 
market. Tight macroeconomic policies were only one com ponent of 
many. Thus, it is extremely difficult to single out the im pact of strin­
gent macroeconomic policies on the exchange market. Additional 
policy measures included (i) the IMF's financial support; (ii) maturity 
extension agreement with foreign creditors on restructuring short-term 
debt; (iii) accelerating capital account liberalization; and (iv) global 
bond issuance. This multi-pronged approach successfully restored 
external stability and allowed foreign reserves to be rebuilt.
ii. Macroeconomic policy responses to the crisis
From fiscal austerity to fiscal stimulus Prior to the crisis, fiscal policy 
prudence had been the norm in Korea with the consolidated central 
government remaining in balance or surplus. In fact, during the 1990s, 
the government consistently reduced its sovereign indebtedness, with 
the central government debt falling to a low of 9% of GDP by 1996 
(IMF, 2000, p. 56).
When the crisis broke out, the initial IMF program presupposed that 
the policy of fiscal conservatism should be continued. The original 
1998 budget, passed on November 1997 before the crisis became full 
blown, was based on a forecasted real GDP growth rate of 6% and tar­
geted a budget surplus of 0.25% of GDP. By early December 1997, 
however, growth estimates had been downgraded to 3%. Under this 
revised macroeconomic outlook, the overall balance was expected to 
worsen to a deficit of around 0.5% of GDP. The objectives of the IMF's 
required fiscal balance were to support the m onetary contraction, 
enhancing confidence in the exchange rate and providing the funds 
necessary to rehabilitate the financial system.
By late 1997, the effects of the crisis were becom ing more severe. 
Then, the program was revised to focus on allowing automatic stabiliz­
ers to operate and tolerating a short-term deficit. However, greater 
fiscal stimulus was programmed later. The supplementary budget was 
implemented in March 1998, putting greater emphasis on increasing 
safety net spending, but this policy stance was still deemed too tight 
given the worsening economic outlook. In face of a vicious spiral of
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economic recession and corporate insolvency, counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy actions were strongly called for. Accordingly, the fiscal policy 
stance was changed toward expansion. Upon consultation with the 
IMF, the target for consolidated budget deficits was adjusted upward 
from the initial 0.8% of GDP (February 1998) to 1.75% (May 1998) and 
4% (July 1998). In September 1998, the secondary supplementary 
budget was implemented with expanded budget deficit target of 5% of 
GDP. Flowever, the actual deficit for the year turned out to be 4.2% 
of GDP because tax proceeds began to recover.
The expansionary fiscal policy continued in 1999 in order to stim u­
late the economy, support economic restructuring and increase spend­
ing for the social safety net. The budget deficit target was set at 4% of 
GDP in 1999, and 70% of the resources for public investment projects 
were front loaded in the first half of the year. The deficit in 1999 was 
much smaller than the forecast because the economic recovery 
was much stronger than expected. As the economy grew by a remark­
able 10.9%, the fiscal deficit shrank to 2.7% of GDP. Because of the 
strong economic recovery, Korea reached again a fiscal surplus in 2000.
Korea's history of fiscal soundness is what allowed for these expan­
sionary policy measures. Korea's public debt as a percentage of GDP 
stood at only 11% in 1997. A figure far lower than the average of the 
OECD countries of about 70% (OECD, 2001). After the crisis, public 
debt as a percentage of GDP jum ped to 16% in 1998 and 19% in 
1999.
From tightening to easing monetary policy Once the task of stabilizing 
the foreign exchange market was accomplished in early 1998, the 
stance of the m onetary policy was progressively eased. In the second 
quarterly agreement (May 1998), the IMF agreed to relax the pressures 
that were adversely affecting the domestic credit crunch by lowering 
the high interest rates and resolving financial difficulties. Continued 
caution was warranted in view of the unsettled global financial 
markets. However, by June 1998, interest rates had been brought down 
to below the pre-crisis level. The relaxation of the monetary policy 
continued in 1999. The short-term interest rate was further lowered to 
support a recovery in economic activity, with the overnight call rate 
falling below 5% in April 1999. The sustained low interest rate boosted 
stock prices, thereby facilitating economic restructuring and the reduc­
tion of debt-to-equity ratios through new equity offerings.
Exchange rate policy and capital market liberalization After Korea 
allowed the won to float on December 1997, the IMF requested that
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the Bank of Korea refrain from intervening in the foreign exchange 
market, except in the event of dramatic exchange rate fluctuations.
With the floating exchange rate system  in place, the Korean gov­
ernment also substantially accelerated its ongoing capital account lib­
eralization plan. Under the IMF program, the Korean governm ent 
agreed to undertake bold liberalization measures; in fact, the Korean 
governm ent can be credited for much of the initiative behind the 
reforms. All o f the capital markets, including the short-term m oney 
markets, were liberalized. But m ost im portantly, the real estate 
market, which had been off lim its and considered non-negotiable, 
was com pletely opened to foreigners in the second quarterly agree­
ment with the IMF (May, 1998).
Nevertheless, a number of regulations on capital outflows of resi­
dents still remain for the purpose of preventing capital flight. For 
example,
•  Institutional investors are permitted to hold deposits abroad for 
asset diversification purposes without a quantitative ceiling. But 
general corporations and individuals are permitted to hold deposits 
abroad only up to $5 million and $50,000 a year, respectively.
•  The monthly allowance for residents staying abroad for over 30 days 
is $10,000. For those staying abroad over one year, a remittance of 
$50,000 (including basic travel allowances) is allowed.
•  Residents traveling abroad may, in general, purchase foreign 
exchange up to the equivalent of $10,000 a trip as their basic travel 
allowance.
•  The basic m onthly allowance for students under 20 years old is 
$3,000; for students with a dependent family, an additional 
allowance of $500 for a spouse and each child is allowed. Residents 
are allowed to remit up to $5,000 a transaction to their parents and 
children living abroad for living expenses and to their relatives 
abroad for wedding gifts or funeral donations, with no restrictions 
on the number of remittances.
•  Residents may make payments abroad by credit card for expendi­
tures relating to travel and tourism; for amounts exceeding $5,000 a 
month, the foreign exchange authorities must verify the authentic­
ity of payments.
•  Loans by residents to nonresidents have to be approved by the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy.
•  For gifts, endowments, inheritance, and legacies, paym ents that 
exceed $5,000 have to be approved by the Bank of Korea.
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• Overseas direct investment in the leasing and sale of real estate, con­
struction, and the operation of golf courses are prohibited. No 
approvals or notifications are required for acquisition of overseas 
real estate by foreign exchange banks, government authorities, and 
residents if given as gifts or through inheritance from nonresidents. 
However, just a notification to the BOK is required for the acquisi­
tion of real estate, necessary for approved business activities, costing 
up to $10 million. For this real estate exceeding $10 million, permis­
sion from the BOK is required.
Under a free floating system with free m obility of capital flows, the 
Korean won/dollar exchange rates might be expected to be excessively 
volatile. However, the Korean won has exhibited an impressive degree 
of stability since the latter half of 1998. As the Korean won steadily 
appreciated in 1998-99, the Korean government continued to accumu­
late huge am ounts of foreign reserves by intervening in the foreign 
exchange market: the stock of reserves rose by US$100 billion between 
1997 and 2002.
iii. Structural reform measures
Structural reforms and restructuring measures have been actively 
carried out on two fronts: the financial sector and the corporate sector.
Financial sector Restructuring of the financial sector has been central 
to the structural reform program in Korea. As a first step before starting 
swift and prudential financial reforms, the government established an 
institutional and legal framework to coordinate and m onitor the 
reform process. The IMF also advised the Korean government to imple­
ment a plan for the closure of nonviable financial institutions, which 
showed no possibility of being revamped, and the rigorous restructur­
ing of others for rehabilitation.
Good progress has been made in consolidating the financial system 
and strengthening prudential regulations and supervision. During 
financial restructuring, public funds were provided to ailing financial 
institutions. By 1999, the Korean government had mobilized fiscal 
resources of 64 trillion won, out of which 44 trillion won was used to 
recapitalize financial institutions, and the remaining 20 trillion won 
supported the disposal of non-performing loans (NPLs). The Korea 
Asset M anagement Com pany (KAMCO) was in charge of purchasing 
and recovering NPLs, while the Korea Deposit Insurance Com pany 
(KDIC) pays off deposits and recapitalizes financial institutions.
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Soon, the 1999 plan to spend a total of 64 trillion won was regarded 
as wholly inadequate. Consequently, the government injected more 
public funds, am ounting to 156 trillion won in total by May 2002 
(equivalent to nearly 30% of GDP in 2001). To raise the money, 
KAMCO and the KDIC issued a total of 104 trillion won in restructur­
ing bonds. The government guarantees the repayment of these bonds 
and pays the interest accruing on them from the budget. An additional 
20 trillion won was raised through other means, and the government 
recycled some recovered funds and loans from the ADB and IBRD. 
These funds were spent purchasing NPLs, recapitalization, repayment 
of deposits and the purchase of assets and subordinated debt.
Although a great deal has been accomplished in restructuring and 
strengthening the financial sector in Korea, much more remains to be 
done. The IMF program did not consider the institutional and other 
constraints that could limit the effectiveness of financial sector reform 
measures. When the crisis broke out, the bank-oriented financial 
system was often blamed for the crisis. The IMF program, therefore, 
included a capital market development plan, in which capital markets 
complement and substitute for the banking system as a source of cor­
porate financing. Although this plan is a reform objective, it can only 
be a long-term priority because the bank-dominated system cannot be 
replaced by a market-oriented system overnight (Park, 2001, p. 37). 
Rapid dism antling of the existing system (even flawed system) could 
create an institutional void.
Corporate sector The high level of corporate debt and weak corporate 
governance in Korea resulted in the debt-financed expansion by busi­
ness conglomerates, raising Korea's vulnerability to the financial crisis. 
In the wake of the crisis, the Korean government made corporate 
restructuring a priority of its reform agenda. Relevant laws and institu­
tions have been reorganized to enable a market-based corporate 
restructuring. Since, the changes to the legal and regulatory framework 
would have little immediate effect on improving com panies' capital 
structure and profitability, the government actively intervened in 
pushing forward corporate debt restructuring.
The government decided to classify corporations into three tiers that 
mirrored the structure of the Korean economy. At the top was the 
small cluster of powerful conglomerates, the so-called Top Five, that 
controlled a vast share of the country's productive and financial 
resources; next, a large group of medium-sized chaebols (ranked 6 to 
64); and finally, SMEs. The government pushed the Top Five to submit
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voluntary restructuring plans. The m ain banks were to review these 
plans and work with the chaebols to prepare final plans by December
1998. The government also announced its proposal to use mergers and 
swaps am ong the Top Five to consolidate overlapping subsidiaries in 
key m anufacturing industries (aircraft, autos, petrochemicals, power 
generation, rolling stock, semiconductors and ship engines). For the 
second tier, the government established an out-of-court workout 
scheme. The scheme was modeled along the Bank of England's London 
Approach.14 The government set up several schemes to help SMEs 
obtain working capital and trade credit.
Market-led operational restructuring in times of a systemic crisis 
is extremely difficult. In the case of Korea, nearly all of the corpora­
tions suffered from liquidity problems. Reducing the debt-to-equity 
ratio is deemed desirable, but it is unclear why the Korean government 
under the IMF program aimed for such a drastic reduction in the cor­
porate debt in such a short span of time.
The adoption of the London Rules for corporate restructuring was to 
some extent understandable in the absence of the market for bankrupt­
cies and well-functioning court-based bankruptcy laws and institutions. 
In out-of-court workout, the government was supposed to play the role 
of mediator, facilitating an orderly debt resolution, and banks were sup­
posed to act as creditors, m anaging the workout of corporate debt; in 
most cases, however, the government dictated the process (Park, 2001).
When a bank was recapitalized through the injection of public funds, 
the government invariably controlled its management. The government- 
appointed bank managers were unwilling to change the status quo. They 
also had little incentive to collect overdue loans or to engage in work­
outs of weak but potentially viable corporate borrowers. The restructured 
banks have avoided corporate workouts as much as possible, so as not to 
increase their holdings of NPLs or to lower their profits. This moral 
hazard problem has therefore delayed corporate restructuring and 
resulted in a deterioration of bank asset quality (Park, 2001).
14 The L ondon  approach to  corporate w orkout (out-of-court workout) differs 
from  a court-supervised rehabilitation or receivership. The approach was taken 
because unlike the Top Five chaebols, m ost o f the medium-size com panies lacked 
access to bank credit or capital markets and needed debt workouts or new  loans 
to have any chance o f  meaningful restructuring. Preferential treatment was given 
in order to encourage banks to participate in  the corporate restructuring process 
and to  extend new  loans. However, it subsequently becam e clear that the lax 
provisioning requirement was a disincentive for banks to  recognize true losses in 
debt w orkout cases and led to  superficial corporate restructuring w ith debt 
rescheduling and long grace period. See Chopra, et al. (2002).
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b) Policy responses in Malaysia15
i. Early responses
For a while, Malaysia followed the orthodox approach to such a crisis, 
namely tightened fiscal and monetary policies, introduced measures to 
redress the balance of payment weakness, and floated the exchange 
rate. This approach was adopted because the economy was taken to be 
overheated, thus the main objective was to reduce excess demand. The 
government had proposed a 3% surplus for the 1998 budget on 
October 1997. The budgetary measures introduced included a 2% 
reduction in government expenditure, deferment of mega projects, and 
cutbacks on the government purchase of foreign goods.
On December 1997, an additional package of policy measures was 
announced. These measures were aimed at strengthening economic 
stability and instilling confidence in the financial system as the 
regional instability proved to be more protracted than was earlier antic­
ipated. The package included a further 18% reduction in government 
expenditure, strict approval requirements for new investments and 
deferment of im plem entation of non-strategic and non-essential 
projects.
Regarding the financial aspects, a comprehensive set of measures was 
implemented such as reclassifying the non-performing loans (NPLs) in 
arrears from six to three months, greater financial disclosure by 
financial institutions and increasing general provisions to 1.5%. The 
reclassification of the NPLs was aimed at adhering to international 
financial practices and ensuring an earlier warning of the rising NPLs. 
The Bank Negara also raised the three-month intervention rate from 
10% to 11%, increased the m inim um  risk-weighted capital adequacy 
ratio from 8% to 10% for finance companies and reduced the single 
customer limit from 30% to 25%. The level of provisions against uncol­
lateralised loans was also raised to 20%. In addition, minimum capital 
for finance com panies was increased from RM5 m illion to RM300 
million and subsequently to RM600 million. The capital adequacy 
framework was also expanded to incorporate market risks. In view of 
the tight liquidity in the system, the statutory reserve requirement was 
reduced from 13.5% to 10%.
As a measure to strengthen the balance of payment position, a target 
was set to reduce the current account deficit from 5% to 3% of GDP in 
1998 by limiting imports and increasing import duties. Stricter criteria
15 See Jom o (2001) and M ahani (2002) for two com prehensive analyses.
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were also introduced for new overseas investments to reduce the 
outflow of domestic capital.
ii. Counter-cyclical measures
The im plem entation of the stabilization policy did not improve the 
economic situation. In fact, the economy continued to contract, 
capital outflow worsened and the ringgit exchange rate remained 
volatile and depreciated. Then, rejecting the IMF type prescription, 
Malaysia reversed its earlier response policies and adopted counter­
cyclical measures to boost the domestic economy. This approach rec­
ommended the introduction of fiscal stimulus, relaxation of the 
monetary policy, and measures to ensure the stability of the banking 
system as well as selective capital controls. However, due to internal 
differences among the top political leadership on the question of crisis 
resolution, these measures only became fully effective in mid-1998.
Fiscal stimulus programs With the reversal of fiscal policy stance in 
mid-1998, an additional development expenditure of US$1.8 billion 
was allocated for agriculture, low and medium-cost housing, educa­
tion, health, infrastructure, rural development and technology upgrad­
ing. The fiscal stimulus programs concentrated on infrastructure 
projects and an Infrastructure Development Fund (US$1.6 billion) was 
established to finance essential projects. Social support was also given 
to the lower income group through direct transfers. These programs 
were aimed at keeping domestic activities going, particularly for small 
and medium scale contractors and industries that were dependent on 
government projects.
The expansive fiscal policy turned the government fiscal position 
from a 2.4% surplus in 1997 to a deficit. In 1998, the fiscal deficit was 
1.8% of GDP and it became larger subsequently to exceed 5% in 
2000-01. These deficits were financed primarily from past savings, as 
the public debt level did not increase significantly during the 
1998-2000 period (it hovered around 36% of GDP). However, 
the Malaysian government had to raise funds to continue with its fiscal 
expansion -  in 2002 the ratio of public debt to GDP jum ped to 46%. 
This was mainly financed from domestic sources (see table 4).16
16 Since the early 1990s, the public sector had attained a surplus budget. Thus, 
there were som e savings that cou ld  be used to finance the deficit. In addition, 
Malaysia had a h igh  savings rate (35%  o f  GDP) and a com pulsory savings 
schem e where the governm ent could access cheap financing.
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Easing the monetary stance An important early measure was to increase 
liquidity and reduce the cost of funding. In this regard, the statutory 
reserves requirement (SRR) was gradually reduced from 13.5% in 
February 1998 to 4% in December 1998. With the reduction of the SRR, 
an additional US$10 billion was injected into the banking system, 
helping to overcome the tight liquidity problem caused by the introduc­
tion of the credit plan and cautious stance taken by banking institutions.
The initial response of increasing the interest rate had seriously 
affected the business community. In February 1998, the effective 
lending rate averaged 24%. Therefore, the immediate task was to 
reduce the cost of funds. The base lending rate (BLR) was reduced from 
a high of 12.3% in June 1998 to 6.8% in October 1999. Lending rates 
were consequently reduced from the 24% peak in February 1998 to 
7.9% in October 1999 and subsequently, in stages, to 6.4% in 2002. 
The lower borrowing costs and higher liquidity did not, however, 
produce high loan growth. Loan growth was only 1% in 1998 and 
1999 as compared to 27% in 1997. The low loan growth was due to 
both demand and supply factors: business conditions were still so 
lethargic for reviving new investments. Moreover, bankers were more 
cautious in extending loans to businesses.
Selective capital controls
A key policy response target was to stabilize the ringgit. In September 
1998, Malaysia implemented selective capital controls consisting of 
two inter-related parts: stabilization of the ringgit (which was pegged 
to RM3.80/US$1) and restrictions on short-term capital outflows, 
which was needed to ensure that the ringgit peg could be sustained. 
The measures im plem ented to support the peg and control capital 
flows were as follows:
•  All settlement of exports and im ports was to be made in foreign 
currency.
•  Travelers were not allowed to import and export ringgit exceeding 
RM1,000 per person.
•  Limit on export of foreign currency by resident travelers was set at 
RM10,000.
•  Residents were required to seek prior approval for remitting funds in 
excess of RM 10,000 for overseas investment purposes.
•  Residents were permitted to obtain credit facilities in foreign cur­
rency up to the equivalent of RM5 million. Any am ount exceeding 
the permitted limit required prior approval.
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•  Residents were not allowed to obtain credit facilities in ringgit from 
non-residents without prior approval.
•  Proceeds in ringgit received by non-residents from the sale of any 
securities were retained in the external account and converted into 
foreign currency after one year.
•  The ringgit was declared not legal tender outside Malaysia.
The capital control measures affected the transfer of funds among 
non-residents via non-resident external accounts, the im port and 
export of ringgit by travelers (both residents and non-residents) 
and investments abroad by Malaysian residents. Similarly, non-resi­
dents were proscribed from raising credit domestically for the purchase 
of shares. Non-resident portfolio investors were required to hold their 
investments for a m inim um  of twelve m onths in Malaysia. However, 
capital controls did not impede current account transactions (trade 
transactions for goods and services), repatriation of interest, dividends, 
fees, com m issions and rental income from portfolio investm ents and 
other forms of ringgit assets.
The selective capital controls were modified on February 1999 with 
the quantitative control (the requirement stipulating that proceeds 
from the sale of ringgit assets be kept in the country for one year) 
being replaced by a price-based regulation called an exit levy. This 
easing of capital control consisted of two parts, as described below.
(i) For capital brought into Malaysia before February 1999, an exit 
levy was imposed on the principal at the following rates:
•  30% for a maturity period of 7 months.
•  20% for a maturity period of 9 months.
•  10% for a maturity period of 12 months.
•  No levy was charged on capital with a maturity period exceed­
ing 12 months.
(ii) For capital brought in after February 15, 1999, a levy was imposed 
on the profits made at the following rates:
•  30% for a maturity period of less than 12 months.
•  10% for a maturity period of more than 12 months.
Although these relaxations were introduced, controlling the flow of 
short-term capital was still the primary objective. A further relaxation 
was introduced in September 1999 on the exit levy -  the two-tier 
system was reduced to a flat rate of 10% on profits repatriated. The exit 
levy was abolished on May 2001. By early 2005, the only remaining
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capital controls are the pegging of the ringgit and the lim itations on 
the outflow of domestic capital.
Another measure that significantly affected portfolio investors was 
the requirement that all dealings in securities listed on the KLSE were 
to be affected only through the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange or 
through a stock exchange recognized by the M alaysian authority. 
Consequently, trading of the 112 M alaysian companies on CLOB, the 
over-the-counter market of Malaysian securities in Singapore, was dis­
continued by the Singapore Stock Exchange in September 1998.
Ensuring the stability o f  the banking sector Besides reviving economic 
activities, the Malaysian policy measures also focused on restoring the 
stability of the banking sector. The core problem was the rising NPLs 
that had weakened the capital base of some banks. As a result, these 
institutions were unable to perform their intermediary function. Thus, 
in order to restore the stability of the banking sector and to restructure 
corporate debt, the M alaysian government established three institu­
tions, namely an asset m anagem ent company to remove the NPLs, a 
recapitalization agency to inject new capital into the troubled banks, 
and a corporate debt restructuring committee.
An asset management company (Danaharta) was established in June 
1998 to manage the NPLs of financial institutions. Its m ain objective 
was to remove the NPLs from the balance sheets of financial institu­
tions at a fair market value and to maximize their recovery value. This 
would free the banks from the burden of debts that had prevented 
them from providing new loans to their customers.
As the capital base of banks had been affected by the decline in share 
prices and NPLs, these banks needed to be recapitalized. For this 
purpose, a Special Purpose Vehicle (Danamodal) was set up in July 
1998 to capitalize banks facing difficulties and especially to top-up 
their capital, which was reduced when Danaharta took over the NPLs. 
The injection of capital was intended to enhance the resilience of the 
banks and to increase their capacity to grant new loans so to speed up 
economic recovery.
To complem ent the restructuring of the financial system by Dana­
harta and Danamodal, the Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee 
(CDRC) was set up in August 1998 to facilitate debt restructuring of 
viable companies, through voluntary solutions. The aims o f the 
restructuring exercise were to minimize losses to creditors, shareholders 
and other stockholders, to avoid placing viable companies into liquida­
tion or receivership, and to enable banking institutions to play a
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greater role in rehabilitating the corporate sector. The CDRC devised 
a market-approach debt-restructuring plan to enable creditors and 
debtors to solve their debts without resorting to legal procedures. It 
also brought together all interested parties to assist in the corporate 
debt restructuring.
As of December 2001, D anaharta had successfully disposed of a 
total of US$13 billion in NPLs. In the process of removing the NPLs, 
financial institutions had to share the losses -  the average discount 
rate for NPLs was 55%. Danam odal injected US$2 billion into 10 
financial institutions, pre-em pting any potential system ic risks to 
the financial sector. As a result, the capital adequacy ratio of the 
recapitalized financial institutions rose to 11.7% to become alm ost at 
par with the industry level (12.6%). Most of the recapitalized institu­
tions have subsequently repaid D anam odal's capital in jection. By 
15 August 2002, the CDRC had resolved 47 cases with a total debt 
am ounting to RM44 billion. The CDRC ceased its operations on 
August 2002.
Malaysia has moved to another stage in its banking sector restructur­
ing -  the 58 financial institutions have now been merged into 10 
banking groups. Each of the banking groups m ay offer a complete 
range of financial services such as merchant banking, fund m anage­
ment and stockbroking services.
Liberalization o f  foreign direct investment Realizing the contribution 
that foreign capital could make to the recovery of the economy, the 
Malaysian government liberalized selected sectors in which it was com­
fortable with foreign presence and in which it could maximize the 
gains from foreign capital injection. Thus, in the manufacturing sector, 
Malaysia relaxed its rules on equity ownership by allowing 100% 
foreign ownership for investments made before the end of December 
2003. Previously, only companies that fully exported their products 
were allowed full foreign ownership.
Equity liberalization was also carried out in other areas. Meanwhile, 
the 30% pre-crisis limit on foreign ownership in the telecom munica­
tions, stockbroking and insurance industries was raised to 61%, 49%, 
and 51%, respectively, although the limit for the telecommunications 
industry was scheduled to be reduced to 49% after five years.
In addition, foreigners were permitted to purchase all types of prop­
erties above RM250,000 for new projects or for projects that are 50% 
completed to reduce excess real estate supply. Previously, there were 
restrictions on foreigners buying landed properties.
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Corporate governance To complement the recovery measures, Malaysia 
also strengthened its corporate governance regime. Although 
Malaysia had im plem ented measures for good corporate governance 
practice, the crisis highlighted some of the shortfalls of the existing 
regime. Additional measures were introduced in order to achieve 
improved transparency and disclosure standards, more accountability 
of company directors and protection of minority shareholders' rights, 
among other intermediate objectives.
3. Assessment of the adjustment processes in Korea and 
Malaysia
Both Korea and Malaysia experienced the crisis starting in 1997. The 
exchange rate in both countries severely depreciated and GDP plunged 
in 1998. Then they showed a sharp V-shaped recovery. Despite this 
shared successful recovery, as explained, several detailed measures 
they used to deal with the crisis were remarkably different. The main 
differences are sum marized as follows. First, while Korea sought IMF 
assistance im m ediately after the crisis and adopted the macro- 
econom ic structural adjustm ent therapies prescribed by it, M alaysia 
refused to rely on the IMF and paved its own path to recovery. 
Second, while Korea liberalized its capital market more extensively 
after the crisis, M alaysia im posed capital controls instead; however, 
both retained or im posed som e restrictions on outflows by residents. 
Third, Korea's exchange rate became, at least officially, completely 
floating, but M alaysia's exchange rate was com pletely fixed, pegged 
to the US dollar.
However, in response to the crisis, both countries shared counter­
cyclical fiscal policies since mid 1998 and in 1999. Both reduced rather 
rapidly interest rates and kept some restrictions on financial outflows 
by residents. The most outstanding feature is that both countries used 
actively fiscal policy, moving from a surplus before the crisis toward a 
significant deficit. Korea made a faster move into a mild deficit in 1997 
and to a large one, 4.2% of GDP, in 1998. Interestingly, with the result­
ing recovery of economic activity, the deficit was reduced to 2.7% in 
1999, and the balance returned to a surplus in 2000. Malaysia moved 
somewhat later into counter-cyclical fiscal policy in 1998 and subse­
quently has remained in deficit.
Among the differences, the m ost striking ones are those related to 
capital controls and the exchange rate regime. In particular, it is the 
capital controls that allowed Malaysia to m aintain the fixed exchange
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rate and to start to reflate its economy right away. Hence, most 
researchers have focused on the role that capital controls played in 
Malaysia's recovery process.
Despite these differences, rebounds of both Korea and Malaysia were 
as drastic as their plunges. Park and Lee (2001) find that the sharp 
recoveries have been faster than earlier similar episodes in other parts 
of the world.17 The growth rates in Korea and Malaysia show a remark­
ably similar patterns from 1997 when the Asian crisis started. Both 
countries experienced the m ost severe recession in 1998, exactly one 
quarter apart: Korea's lowest growth rate was -8.1%  in 1998 Q3 and 
M alaysia's was -11.2%  in 1998 Q4. Thereafter, both countries 
rebounded quite rapidly so that the growth rates for the following 
three quarters were -5.9% , 5.8% and 11.2% for Korea and -1.0% , 4.8% 
and 9.1% for Malaysia.
The above findings indicate that, at least, the capital controls did not 
produce adverse results for Malaysia. However, a number of researchers 
discount the role of the capital controls in M alaysia's recovery on the 
ground that Korea m anaged to recover without im posing capital 
controls. Krugman (1999), one of the earliest proponents of 
capital controls (Krugman, 1998), asserts that the financial panic was 
coming to an end just about the time that Malaysia decided to impose 
the controls. Nonetheless, he also states that "it would now be foolish 
to rule out controls as a measure of last resort".
On the other hand, there are also a number of studies showing that 
Malaysia's capital controls have been more successful than in other 
cases. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2000) and Edison and Reinhart (1999) 
find that in Malaysia the capital controls did produce the intended 
results of greater interest rate and exchange rate stability and more 
policy autonomy.
Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) go even further, asserting that the capital 
controls allowed Malaysia a speedier recovery than would have been 
possible via the orthodox policies of the IMF. This assessment crucially 
depends on the different timing they im pose on M alaysia's recovery 
process. M ost other studies, explicitly or implicitly, assume that the 
crisis and recovery occurred simultaneously in Korea and Malaysia. 
However, Kaplan and Rodrik argue that Malaysia's situation at the time 
of its capital controls was much worse than Korea's. In fact, they claim 
that M alaysia’s im position o f capital controls could be viewed as the
17 All the data in this section have been obtained from  the Asian Recovery 
Inform ation Center (http ://aric.adb.org).
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equivalent of Korea's appeal to the IMF for assistance. The difference in 
tim ing is about three quarters. Because M alaysia's recovery process, 
which started with its introduction of capital controls, was superior to 
Korea's, which started three quarters earlier, Kaplan and Rodrik con­
clude that the capital controls were more effective, eradicating 
M alaysia's financial pressures so quickly that the country was able to 
recover faster than Korea.
While Kaplan and Rodrik's research is quite interesting, juxtaposing 
Malaysia's recovery process three quarters later to Korea's is disputable. 
In fact, Korea's minimum GDP growth rate leads Malaysia’s by just two 
quarters. M alaysia's recovery of GDP lags behind Korea's by one 
quarter. Further, while Malaysia bounces back more quickly (from 
-11.2%  to -1.0%  vis-à-vis -8.1%  to -5.9%  in Korea), its peak growth 
rate is lower than Korea's. Hence, it is not evident which recovery 
process is unequivocally better. What is evident is that both recovered 
notably faster than the rest of crises-hit East Asia and Latin American 
economies victims of the Asian contagion.
If we examine the components of GDP in the recovery process, there 
are additional differences between Korea and Malaysia. Figure V .l 
shows changes in the share of private consum ption and investment in 
GDP from 1996 Q1 to 2002 Q l. Panel A is the consum ption share 
in GDP. As implicated by any standard theory of consum ption 
smoothing, the consum ption share shows remarkable stability in both 
countries. However, the consum ption share is slightly lower in the 
crisis period.
Panel B in Figure V .l shows that investment was indeed m ost devas- 
tatingly affected by the crisis. In both countries the investm ent share 
drastically decreased during the recession and did not recover fully 
until 2001. An interesting point to note is that while Malaysia's invest­
m ent share before the crisis was higher than Korea's, it becomes 
slightly lower after the crisis. We believe that this is closely related to 
the fact that Malaysia was heavily dependent on FDI in the formation 
of investment before the crisis, but FDI inflows did not fully recover 
after the crisis. We will return to this issue later.
Figure V.2 shows the growth rate of components of GDP for both 
countries from 1996 Q l to 2002 Q l. Again we can confirm from Panels 
A (consumption) and B (investment) that the consumption growth rate 
fluctuates much less than the investment growth rate in both coun­
tries. Panels C and D show the growth rates of exports and imports. 
Interestingly, the growth rate of imports fluctuates more than that of 
exports in both countries. Further, the fact that growth of imports at
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Figure V .l Changes in GDP shares o f  expenditure com ponents, 1996 Q l-2 0 0 2  
Q1 (%)
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
the beginning of the recovery remained negative in both countries, 
accompanied by a positive growth rate of exports, seems to have con­
tributed to the recovery process.
Another im portant factor in the recovery process was monetary 
policy.18 While Korea initially im posed high interest rates as recom­
mended by the IMF, its subsequent lowering seems to have helped the 
recovery. Figure V.3 shows monetary policy stances o f both countries 
in terms o f the three-month inter-bank lending rate. It confirms the 
discussion in section 2. By June 1998 Korea had brought down interest 
rates below the pre-crisis level. In Malaysia, also after the sharp rise by
18 In general, Park and Lee (2001) find  that m onetary p o licy  is less im portant 
than fiscal p o licy  for post-crisis recovery in 95 episodes o f  crises during the 
period from  1970 to  1995.




Figure V.2 Growth rates o f  expenditure com ponents, 1996 Q l-2 0 0 2  Q1 
Note: Due to  the lack o f  quarterly data, all the series start from  1997 Q1 for 
Malaysia.
178 Seeking Growth under Financial Volatility
D. Imports
Figure V.2 (continued)
mid-1998, the lending rate had decreased to 9.5% in August 1998, but 
a more substantial decrease of the interest rate immediately followed 
the capital controls in September 1998 and remained below the rate in 
Korea afterwards (see figure V.3).
In general, there was concern that a sharp depreciation of the 
domestic currency would create inflation. However, for both Korea and 
Malaysia, the financial crisis led only to a small increase in inflation, 
which enabled both countries to adopt expansionary policies. Figure
Figure V.3 M onetary variables, Jan 1996-Jan 2002 (three m on th  inter-bank 
lending rate)
Note: The available quarterly interest rate series for Malaysia starts from  1998 
Q2.
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V.4.A shows the inflation rates for both countries. During the crisis, it 
was over 7% in Korea and around 5% in Malaysia. Subsequently, both 
returned to lower ratio; in particular, M alaysia's inflation rate fell 
further. The main factor that prevented the inflation rate from 
jumping during the crisis was the drastic fall in domestic demand, par­
ticularly investment. Even during the recovery, both countries' strong 
m anufacturing sectors with excess capacity were able to meet the 
higher demand without generating further inflation.
Panel B in Figure V.4 shows the change in the unem ployment rate. 
The unem ployment rate in M alaysia was not particularly high even 
during the crisis, partly because the large group of immigrant workers 
in M alaysia at the time absorbed the severe im pact of the economic
A. Inflation rate
B. Unemployment rate
Figure V.4 Inflation and unem ploym ent rates, 1990-2001 
Source: IMF.
180 Seeking Growth under Financial Volatility
recession, causing m any of them to leave Malaysia for their home 
countries.
In Korea, the financial crisis took a heavy toll on the labor market, 
but this market showed significant flexibility in response to the crisis, 
both in terms of prices and quantity. Faced with the collapse in 
demand in the wake of the crisis, firms slashed both wages and 
employment. Nom inal wages fell by an average of 9% in real terms in
1998. A 2.5% decline in nom inal wages was the first since 1970. 
Layoffs were concentrated in SMEs where the highest rate of bankrupt­
cies was recorded, as well as in the financial sector. By contrast, with 
few exceptions, chaebols did not undertake large-scale layoffs, 
although many reduced their workforces through voluntary separation 
and early retirement packages.
Unemployment in Korea, which averaged about 2.5% during 
1990-97, rose sharply following the crisis to peak at 8.7% in February
1999. The unem ploym ent problem was moderated by a significant 
decline in the labor force participation rate, mainly as a result of the 
postponem ent o f job search by younger workers and a substantial 
withdrawal from the labor force by discouraged female workers. As dra­
m atic as the recovery o f GDP was the drop in the unem ployment rate 
to almost the pre-crisis level in 2002 (3.1%; see table V.4). The fact that 
the crisis was relatively short-lived, along with the existence of a newly 
and rapidly developed information technology sector, in particular in 
the small and medium-sized business sector, contributed to the rapid 
restoration of the unemployment rate.
Despite some differences in details, Korea and Malaysia were sim i­
larly successful in their economic recovery. While Malaysia chose to 
take the heterodox route by adopting capital controls, its recovery was 
remarkable. The capital controls on outflows seem to have been suc­
cessful. Further, as emphasized by "second-generation" models of cur­
rency crises, even an economy with strong fundam entals can face 
credit panic and a run on reserves due to a loss of market confidence. 
In such cases, a temporary suspension of capital outflows can stop the 
run and eliminate the bad equilibrium. In the case of Malaysia, the 
existence of an active offshore securities and ringgit market provided 
an important and critical aspect of the usefulness of capital controls in 
m anaging a "second-generation" type of crisis. As shown by evidence 
of pressures on the exchange rate, the ringgit continued to face severe 
pressure from January 1998 up to the time when the selective capital 
controls were introduced. On the other hand, the currencies of the 
other crisis-hit economies had already stabilized by then.
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For capital controls to be successful, it is crucial for the crisis country 
to be fundam entally strong. If the crisis is due to fundam ental prob­
lems, then the second-generation models are not applicable and the 
crisis can end only when the fundam ental problems are eliminated. 
Then, why did Korea, which was as fundamentally strong as Malaysia, 
not choose to follow the same route? We believe that, while capital 
controls were a tem pting choice for Korea, Korea may have worried 
about the possible side effects. Furthermore, Korea was not free from 
the IMF's advice under the IMF program.
As regards capital account liberalization, the Korean government opted 
for a "big bang” approach by substantially accelerating its ongoing liber­
alization plan. In reference to the IMF program, one can say that the IMF 
is a veiled agent of a Wall Street-Treasury complex that is expanding its 
domain of influence. Under the IMF program, the Korean government 
pursued a far more extensive capital market opening than what had 
been agreed upon with the IMF. The goal was simply to stabilize the 
exchange market by attracting more foreign capital. Korea was facing an 
increased demand for the liquidation of foreign currency claims. On the 
other hand, there was little risk of domestic capital flight, because of 
restrictions on domestic residents to take capital abroad.
4. Policy implications
The recovery has been far greater in Korea and Malaysia than in other 
crisis-hit countries. In this section we summarized some policy implica­
tions of the experiences of the two countries.
First, the standard solutions are not the only effective ways of 
dealing with a crisis. In deciding on the appropriate response measures, 
it is critical for policy-makers to be fully cognizant of the real causes of 
the crisis and the initial domestic conditions and capacity to respond. 
Under some circumstances, capital controls with an expansionary 
policy can be as effective as the standard solutions, at least in the short 
run. However, strong economic fundamentals are essential in enabling 
a country to choose different response measures. These fundam entals 
not only include all macroeconomic factors but industry-level factors 
as well. For example, m anufacturing industries must also be able take 
advantage of the recovery, the financial system must be well capital­
ized and supervised, and there must be sufficient domestic sources of 
funding. Under such circumstances, a country will be freer to choose 
the measures that best suit domestic conditions since it will not be 
dependent on external financing.
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Second, the swift change toward an expansionary macroeconomic 
policy stance helped the two economies recover quickly. The positive role 
of counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies in the post-crisis recovery, 
including fiscal and m onetary policies, raises the question of whether 
the initial monetary and fiscal tightening was kept high for too long, 
and as a consequence deepened the crisis. In Malaysia, the expansion­
ary monetary policy was essentially possible due to the capital controls. 
A policy of a high interest rate to stabilize the exchange rate would 
have had severe im plications because of M alaysia's large domestic 
banking debt. Although Malaysia was less vulnerable to external shocks 
mainly due to a more stable pattern of capital movements (smaller 
share of short-term external debt), an expansionary m onetary policy 
could not have been effectively implemented without the capital con­
trols.
Third, in both countries, a favorable external environment and more 
export-oriented economic structure helped the quick recoveries. 
Achieving a current account surplus helped injecting liquidity into the 
economy and to boost domestic demand and stabilize the exchange 
rate. Robust export growth propelled the strong recovery in the m anu­
facturing sector, which, given its large share of GDP in both countries, 
became the engine of output recovery.
Fourth, the crisis was induced by the private sector, the domestic 
private sector was not a likely candidate to lead the recovery. As a con­
sequence, an expansionary fiscal policy played a leading role in the 
recovery of economic activity.
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Macroeconomics in Post-Apartheid 




At the time of South Africa’s transition to democracy, marked by the 
election of the African National Congress led by Nelson Mandela in 
April 1994, the new government was faced with formidable challenges. 
Apartheid's legacy was extremely high levels of poverty and income 
inequality, as well as an economic power totally concentrated within 
the white population. The economy had been in long-term decline for 
over twenty years, and had experienced more than a decade of sub­
stantial economic isolation, resulting from politically-linked sanctions 
on trade and investment and exclusion from global capital markets. 
But democratization made global reintegration possible.
A decade later, only limited progress has been made in improving 
growth and distribution. GDP growth between 1994 and 2003 has been 
disappointing, averaging only 2.8% per annum: with a population 
growth rate of 2.0%, per capita growth was only 0.8% per annum. Ten 
years after apartheid ended, poverty and inequality remain very high: 
32% of the population were living on less than $2 per day in 1995, and 
this rose to 34% in the subsequent five years. The Gini coefficient was
0.56 in 1995 and it increased to 0.58 in 2000 (Hoogeveen and Ozler,
* I w ould  like to  thank com m ents from  participants in  seminars at ECLAC in 
Santiago and in Buenos Aires, in the Departm ent o f  E conom ics at Wits 
University, Johannesburg, and the W its Institute for Social & E conom ic 
Research. For his com m ents and his support, I am particularly grateful to 
Ricardo Ffrench-Davis at ECLAC. Some o f  the material in this chapter also 
appears in S. Gelb, "The South African econ om y: an overview ", in J. Daniel, et 
al. (eds.), State o f  the Nation: South Africa, 2004-2005 , HSRC Press, Cape Town, 
2004.
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2004). By 2000, the share of the higher income decile was 45.2%, while 
the lowest decile's share was merely 0.4%. In September 2003, the 
official unem ployment rate was 28.2%, and on the "broad" definition 
of unemployment, it was as much as 41.8%.1 Unemployment rates dif­
fered markedly am ongst racial groups, 48.8% of Africans being unem ­
ployed on the broad definition compared with only 7.6% of whites 
(Statistics SA, 2004).
To be sure, internal financial stability has been established: con­
sumer price inflation has been held below 8% alm ost permanently 
since 1996 compared with 15.3% in 1991 and 9% in 1994, and the 
fiscal deficit reduced from 7.3% of GDP in 1993 to below 3% since
1999. Yet it is fair to ask, first, whether this represents macroeconomic 
success, since the external financial position has been extremely 
volatile, and second, even if it is regarded as successful, whether the 
price has been too high, given the poor performance of output and 
employment growth.
This chapter examines macroeconomic policy and performance 
during the 1990s, to answer these questions. Section 1 starts with a dis­
cussion of the political economy of the transition period which shaped 
the policy choices of the democratic government. Section 2 describes 
the processes of external liberalization and macroeconomic reform 
between 1990 and 1994, which provided the context for m acroeco­
nom ic policy since 1994, which is then discussed in section 3, starting 
with fiscal policies and then turning to monetary and exchange rate 
policies. Section 4 examines macroeconomic performance, looking at 
investment, savings and the balance of payments. Section 5 discusses 
briefly sectoral issues, and section 6 concludes.2
1. The political economy of transition
Poverty and inequality in South Africa are rooted in colonial military 
conquest and the exclusion of people of color from the political system 
when the country became independent from Britain in the early 20th 
century. Racial inequality was deepened by the pattern of economic 
growth after mineral discoveries in the late 19th century. The forced 
labor regime in m ining extended into a system of migrant labor and
1 The official rate reflects on ly  econ om ica lly  active people w h o  had actively 
sought work during the previous four weeks, while the broad rate includes those 
w h o  want to  work but have becom e discouraged from  actively seeking jobs.
2 The appendix presents basic econ om ic and social data for South Africa.
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racial discrimination in the labor market when secondary and tertiary 
sectors developed behind tariff protection after the First World War. 
The end of the "easy" phase of import-substitution in labor-intensive 
consumer goods was followed after 1945 by a shift to capital-intensive 
production for the domestic market of both consumer durables (autos, 
electrodomestics) and heavy intermediate goods.3 This helped to build 
political support for apartheid am ongst urban whites who benefited 
from discrim ination in the upper skill levels of the labor market. 
Growing mineral export earnings (stabilized by the fixed international 
gold price) financed imports of investment goods, making strong long- 
run growth possible in the 1950s and 1960s with a widening racial gap 
in living standards. Increasing capital-intensity limited labor absorp­
tion of low-skilled workers and open black unem ployment rose from 
the late 1960s, when long-run m anufacturing profitability began to 
falter. With low labor productivity, because of the apartheid labor and 
education systems, the m anufacturing sector was not internationally 
competitive, and import dependence was high because low effective 
protection on machinery and assembled intermediates had restricted 
backward integration. The breakdown of the Bretton W oods system 
followed by the 1970s oil shocks led to pressures on South Africa's 
trade account, while renewed domestic opposition to apartheid 
resulted in capital flight and growing m om entum  for international 
trade and investment sanctions against apartheid. These pressures led 
to some liberalization of apartheid restrictions, combined with severe 
repression as the regime struggled to maintain its hold on power.
GDP growth dropped from about 5.5% in the 1960s to 3.3% in the 
1970s to 1.2% in the 1980s; fixed investment was reduced from more 
than 25% of GDP in the 1970s to about 18% in the mid-1980s and TFP 
growth in manufacturing dropped from 2.3% per annum  in the 1960s 
to 0.5% in the 1970s and -2.9%  during the first half of the 1980s. 
Adding to pressures on the balance of payments, international credi­
tors recalled public sector debt in 1985, as government intransigence 
over political liberalization led to fears of endemic political unrest. The 
necessity to finance debt repayment imposed a current account surplus 
and import restrictions, severely tightening the external constraint on 
growth given the dependence on imported capital and intermediate 
goods.
3 This was a pattern similar to that o f  m any Latin American econom ies, but d if­
ferent from  East Asia w hich  fo llow ed  im port-substitution w ith  labor-intensive 
export-prom otion  resulting in higher em ploym ent rates and greater equity.
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The distributional im pact of economic decline in the context of 
political liberalization was very uneven. White business groups based 
in mining and in finance did well, while medium-sized firms in m anu­
facturing and services (also white-owned) became vulnerable. 
Ownership concentration increased: in 1990, six conglomerates based 
on m ining and finance controlled companies with 86% of the market 
capitalization on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. As late as 1986/7, 
big business had given explicit support to the continuation of martial 
law and political repression, but by 1989 these economic groups sup­
ported constitutional negotiations with the hitherto-banned national­
ist political movement, eventually recognizing that their long-run 
interests were tied to democratization as the only route to relaxing the 
binding external constraint and restoring economic growth.
The black urban middle class also made gains during the period of 
economic decline. There were substantial job losses primarily amongst 
unskilled workers, in m anufacturing and construction as well as the 
public sector and services, but blacks with education and skills 
benefited: technical and white-collar occupations increased as a pro­
portion of the labor force in all sectors. The number of Africans in 
"m iddle class" occupations grew 6% per annum, nearly trebling 
between 1970 and 1987 when 19% of employed Africans were in 
middle class jobs and comprised nearly a quarter of the middle class 
(Coloreds and Indians another 18 %) (Crankshaw and Hindson, 1990). 
Despite the rise of a middle class, black control over resources, espe­
cially in the corporate sector, was alm ost non-existent: it is estimated 
that black m anagem ent in white firms was 4% in 1990, and blacks 
owned only 0.1% of the capitalization of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange in 1994.
From the mid-1970s a diverse urban black civil society grew: in addi­
tion to an effective black trade union movement, community organiza­
tions, professional and business bodies, media and cultural 
organizations and women's and youth organizations were established. 
This became a significant factor driving the society to negotiated 
democratic transition, together with strategic focus from the exiled 
nationalist movement, the African National Congress (ANC). In early 
1990, the ANC was unbanned and Nelson Mandela released from 
prison. The form of the transition -  not the overthrow of the apartheid 
state but constitutional negotiations which lead ultimately to a de facto 
coalition government with the previous (apartheid) ruling party for 
over two years until June 1996 -  reflected the prevailing balance of 
class power. It implied blacks' recognition of whites' role in society and
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of their property rights, though the latter were qualified by the impera­
tive of "capital reform” to open the ownership and management of the 
private sector to blacks (together with state institutions and public 
corporations).
The ANC leadership recognized that sustainability of future growth 
would depend not just upon the immediate benefits from relaxing the 
external constraint represented by sanctions and the debt moratorium, 
but on increased exports and capital inflows, as well as on im proving 
investment ratios and industrial productivity. In prioritizing the revival 
of growth, the ANC recognized its interdependence with (white) big 
business, reaching an "im plicit bargain" with the latter, combining on 
the one hand the latter's support for deracializing (private) economic 
power and the state, with the new government's acceptance of reinte­
gration into international goods and capital markets on the other, 
involving trade and financial liberalization and supposedly "investor- 
friendly" macro policies.4
Although a "basic needs" program was articulated within ANC circles 
during the course of the constitutional negotiation phase of the transi­
tion, spelling out a "growth through redistribution" process premised 
on the expansion of labor-intensive sectors producing consumer goods 
and services for the poor, it too would require relaxing the external 
constraint (to finance capital equipment imports), as well as a consid­
erable increase in deficit financing. The basic needs approach thus 
failed to win much support from either domestic business groups or 
foreign financial institutions, while within the ANC its support was 
limited by the weakness o f the two constituencies who would be its 
m ajor beneficiaries: small black business and the unemployed poor. 
More influential in the ANC alliance were organized black labor with 
members in established industry and the black intelligentsia and pro­
fessional middle classes looking to move into government and the 
public sector, neither of whom would benefit greatly from a basic 
needs focus.
4 ANC views o n  fiscal p o licy  were strongly in fluenced by  the political con se­
quences in  Chile and Nicaragua o f  rapid fiscal expansion  to  address popular 
needs by  the Unidad Popular and Sandinista governm ents, respectively.
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2. External liberalization and macroeconomic reform, 
1990-945
Policy formulation and im plem entation to liberalize international 
trade and finance began well before the first democratic election in 
1994. Some reforms were driven by private institutions such as the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), while individual state agencies 
pursued their own agendas. ANC policy-makers were incorporated into 
m ost discussions, but before 1994 were not in a position to direct 
policy reforms. The context of an ongoing political transition and a 
weakened state m eant that the reform process was highly fragmented 
and lacking a coherent framework. Between 1990 and 1994, the debate 
over economic policy for "the new South Africa" took place in hun­
dreds of workshops, conferences, seminars and publications, convened 
by dozens of different organizations inside South Africa and abroad. 
The contemporary version of the W ashington consensus provided an 
"off the shelf" set of prescriptions which were aired on all these occa­
sions, often by representatives of the Bretton W oods institutions. 
Consequently, these ideas inevitably influenced resulting policy 
specifics. But little attention was paid to issues being debated interna­
tionally at the time, such as the pace and (especially) sequencing of 
capital account and current account liberalization, or the interaction 
between policy reform and social safety net issues.
Processes begun in 1992 led to legislation in 1994 and 1995 allowing 
foreign banks to establish branches, deregulating the JSE via a "Big 
Bang" opening to foreign security dealers, and abolishing the two-tier 
exchange rate together with all capital controls on foreign investors.6 
The removal of the financial rand discount re-established the link 
between international and domestic interest rates. Re-entry to interna­
tional borrowing had been facilitated by the signing of an IMF standby 
credit facility of US$750 million in November 1993 by the Transitional 
Executive Council (a joint ANC-National Party authority which ran for 
six m onths prior to the election). By the end of 1994, both M oody's
5 M ore extensive discussion o f  these issues is developed in  Gelb (1998; 2003) 
and Gelb and Black (2004a).
6 Restrictions on  outward investm ent by dom estic investors were relaxed 
through gradual raising o f  investm ents ceilings, though  som e restrictions 
remain; for exam ple, dom estic corporations are allow ed to  invest from  their 
dom estic sources up to  ZAR2 b illion  per project elsewhere in Africa, and ZAR1 
billion  per project outside Africa. The South African currency is the Rand, abbre­
viated here to ZAR.
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and Standard and Poor's had included South Africa in their ratings and 
the government had floated a US$750 million international bond 
issue.
South Africa has long had very sophisticated financial markets by 
emerging country standards, and following liberalization, foreign entry 
into both banking and securities trading was rapid and portfolio 
inflows rose quickly from their sanctions-era levels (figure VI. 1). This 
helped to fuel strong growth in the financial sector (table VI.2) and to 
transmit capital flow volatility to the macroeconomy. In 1996, the JSE 
ranked 14th globally by market capitalization. Trading volumes rose 
from 2.2 billion shares in 1992 to 5.2 billion in 1995 (and over 55 
billion by 2002), and liquidity (value of shares traded as a proportion 
o f market capitalization) from 5% in 1992 to 43% by 2002. Non-resi­
dents accounted for 52% of share transactions by value in 2002. 
Foreign bank presence also grew rapidly, from 40 representative offices 
to over 80 banks present in 2000.
Trade policy shifted from import protection to export promotion in 
the late 1980s, but the new instruments mainly benefited capital-inten­
sive sectors dominated by the big business groups. In 1990, the General 
Export Incentive 5cheme (GEI5), a tax-free cash subsidy to exporters 
based on domestic value-added, was introduced "to encourage the pro­
duction and export of processed raw materials, [which] overlooked ... 
labor-intensive exports" (Jenkins and Siwisa, 1997, p. 12; Levy, 1992, 
p. vii). Generous tax incentives for investment were introduced in 1991, 
also aimed at encouraging natural resource "beneficiation" to promote 
exports of processed materials. In 1990, the state-owned Industrial 
Development Corporation formulated a tariff reform program, which 
became the basis of South Africa's offer to GATT in 1992, when the 
ongoing political transition opened Uruguay Round negotiations to 
the government's participation. Domestic political pressure led to orga­
nized labor (and business associations) becoming directly involved in the 
GATT discussions in 1993. South Africa acceded to the WTO in 1995, but 
in September 1994, the ANC government announced tariff reductions in 
the auto industry ahead of the GATT deadline, and in March 1995, it 
scrapped proposed adjustment subsidies to the textile sector while accel­
erating tariff reductions. The 1996 depreciation of the currency offering 
implicit protection led to further acceleration of tariff reductions.
Trade liberalization has simplified the tariff structure and lowered 
protection levels: from 1990 to 1999, the number of tariff lines was 
reduced from 12500 to 2463 with positive tariffs, the number of bands 
from 200 to 45, and the (unweighted) mean rate from 27.5% to 16.5%.
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But the structure of protection remains biased against both upstream 
development of the machinery and equipment sector, and also against 
exports, especially after the elimination of GEIS and other export subsi­
dies in 1997 (Lewis, 2001, p. 43). Sectoral duty drawback programs 
replaced GEIS for exporters in two sectors, autos and apparel. Tariff 
reform was intended in part to reinforce anti-inflation policy through 
more vigorous product market competition, reinforced by scrapping 
the 22 single-channel marketing boards in agriculture.
M acroeconom ic policy reforms were also introduced before 1994, 
and these set the tone for subsequent policy. Inflation had cycled 
around 15% since 1973, but from 1989, the central bank used fiercely 
contractionary interest rate policy to lower it into single digits by 
1993. The Bank also proposed to enshrine its own independence in 
the constitution  using the German Bundesbank as a m odel in its 
arguments for lower inflation. This was accepted by ANC negotiators, 
anxious to "build credibility” am ongst international and dom estic 
investors. As a result, the central bank governor appointed in 1989 
was retained in 1994 and only in 1999 was replaced by an ANC 
politician.
Fiscal policy during the transitional period did not support the m on­
etary policy stance. The deficit rose from 1.4% of GDP in 1991 to 7.3% 
in 1993 (and government debt from 29% of GDP in 1990/1 to 48% in 
1994/5) as the old regime increased politically-related expenditure, 
raising salaries and pension payouts am ongst its white public service 
support base while it still had the power to do so, raising welfare 
expenditure for blacks in an effort to buy votes in the forthcoming 
democratic election, and raising police spending in response to 
growing political violence. In a break from tradition, the outgoing gov­
ernment appointed a leading private sector industrialist rather than a 
party politician as Minister of Finance in 1993, who introduced fiscal 
deficit targeting which like independent central banks had become 
standard fare in the international consensus. Like the central bank gov­
ernor, he was retained by the ANC when it established the 
Government of National Unity in 1994. An ANC politician was 
appointed as Finance Minister for the first time in 1996.
Despite the ANC's formal alliance with black trade union and com ­
m unity organization federations, fiscal decisions were increasingly 
"insulated" from popular political pressures, as the "W ashington con­
sensus" recommended, to build the credibility of economic reforms. 
The ANC's election platform  had included an economic program 
labelled the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP). An RDP
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Ministry was established in the President's Office but its influence over 
fiscal decisions was tightly circumscribed.7 ANC ministers, including 
the former trade union leader appointed RDP Minister, publicly com ­
mitted to fiscal stringency as reflected in the 1993 targets, and the 
overall deficit was m aintained even though the budgetary share of 
social spending rose significantly from 1995. In 1996, the labor m ove­
ment was explicitly excluded from the process leading to the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy, discussed below.
3. Macroeconomic policy post-apartheid
After embracing financial openness, capital inflows to South Africa 
expanded many-fold. But flows have been dom inated by portfolio 
investment rather than direct investment. As in emerging economies 
in Latin America and Asia, efforts to "build credibility" by adopting 
and sticking to the "right" policies -  tight monetary and fiscal policies 
favored by portfolio investors, and aggregate demand restrictions even 
when domestic cyclical conditions support a more relaxed approach -  
have not enabled South Africa to avoid the volatility and destabiliza­
tion associated with external capital flows. During the decade, there 
were three foreign exchange crises involving capital inflows reversals 
and exchange rate collapses. Interestingly, flows to South Africa are not 
closely tied to those to Latin and Asian economies: only the second 
crisis was linked to other emerging economy capital out-surges, the 
first and the last of these being purely South African affairs.8
Macroeconomic conditions and policy shifts during the past decade 
have been dominated by these crises. The first started in February 1996, 
triggered by domestic political uncertainty and consensus that the Rand 
was overvalued. The policy response was a major re-statement of policy 
in the form of GEAR, which "repackaged" the governm ent's com m it­
ment to investor-friendly fiscal and m onetary policy, tariff reduction 
and privatization in the expectation that the “announcem ent effect" 
would restore calm to the capital account. The second forex crisis in 
1998, in the wake of the Asian crisis, resulted in the abandonm ent 
of exchange rate stability as a policy goal and the introduction of
7 An "RDP Fund" o f  5%  o f  governm ent expenditure was set up from  w hich  line 
departments cou ld  apply for funds for special projects.
8 Nor have the rise in capital inflow s since 2002 and the associated overvalua­
tion o f  the ZA rand been linked with parallel flow s in to  Latin econ om ies -  the 
ZAR's value is m ore closely correlated with currencies o f  other mineral-exporters 
such as the Australian dollar.
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inflation-targeting. The third crisis occurred in late 2001, with causes 
that remain unclear despite an official inquiry. Currency depreciation 
during the third crisis was rapidly reversed, partly as a result of rising 
global comm odity prices in the wake of September 11 and the dollar's 
weakening globally, and in fact the ZAR has probably been substan­
tially overvalued since late 2002. Thus, interest rate and exchange rate 
fluctuations through the decade have provided "unfriendly" signals to 
the real sector, notwithstanding the success in achieving fiscal stability 
and low inflation rate. The rest of this section looks in more detail at 
fiscal policy, monetary policy and exchange rate policy.
a) Fiscal policy -  the success story
Fiscal policy has largely met its immediate objectives during the post­
apartheid era. The National Treasury has completely reconstructed the 
budgetary and expenditure processes, a task both im posed and facili­
tated by the fundamental changes in provincial and local government 
jurisdictions in the new constitution, which naturally scrapped the 
apartheid "bantustans". But the Treasury has gone well beyond this 
aspect, introducing new systems of financial planning, expenditure 
management, reporting and accountability. Since 1997/98, budgeting 
has taken place within a Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF), a three-year rolling framework intended to provide greater cer­
tainty to line departments to plan and im plem ent policy programs, 
which are budgeted and evaluated on the basis of output-linked perfor­
mance indicators, rather than on inputs. For the Treasury it enables a 
combination of aggregate fiscal restraint with strategic reprioritization 
for allocative efficiency. The MTEF is supported by the Public Finance 
M anagement Act (PFMA) passed in 1999, which im poses strong con­
trols over financial m anagem ent in all public sector institutions, with 
stiff penalties for transgressions. The PFMA requires departments to set 
measurable objectives for their spending, including details of outputs 
and service delivery indicators. The Treasury has imposed stringent dis­
cipline on provincial governments which have overspent budgets, 
though at the same time, many departmental budgets, at both national 
and provincial levels, have been underspent due to capacity constraints 
in the public sector.
These reforms have contributed to a steady decline in the fiscal 
deficit since 1994, when deficit targets were first made explicit. The 
Treasury met its own fiscal target set in the 1996 GEAR statement -  to 
reduce the deficit to 3% of GDP by 1999. However, the primary surplus 
(revenue less non-interest expenditure) has experienced erratic shifts
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between pro- and anti-cyclical stances, underlining that in a context of 
sudden capital flow reversals and exchange rate declines, fiscal policy 
cannot easily be used to stabilize activity levels in the real economy. 
Since 2001 "a more expansionary fiscal stance has been adopted" 
(National Treasury, 2004, p. 56): the primary surplus declined, with 
real non-interest expenditure rising 7.8% per annum  on average, after 
real cuts of almost 2% per annum the previous three years (table VI. 1).
Table VI. 1 also shows that since 1999/2000, public debt levels have 
been substantially reduced from close to 50% of GDP to below 40%, 
where there need be little concern about sustainability or a "debt trap". 
With lower nom inal interest rates, reduced debt levels have helped to 
bring down interest expenditure. Van der Berg (2001) shows that 
between 1993 and 1997, overall per capita social spending increased by 
23.8% in real terms, with significant redistribution across income and 
racial categories: per capita spending on the lowest incom e quintile 
increased 28%, and on the next two quintiles 56% and 31%, respec­
tively. Allocations to social security and welfare increased dramatically, 
but at the expense of housing. Capital expenditure by government was 
severely cut during the mid-1990s to make room  for the increased 
share of social spending, dropping to very low levels. Investment 
spending for the overall public sector fell below 5% of GDP from 1992, 
compared with an average of 10% during the 1980s (see figure VI.5, 
below). It can be argued that Treasury's successful institutional reforms 
have privileged the financial dimension of public expenditure over its 
substantive contribution to sustained economic development.
There has been a substantial improvement in revenue collection, 
which has been an essential aspect of the success in m anaging the 
fiscal stance. The SA Revenue Service, given organizational autonom y 
from the Treasury in 1997, re-organized and modernized itself, result­
ing in increased efficiency in revenue collection, greater compliance by 
taxpayers and a significant widening of the tax base. Efficiency 
improvements are reflected in the smaller backlog of unassessed 
returns at the end of the tax-year: in March 1998, the backlog was 49% 
of the 4.7 million (individual and corporate) returns, but by March 
2003, it was only 5.4% (South African Revenue Service, 1998, 2003). 
Compliance measures include risk-profiling of taxpayers, more exten­
sive and integrated taxpayer auditing, improved enforcement and debt 
collection. The number of taxpayers in the tax base has been widened 
substantially: over the four years from 1998/99 to 2002/3, the number 
of individual and company income taxpayers each grew an average of 
12% per annum.
Table V I.l Government budget: size and distribution, 1990-2004
1990/1 1995 /6 1998 /9 2001/2 20 0 2 /3 2 0 0 3 /4 1 2 0 0 4 /5 2
1 G rowth rate, real non-interest expenditure (%) n.a. n.a. -5 .1 7.1 6.7 9.5 5.0
2 Current non-interest expenditure 23.2* 23.6 22.5 22.2 22.9 24.9 25.0
3 Interest expenditure 4.3* 5.9 5.7 4.7 4.1 3.9 3.8
4 Budget deficit 1.4 4.5 2.3 1.4 1.1 2.3 2.3
5 Capital expenditure 1.7* 1.6 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3
6 Net governm ent debt 29.0 48.0 47.6 42.1 36.3 36.8 38.0
7 Education 18 21 22 20 20 20 20
8 Health 9 10 11 11 11 11 11
9 Social security, welfare 6 10 12 12 14 15 16
10 Housing, other soc services 13 5 3 4 4 5 5
11 Social services (total) 46 46 48 48 49 50 51
12 Protection services 20 17 16 17 17 17 16
13 E conom ic services 14 11 9 11 12 13 13
14 Interest 12 19 20 17 15 13 13
15 Other 8 7 8 7 6 7 6
16 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
17 C om pany incom e tax 21.5 13.9 16.4 23.6 26.1 25.6 n.a.
18 Personal incom e tax 33.6 40.2 42.1 35.8 33.4 32.4 n.a.
19 VAT 25.4 25.7 23.8 24.2 24.9 26.7 n.a.
20 Other 19.4 20.2 17.7 16.3 15.6 15.2 n.a.
21 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Calculated from National Treasury, Budget Review  (several years).
Notes: Fiscal years, ending March 3 1 .1 estimated; 2 budgeted; n.a. = not available; *  1991/2 data. 
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Tax revenue declined as a share of GDP during the early 1990s, 
reaching a low of 22.6% in 1995/96 before increasing. Since 2001/2 it 
has been m aintained just below the GEAR-specified ceiling o f 25%. 
Government has had a formal comm itm ent to prom ote growth and 
employment through private investment, and officials have often 
expressed the view that tax cuts on company profit (income) are the 
most effective m echanism  to increase investment. Surprisingly then, 
the strong performance on the revenue side of the budget has been 
directed to tax cuts for the middle and formally-employed working 
classes, enabling these groups to increase their consumption spending, 
rather than to possible alternatives which might directly or indirectly -  
via provision of public goods and services, or increased private invest­
ment to create jobs -  have benefited the informally employed and 
unemployed. According to the Treasury, R73 billion in tax relief has 
been given since 1994/95, of which 86% has gone to individuals 
(National Treasury 2004, p. 79). Table VI.1 shows that the relative con­
tribution of com pany income tax first fell and then rose during the 
1990s, while the share of personal income tax increased substantially 
to a peak of 43% in 1999/2000, before falling as a result of tax relief. 
Over the six years to 2003/4, the income tax burden -  the share of 
aggregate personal income paid in tax -  fell from almost 15% to below 
12%, despite the improvement in tax collection efficiency. At the same 
time, revenue from company income tax grew 12% per annum  in real 
terms.
b) Monetary and exchange rate policy -  moving goalposts
Monetary and exchange rate policies are considered together, because 
capital account liberalization restricts choices in both. Policy-makers 
would choose, if they could, to have all three of the following features 
in the macroeconomic policy regime: an open capital market to enable 
access to external finance; a stable nominal exchange rate to underpin 
international trade; and control over domestic interest rates to support 
objectives such as output growth or price stability. The problem is that 
these three goals constitute a "trilem m a": achieving all three sim ulta­
neously is not possible, at least not in a sustainable manner, so that 
policy authorities must decide which two to prioritize and which one 
to abandon (Obstfeld, 1998).
Up until 1995, policy in South Africa opted for the latter two goals -  
exchange rate stability and independent monetary policy. But capital 
account liberalization in March 1995 re-posed this choice, and subse­
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quent monetary and exchange rate policy can be divided into two 
phases. Initially policy-makers tried to pursue all three objectives, but 
by September 1998 the costs of trying to avoid the trilemma had 
become too high, and exchange rate stability was abandoned in favor 
of monetary policy autonomy, with the introduction of inflation 
targeting.
From the early 1990s until 1999, the Reserve Bank set formal targets 
for money supply (M3) growth, though in practice m onetary policy 
was "eclectic" (its term) with the nom inal exchange rate sometimes 
also implicitly targeted. High interest rates were used to lower 
inflation, together with a slowly depreciating nominal exchange rate to 
stabilize the real exchange rate for export competitiveness (figure VI.3 
below). Prior to the 1994 elections, South Africa's capital account had 
been closed. Exchange controls restricting capital outflows were in 
place on and off from 1961, and were re-imposed during the debt 
standstill in 1985, together with the dual exchange rate (separate rates 
for commercial and financial transactions) which discouraged disin­
vestment by foreigners. The removal of restrictions on South Africans' 
investing abroad was a priority concern for dom estic business in the 
context of their support for democratization to enable re-integration 
with global financial and goods markets. In his keynote Annual 
Address in August 1994, the Reserve Bank Governor responded to the 
pressure for the early and total removal of controls by re-affirming the 
Bank's comm itm ent to their removal but in an orderly and gradual 
process of financial re-integration (Stals, 1994).
Even with the capital account closed, South Africa experienced 
massive capital inflows in the wake of the 1994 election, fulfilling the 
expectation that democratization would relieve the external constraint. 
Between July 1994 and June 1995, net inflows am ounted to 3.8% of 
GDP (Stals, 1995). These inflows were undoubtedly driven in part by 
supply factors in global financial markets, specifically the search for 
profitable outlets for funds. During 1994 there was a rise in global 
flows to "em erging m arkets", and in the wake of the M exican crisis 
from late 1994, a further increase in the flows to EEs outside Latin 
America (Ros, 2001). The Reserve Bank became alarmed by the size, 
speed and composition of inflows, which went mainly into short-term 
assets, worried that its efforts to lower inflation and enhance interna­
tional competitiveness would be undone by excessive m oney supply 
growth and pressure for currency appreciation.
The Bank began to emphasise these disadvantages of capital 
inflows. But though it referred approvingly to controls on capital inflows
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adopted in other emerging markets,9 it opted instead for capital 
account liberalization in March 1995, as a strategy to reduce the size of 
net short-term inflows, by offsetting large gross inflows with capital 
outflows. The dual exchange rate was unified to remove restrictions on 
non-residents' transactions, and a series of steps begun towards 
the relaxation of restrictions on residents' foreign investment. For the 
Reserve Bank, the unified exchange rate carried the additional substan­
tial advantage that capital inflows would now occur on the same basis 
as commercial transactions, adding to forex reserves and enabling the 
reduction of its "forward book" and uncovered foreign currency posi­
tion, which the policy authorities saw as major risks.10 In the next 12 
months, the Net Open Forward Position (NOFP) was reduced by about 
two-thirds from US$25.8 billion to US$8.5 billion (Mboweni, 2004).
The strategy was based on an assum ption of large capital inflows 
with a longer-term maturity profile, to avoid the risk of net outflows. 
This was remarkably optimistic, more so in light of the "tequila" crisis 
in Mexico from December 1994, the first big emerging market financial 
crisis of the 1990s globalization. Although South Africa's capital liberal­
ization strategy has been praised for being gradual (IMF, 1997),11 the 
freeing of foreigners' transactions in a one-off "Big Bang" has produced 
a substantial increase in capital flow volatility.
Figure VI.1 illustrates the instability of inflows after 1994, which have 
been dominated by portfolio flows, which are more volatile than direct 
or "other" investment (mainly bank loans). Substantial direct invest­
ment into South Africa was expected, but as things have turned out, 
South Africa has not been a m ajor destination for FDI since 1994 (Gelb 
and Black, 2004b). Portfolio flows by contrast have been very large: 
between 1994 and 2002 portfolio flows to South Africa were about three 
times as large (as a percentage of GDP) as flows to a group of 16 emerg-
9 See the discussion on  Chile and C olom bia in  Ffrench-Davis and Villar (2005).
10 These were con tin gent liabilities reflecting the "insurance" against Rand 
depreciation, w hich  the Bank provided after the debt standstill in  1985, in order 
to  m axim ize foreign in flow s by  encouraging international borrow ing. If the 
exchange rate depreciated, the Bank w ould  com pensate public and private 
sector borrowers for the additional debt service burden, w ith taxpayers bearing 
the cost. The dual exchange rate system required non-residents to  trade ZAR 
assets on ly  w ith  each other, n o t with residents, and non-residents' financial 
flows were n ot recorded in the BOP capital account. After the exchange rate was 
unified in  1995, non-residents' financial transactions w ent through the capital 
account, were available to  the central bank and affected forex reserves.
11 Gradualism is n ow  part o f  the orthodoxy, but it was n ot at that time.
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Figure VI. 1 Gross capital inflows, 1990-2003
Source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin (various issues). Unless 
otherwise noted, data for all figures are from  this source.
ing markets with similar sovereign credit ratings, while FDI flows were 
less than half as big as for the comparator group12 (IMF, 2004b). 
Portfolio investment into South Africa is dominated by unregulated 
equity flows into the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, about 70% of the 
total. Between 1995 and 2002, South Africa received 22% of net total 
portfolio equity flows to developing countries (World Bank, 2003). The 
composition of inflows is partly a consequence of the sequencing of lib­
eralization: direct investment, the banking system and equity and bond 
markets were all liberalized at roughly the same time in line with 
the contemporary international consensus. By the late 1990s, after the 
tequila and East Asian crises, the conventional argument had shifted to 
recommend first liberalizing direct investment, the "least footloose" 
flow, well before any financial flows (Eichengreen, 2000).
Notwithstanding capital account liberalization in March 1995, the 
Reserve Bank continued to pursue its existing policy goals of cutting 
inflation together with nom inal exchange rate stability (or at most 
slow depreciation) to m aintain a competitive real exchange rate. This 
implied a com bination of high real interest rates and some "steriliza­
tion" of the m onetary effects of net capital inflows to limit money
12 P ortfolio  flows to  the group o f  em erging markets com prised on ly  28%  o f  
inflows, but for South Africa, the share was 70%. M exico, C olom bia, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala and Uruguay were included, but not Argentina, Brazil and Chile.
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Figure VI.2  Effective exchange rates indices, 1990-2003 (m onth ly data,
1995 = 100)
REER = real effective exchange rate 
NEER = nom inal effective exchange rate
supply growth. In other words, the Bank continued to pursue both 
monetary policy and exchange rate goals despite having shifted to an 
open capital account. Such evasion of the "trilem m a" was possible as 
long as net capital inflows were large enough to finance current 
account deficits and to reduce the NOFP, the Reserve Bank's exposure 
in the forward foreign exchange m arket.13 Net inflows were sufficient 
in this sense between March 1995 and January 1996 and again from 
September 1996 through April 1998. But given foreign portfolio 
investors' herd-like behavior, net inflows were subject to abrupt drops, 
as in February 1996 and May 1998. On both occasions, the Reserve 
Bank tried to stem the outflow by absorbing exchange rate risk from 
both importers and foreign investors, selling dollars into the spot 
market and increasing its NOFP (Stals 1996; 1998). In 1996, it sold 
about US$ 14 billion and in 1998, about US$ 10 billion, which pushed 
the NOFP back up close to its March 1995 level. In other words, foreign 
exchange purchased to reduce the NOFP during 1995 and again during 
1997 through April 1998, had in effect been wasted. In a somewhat 
contradictory move, given the support via the exchange rate to
13 The Reserve Bank reduced the NOFP by purchases o f  dollars in the forward 
market, funded b y  spot market sales.
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Figure VJ.3 Interest rates and inflation, 1983-2003 (%)
importers, real interest rates were pushed up substantially -  about 
2.5 percentage points in 1996 and a full 7 percentage points in 1998 -  
to attract foreign portfolio flows back. In both crises, the rand eventu­
ally re-stabilised at levels about 20% below the pre-crisis level, and net 
inflows surged again, so that financial recovery was at the expense of 
domestic equilibrium (figures VI.1 and VI.2).
Late in the 1996 crisis, the GEAR policy statement was issued to 
restore (portfolio) investor credibility. It explicitly re-stated com m it­
ments to all three "trilem m a" objectives: "consistent monetary policy 
to prevent a resurgence of inflation, ... [a nominal] exchange rate 
policy to keep the real effective rate stable at a competitive level, ... 
[and] a further step in the gradual relaxation of exchange controls", 
that is, an open capital account (Department of Finance 1996). After 
the 1998 crisis, in contrast, the costs of trying to m aintain all three 
objectives and ignore the "trilem m a" had become clear, and monetary 
and exchange rate policy shifted to a new phase. Capital account liber­
alization was not reconsidered, so that the choice lay between targeting 
the nom inal exchange rate and m aintaining m onetary autonomy. 
Given the already heavy investment in low inflation and the perceived 
constraint of a large NOFP, the authorities unsurprisingly opted for the 
latter, abandoning efforts to target the nom inal exchange rate, taking 
"a decisive decision ... to reduce the NOFP to zero" and establishing an 
inflation targeting regime, the "best practice" monetary policy accord­
ing to the late-90s international consensus (Mboweni, 2004).
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Inflation targeting was formally instituted in February 2000, with 
interest rate adjustments being the Reserve Bank's m ain policy instru­
ment to meet the Minister of Finance's target. The institutional 
arrangements include mechanism s for broader participation (a sem i­
annual M onetary Policy Forum) and improved transparency (public 
statements after each meeting of the Bank's M onetary Policy 
Committee). The initial target was to bring inflation (the CPIX, exclud­
ing mortgage interest rates) within a range of 3-6%  by April 2002. 
Inflation inertia had been broken by the mid-1990s and the CPI had 
dropped steadily from 10% between 1993 and 2000, helped by tariff 
liberalization and increased product market competition (figure VI.3). 
But the ZAR's nom inal depreciation of 25% in late 2001 pushed price 
increases (especially for food) above 10%. Nom inal interest rates had 
dropped from 1998 until 2000, before rising slightly during 2001, and 
the Reserve Bank pushed rates up through most of 2002 to address the 
uptick in inflation from late 2001. The absence of inflationary expecta­
tions meant the increase was a temporary blip, and by the second half 
of 2003, inflation was within the target band and interest rates were 
dropping.
Although the 2002 interest rate increase was the appropriate 
response within the inflation targeting regime, it was pro-cyclical 
rather than anti-cyclical; in other words, monetary policy destabilized 
the real economy. The rate hike coincided with the start of the strong 
ZAR appreciation, reinforcing the im pact on output of the extreme 
exchange rate volatility from the last quarter of 2001. This underlines 
the rigidity of inflation targeting, which allows for monetary policy 
autonom y but focuses on a single objective, ignoring output and the 
need from time to time for rapid reflation to counter a cyclical down­
turn. Figure VI.2 illustrates the fluctuations of the real trade-weighted 
exchange rate: a gradual depreciation of 25% from late 1998 to August 
2001 was followed by a sharp 25% depreciation until December 2001, 
and was itself followed by a 45% appreciation in the next 18 months up 
to mid-2003. Over the three years since mid-2001, the ZAR was one of 
the most volatile currencies in international markets.
According to the Finance Minister, "government has chosen to 
follow a flexible exchange rate to act as a shock absorber against global 
developments. Exchange rate adjustments help cushion the economy 
from external trade and capital shocks and mitigate the impact of eco­
nomic contraction, especially for the poor" (Manuel, 2002). One 
problem is that any m itigating effect may be asymmetric -  true for 
depreciations, but not appreciations -  and also require that monetary
Macroeconomics in Post-Apartheid South Africa 203
policy act in concert. Further, the argument m ay hold only for adjust­
ment from one "long-run equilibrium" position to another, in which 
the direction of capital flows remain stable allowing time for the offset­
ting effects of exchange rate adjustment to work themselves through.
The situation since early 2001 cannot be described as a "shift 
between equilibria” . The international financial markets have experi­
enced increased turbulence since the dotcom  bubble burst in April 
2001, which was followed by "9/11", rising commodity prices, the war 
in Iraq, and the weakening of the US dollar. During this period, capital 
flow volatility has increased for South Africa, with five abrupt and large 
reversals between quarters during the subsequent two years: for 
example, an outflow of 0.4% of GDP in Q l:2003 was followed in Q2 by 
an inflow of 2.4% of GDP (South African Reserve Bank, 2003).
Capital inflows since 1994, including foreign borrowing by govern­
ment, have allowed the rebuilding of the econom y’s "balance sheet": 
in February 2004, the NOFP was "closed out" and the Reserve Bank was 
no longer exposed to the risk of exchange rate depreciation. Foreign 
exchange reserves had reached secure levels by late 2002, with the help 
of capital inflows. This has certainly removed a "structural" constraint 
from macroeconomic policy and has contributed to the further upgrad­
ing of South Africa's credit rating by international agencies. The 
stronger financial basis is also reflected in the declining long-term 
bond yield and the narrowing of the differential between US and South 
African yields (figure VI.3). As a consequence, as in several Latin 
American countries in the early 1990s and again after the tequila 
crisis,14 there have been repeated claims by the monetary and fiscal 
authorities that "overall macroeconomic stability has now been 
achieved" and economic policy should in future focus on "m icroeco­
nomic reforms".
But it is hard not to conclude that macro policy has, intentionally or 
not, privileged financial concerns over output growth, and portfolio 
investment over fixed investment. Capital account openness has pro­
duced exchange rate volatility, which worsened after the explicit float 
since 1998, but throughout the decade has meant inconsistent signals 
from interest rates and exchange rates to producers of tradables, 
increasing uncertainty and encouraging "waiting" in production and 
investm ent decisions. Stability of domestic prices and in the fiscal 
accounts has been achieved only at the expense of external instability, 
and fluctuating aggregate demand.
14 See Ffrench-Davis (2005) and ECLAC (2002).
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4. Macroeconomic performance post-apartheid
Figure VI.4 illustrates the disappointing performance of GDP which, as 
noted earlier, averaged only 2.8% per annum between 1994 and 2003. 
The chart underlines that the economy is firmly trapped on a "low 
growth" path, with GDP growth reaching a peak of 4.3% during the 
period though still positive, in contrast to the experience during 
the 1980s and early 1990s when growth was negative during reces­
sions. Reinforcing the impression of a shift in macroeconomic behav­
ior, the chart also shows that the output gap -  the difference between 
actual and potential output -  has fluctuated within a narrow range 
since 1995 compared with the period since 1983 .15 Declines in output 
growth have not been associated with large drops in utilization, while 
stronger growth has not created pressure for higher utilization rates -  
the growth elasticity of utilization is low and the economy has not 
been operating close to full capacity notwithstanding the apparently 
small output gap. The underlying problem, reflecting a low growth 
"trap", is that the accelerator is weak: capital formation has not been 
strong enough to raise the growth rate of the capital stock above a 
paltry 1.25% per annum  between 1994 and 2003, so that growth of 
potential output averaged a mere 2.1% per annum, which in turn has 
fed back into low rates of capital formation.16
The three foreign exchange shocks -  in 1996, 1998 and 2001 -  have 
not been reflected in a consistent manner in lower GDP growth or 
rising output gaps. In 1996, GDP growth rose, though the business 
cycle shifted into downswing late in the year and the growth rate 
dropped in 1997. In contrast, the 1998 crisis lowered growth for the 
year and widened the output gap, but there was a recovery the follow­
ing year in GDP growth.17 In 2001, growth declined notwithstanding a 
higher dom estic activity level, but the currency appreciation in 2002 
enabled a growth improvement. What is noteworthy is that different 
components of aggregate demand have "led" growth at different stages
15 The output gap is based o n  the residual betw een the actual capital-output 
ratio and its polynom ia l trend line for 1967 to  2003. The depth o f  fluctuations 
in  the curve is m ore im portant than the absolute size o f  the gap indicated on  
the scale.
16 The marginal productivity  o f  capital (increm ental output-capital ratio) aver­
aged 0.74 and the capital-output ratio 2.3.
17 Though dom estic u tilization  actually declined in  1999 as indicated b y  the 
small increase in  the output gap, the GDP grow th being driven b y  a strong 
increase in  net exports.
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Figure VIA  G row th in  GDP, year-on-year change in real capital form ation, 
average output gap, 1983-2003 (%)
of the cyclical fluctuations since 1994 -  there has not been a stable 
"adjustm ent m echanism” to shocks.
We turn now to examine the behavior of key macroeconomic vari­
ables, looking in turn at fixed capital formation, national savings and 
the balance of payments.
a) Fixed capital formation
There was a brief spurt in fixed investment between 1993 and 1995 
associated with the shift to democracy and the opening of the 
economy, but since 1996, capital formation has performed poorly. 
Figure VI.4 suggests that investment behavior has responded to volatile 
m acroeconomic "prices" -  exchange rates and interest rates -  in the 
context of the foreign exchange shocks and policies used to address 
them .18 In 1996 and 1997 and again in 1999, investm ent growth 
dropped following large depreciations and interest rate hikes exchange. 
In 2001, there was again a drop in investment, which was reversed in
18 For discussion in  the Latin Am erican and Chilean con text o f  the negative 
im pact on  fixed capital form ation  o f  an overem phasis on  low  in flation  and 
fiscal discipline as the tw o m acro p o licy  goals, see Ffrench-Davis (2005, chs. II 
and IX).
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2002 as currency appreciation lowered costs for im ported equipm ent 
and the real interest rate declined due to higher inflation.
It is also evident from figure VI. 4 that the cyclical response of capital 
formation to m acroeconomic conditions is weaker than was the case 
before 1994 -  as with the output gap, the amplitude of the fluctuations 
is smaller.19 This is perhaps a consequence of a weakening of the accel­
erator effect just described. Figure VI.5 reinforces this impression by 
putting the investm ent rate in longer-run perspective. The private 
investment rate has averaged only 12.1% of GDP between 1994 and 
2003, still below the rate in 1988 after the foreign debt standstill. 
Despite the significant improvement of private sector profitability and 
productivity during the 1990s (Nattrass, 2003), investment has not 
risen much from the average o f 10.6% between 1990 and 1993, years 
of deep recession and political transition.
The “slack" in investment demand has not been filled by the public 
sector, although public investment rose in real terms by 9% per annum 
between 1994 and 1997, and from 3.7% to 4.7% of GDP. But when 
private fixed investm ent and GDP growth were slowing by 1998, the 
broad fiscal stance led to a slowdown of public investment. With 
several ups and downs, it remains well below its 1980s levels both in 
real terms and as a share of GDP. Additionally, since 1994 growth 
in investment in social infrastructure has been stronger than in eco­
nomic infrastructure.
Beyond the im pact on macroeconomic prices of policies oriented to 
financial concerns, the "m uting” of the investm ent function seems 
to be related to low "anim al spirits", a lack of "fundam ental" investor 
confidence related to socio-political factors and the democratic transi­
tion. In recent surveys, firms operating in South Africa have cited prob­
lems of poverty and inequality like crime and disease (such as 
HIV/AIDS) as central discouragements to investment. They also report 
that investment is constrained by issues such as labor regulations or 
the tax regime. Together with the socio-economic factors, this suggests 
underlying anxiety about the security of property rights and about 
government com m itm ent to a business-friendly operating environ­
ment (Gelb, 2001). Such uncertainty about the stability and pre­
dictability of the operating environment can severely retard fixed 
investment decisions, which involve longer time horizons and less 
reversible comm itm ents than portfolio investments. Government has
19 The figure show s total investm ent but a similar con clusion  holds for private 
investment.
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Figure VI.5 Fixed investm ent as share o f  GDP, 1982-2003 (%)
repeatedly dismissed these sentiments as reflecting racist bias towards 
the new black government on the part of white corporate decision­
makers, but it remains the case that "credibility" of the policy frame­
work in broad terms was not yet established, even a decade after the 
end of apartheid.
The broad-based nature of the ANC's political constituency and gov­
ernment's own actions -  for example, the poor m anagem ent of the 
GEAR policy statement -  have made it difficult to rule out the prospect 
of a shift in the political balance within the ruling party leading to far- 
reaching policy changes. As noted earlier, GEAR'S primary aim was to 
build investor credibility, though the emphasis on fiscal and domestic 
price stability was more likely to appeal to portfolio investors than pro­
ductive investors. But government leaders actively excluded the ANC's 
labor allies from policy discussions both before and after the policy's 
publication, notwithstanding the crucial nature of the "announcement 
effect". When the statement was released in June 1996, senior govern­
ment officials made a crude attem pt to establish bona fides with inter­
national portfolio investors by describing the policy as a "home-grown 
version" of the W ashington consensus and as "non-negotiable" with 
the trade unions. They also refused to discuss GEAR at the statutory tri­
partite National Economic Development and Labor Council (NEDLAC), 
notwithstanding that the labor movement was at the time deeply 
involved in policy consultations as such key areas as labor market
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regulation and trade liberalization. These tactics merely served to 
provoke the unions into hostile public opposition to GEAR. Political 
infighting about GEAR persisted within the alliance for over five years, 
irreparably dam aging the image of unity within the alliance and rein­
forcing uncertainty about policy stability, particularly given the social 
and political "distance" between black politicians and white business. 
Whereas a show of union support for GEAR might have contributed to 
a picture of co-operation amongst government, business and labor and 
promoted investor confidence, GEAR'S investment objectives were 
undermined instead.
Uncertainty in the broad investment environment has reinforced a 
"wait and see" attitude am ongst individual investors, and obstructed 
firm-level policy strategies to raise investment. One strategy has been 
to try to overcome "co-ordination failure" am ongst investors by com ­
munication and mobilization for collective action. Investment accords 
or social contracts have been debated at two national "econom ic 
sum mits", but these have not resulted in binding commitments on the 
"social partners"; that is, organized business and labor. Government 
has tried to unify business associations across racial, linguistic, regional 
and sectoral lines, and established high-level "presidential working 
groups" for dom estic and foreign business. Regional corridors were 
identified as targets of focused public planning and financial resources, 
to overcome co-ordination failure by a "big push" effect,20 identifying 
anchor projects (usually large capital-intensive materials processing 
plants) and attem pting to "lock in" other investments through public- 
private dialogues.
Several investm ent incentives schemes have come and gone during 
the 1990s, though it is debatable whether these alter firms' decisions 
even in the absence of such inconsistency of instruments and targets. 
Early 1990s incentives focused on natural resource-based industrializa­
tion and cheap energy, supporting large capital- and energy-intensive 
plants. They were scrapped in 1993 but the focus continued through 
the Spatial Development Initiatives. A Tax Holiday Scheme was intro­
duced in 1996 in the GEAR statement to provide incentives for 
employment creation and investment in specific regions, but with­
drawn in 1999 due to low take-up rates. A general export incentive 
scheme (GEIS) was established in 1990 and halted in 1998, to be
20 As advocated by  Rosenstein-Rodan in his classic article "Problems o f  industri­
alisation in  Eastern and South-eastern Europe" (1943) and adapted by  Albert 
Hirschman in  his Strategy o f Economic Development (1958).
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replaced by duty drawback programs for exporters, but only in two 
sectors: autos and apparel.
Investment prom otion agencies have been established to actively 
pursue potential projects, especially FDI. But as noted, new FDI since 
1994 has disappointed, with gross inflows averaging $1.9 billion per 
annum  between 1994 and 2002, while net inflows were 1.5% of the 
developing country total (UNCTAD, 2003). On a dollar per capita basis, 
FDI inflow was close to developing countries' average, though South 
Africa's per capita income is about 2.5 times the developing country 
average (Gelb and Black, 2004b).
b) Savings
South Africa's national savings averaged 15.8% of GDP since 1994, well 
below the average level of 20.8% between 1984 and 1993. South 
African policy since 1994 has been premised on a neo-classical view of 
the savings-investment relation. A key justification for the tight fiscal 
stance from 1993 was to raise government savings, which had become 
negative during the early 1990s spending spree, but have been above 
2.5% since 1999. But household savings have averaged a mere 0.5% of 
GDP since 1994, compared with 3.5% between 1984 and 1993, and 
corporate savings have also dropped from 15.2% to 13.5%. However, it 
is doubtful that investment has been held back by lack of savings, since 
overall domestic savings have been sufficient to finance fixed capital 
formation (excluding changes in inventories) in all but two years since 
1990. In addition, corporate savings have been adequate to finance 
corporate investment: the corporate sector (the m ajor contributor to 
domestic savings) has had a financial surplus -  an excess of sector 
savings over its own investment -  between 1994 and 2000 and near­
balance (tiny surpluses or deficits) since 2001.
It does not autom atically follow that an investment increase would 
be unconstrained by lack of savings, however, since the savings 
propensity has not been stable, but appears to have dropped for both 
corporations and households over the past decade, so that income 
growth yields a smaller rise in the volume of savings than before. The 
corporate sector's savings has declined as a share of GDP since 1996, 
notwithstanding a rise in net profit as a share of GDP from 24.7% in 
the 1980s to 31.1% since 1994. This suggests that firms have increased 
dividend payouts to equity-owning households relative to retained 
earnings to fund investment. At the same time, households have been 
increasing consumption rather than savings. Household savings, which 
averaged 2.8% of GDP during the 1980s, were already very low in 1995
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at just 1% of GDP, and have fallen to near zero since 1999. During the 
1980s, falling household savings were linked to rising debt levels, as 
households borrowed to m aintain both consum ption levels and con­
tractual savings (insurance and pension funds). But the links between 
household wealth, debt and savings shifted after 1993, as household 
wealth rose as a result of lower inflation and rising asset values, espe­
cially for housing. At the same time, trade liberalization encouraged 
higher consumption of imports. This led to a consumption spurt in the 
mid-1990s and further declines in household savings. Consum ption 
growth continued to be strong during the late 1990s with the decline 
in interest rates from 1998, which m eant household debt-to-assets 
ratios dropped further (Prinsloo, 2002).
c) The balance o f  paym ents
Since 1994, South Africa has returned to the "norm al" developing 
economy situation with a current account deficit and net capital 
inflows, compared with the debt standstill period between 1985 and 
1993, when foreign savings were negative. Figure VI. 6 shows that the 
current account deficit (the contribution of foreign savings to overall 
savings) has remained very small since 1994, never rising above 2% of 
GDP, and since 1999, more or less in balance. The figure supports the 
"Keynesian” view that investment is constrained not by lack of 
savings, but by the issues of confidence and macroeconomic instabil­
ity: had investment levels warranted it, a larger current account deficit 
could have been financed by net capital inflows notwithstanding their 
volatility. Instead, capital inflows in excess of the external deficit have 
been used to build foreign reserves.
Both non-gold exports and imports have risen by around 50% since 
1993. The volume of imports grew very rapidly until 1997 in the wake 
of trade liberalization but levelled off thereafter, as slower output 
growth limited imports of investment goods. Non-gold exports have 
risen more steadily, and the improvement in export performance -  
partly driven by currency depreciation -  reflects a major post-1994 
shift, particularly given the increased share of m anufacturing exports 
compared with primary commodities. Gold exports and output have 
undergone long-term decline (IMF, 2004a). Including the small non­
factor services deficit, the trade balance has been in surplus, averaging 
just over 1% of GDP between 1995 and 1998 but then rising to 3% 
since 1999. The factor services deficit has been a persistent failure 
in the balance of payments for decades, and rose from 1.9% of GDP in
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Figure VI.6 Balance o f  payments, 1982-2003 (%  o f  GDP)
1995 to 2.6% in 2000, driven by profit and dividend outflows in part 
due to the relocation to the UK and US of the head offices of several 
major South African corporations.
5. Employment and the composition of growth
As noted in the introduction, South Africa's (broad) rate of unemploy­
ment was 41.8% in 2003, and the prospects for lowering the similarly 
high level of poverty depend to a large extent on the creation of jobs. 
Performance in this respect has been as dismal as growth. A careful 
assessment of the increase in employment between 1995 and 2003 sug­
gests that about 1.4 million jobs were created in a labor force that was 
estimated to be 13.6 million people in 1995, of whom 4 million 
(29.4%) were unem ployed (Casale, et al., 2004). But the size of the 
labor force was certainly undercounted in 1995, as in 2003 it was 
estimated at 20.3 million people. Of the new jobs, more than half rep­
resent work in subsistence agriculture, informal sector self-employment 
or domestic service.
The low growth of overall employment has been exacerbated by 
changes in the sectoral composition of output and of trade, which have 
resulted in a "skills twist" within the labor force. In every sector except 
construction, employment of highly-skilled workers has grown since 
1985 while employment of unskilled workers has declined. Table VI.2
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Table VI.2 Sectoral output shares, 1995 prices





1990 1994 2003 2003
Agriculture 5.0 5.0 4.0 0.3
M ining 7.3 7.4 5.5 -0 .2
Manufacturing 22.0 20.5 19.8 1.2
Other industry 6.9 6.7 6.7 1.7
Transport and com m unication 7.9 8.3 12.2 5.5
Financial services 15.6 16.3 19.6 3.8
Govt, and com m unity services 16.0 16.5 13.7 1.0
Trade and other services 19.4 19.3 19.3 1.7
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 2.0
Source-. South African Reserve Bank (2004).
shows that the shares in output of both m ining and m anufacturing 
declined, together with "other industry” (construction and utilities), 
while transport and comm unications and financial services grew 
strongly. W ithin manufacturing, there were also output composition 
shifts. Labour-intensive sectors (food and beverages, textiles and cloth­
ing and footwear) grew slowly at around 0.2% per annum, declining 
from 23% of m anufacturing value-added in 1990 to 20% in 2000. 
Capital-intensive materials-processing industries -  basic metals, wood 
products and chemicals -  were the fastest-growing sectors: basic metals 
and wood products each grew by more than 4% per annum  and 
increasing their shares of manufacturing value-added to 16% and 3.9% 
respectively (Kaplan, 2003).
The shift to more capital-intensive sectors was linked to trade and 
trade policy. Import penetration in labour-intensive sectors rose from 
55.5% to 67.5% between 1993 and 1997, squeezing domestic output 
and employm ent (Edwards, 1999). A significant change took place in 
the sectoral composition of exports between 1990 and 2003; in particu­
lar, there was a shift from minerals to basic processed goods (chemicals 
and plastics, wood products and basic metals) and to machinery and 
equipment, though the latter has been dom inated by basic vehicle 
components, comprised of processed natural resources (Black, 2002).
Before the shift to a more export-oriented trade policy, the manufac­
turing capital stock was dom inated by capital-intensive materials-
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processing: in 1988, chemicals comprised 29.8% of the total stock, iron 
and steel and non-ferrous metals 19.2%, and paper and non-metallic 
minerals each more than 6%, together nearly 62%. Thus a World Bank 
analysis concluded in 1992 that "the industrial policy of the past four 
decades ... [has] helped create competitive capability in relatively 
capital-intensive activities, so these activities would disproportionately 
be the beneficiaries [of a package of outward-oriented policies], ... 
South African manufacturing might be an engine of growth, but not of 
(direct) employment creation" (Levy, 1992). Although m ost studies 
of South Africa's trade liberalization have concluded that employment 
losses have been due to technological change to enhance export com ­
petitiveness, rather than trade liberalization and increased import pen­
etration (Edwards, 1999; International Labour Organisation, 1999), it 
remains true that "South Africa has a low and declining share of 
exports that use unskilled labour, and a high share using more skilled 
labour" (Lewis, 2001).
6. Conclusion
This chapter asked at the outset whether the reduction in the fiscal 
deficit and the rate of price inflation which have been achieved in 
South Africa during the past decade can be taken to represent macro- 
economic "success", given the volatility in the external accounts over 
the same period, and asked also whether this "success”, if it be so 
judged, came at too high a price in the form of low growth of output 
and employment.
The chapter has answered the first question in the negative and the 
second in the affirmative. But it is fair to ask, in conclusion, whether it 
is too early to define answers, and whether in any event there were 
alternatives to the approach adopted. The first question is particularly 
pressing, since by the end of 2004 many believed the South African 
economy had "turned the corner" and established itself on a higher 
growth path. Between 1999 and 2003, growth averaged 2.9% per 
annum, but it rose to 3.7% in 2004. Macro prices have also "recovered" 
as the ZAR has steadily but slowly appreciated in nom inal terms since 
early 2002, the effective and the US dollar rates both returning to their 
levels of late 1999/early 2000. The currency risk premium on South 
African bonds declined by over 100 basis points during 2004, and 
domestic nominal interest rates dropped from 17% at end-2002 to 11% 
two years later.
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These favorable shifts in macroeconomic prices have boosted domes­
tic expenditure, including household consumption, over 2003-04. Two 
additional factors have been significant in contributing to the growth 
upturn and more optim istic perceptions. The first is the global com ­
modity price boom, which resulted in earnings from metals and miner­
als exports rising 12.5% in 2004 notwithstanding the strong ZAR, and 
these products' share of total exports to 58% (2002: 47%). The second 
is the rapid growth of the black middle class, in large part as a conse­
quence of "Black Economic Empowerment" (BEE), affirmative action 
policies which have been increasingly assertive since 1999. This 
group's presence in managerial and professional positions has 
increased rapidly during the decade since the end of apartheid, and the 
share of black people in the middle class is now estimated to be about 
55%, compared with a quarter at the start of the 1990s. The incomes of 
this group have increased rapidly, linked to their access to both higher 
salaries than in a competitive market as well as to equity in corpora­
tions (their own employers and others) which are increasingly required 
to diversify their ownership. There is also considerable pent-up 
demand within this group for housing and consumer durables, given 
their exclusion from the suburbs under apartheid and the rapid upward 
mobility in their social status. This has contributed to substantial 
increases in nom inal housing prices during 2004 -  a rise of 35% in 
some South African cities -  resulting in a wealth effect further fuelling 
demand, so that household consum ption expenditure grew 5.9% 
during 2004 (notwithstanding the poverty and unem ployment 
numbers). But this consumption-led growth has sucked in imports, 
which grew nearly 10% in 2003, and 15% in 2004.
With memories of the tequila crisis in Mexico in 1994 and the 
Argentinean crisis of 2001, Latin American analysts will immediately 
question the sustainability of the growth process described here. As dis­
cussed earlier, there has been a significant drop in private savings, and 
the downward shift in corporate and household savings propensities is 
linked to long-term increases in im port and tax propensities, rather 
than reflecting a temporary adjustment to the opening of the economy 
and the establishm ent of democracy. This points to the limits of con- 
sumption-led growth, since private savings may not respond strongly 
to rising income if investment were to increase, which would augment 
reliance on foreign savings, and result in "stop-go" cycles associated 
with capital flows volatility. Raising investment is of course a separate 
problem, and the discussion above has shown that capital formation 
stayed flat even while export demand increased from 1999. Whether
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investment will respond to the growth in consum ption is similarly 
moot, but the BEE policies which are driving the latter are also produc­
ing a progressive "blackening" of business which over time should help 
resolve the democratization dilemma facing investment by building 
government's policy credibility in the corporate sector.
None of this addresses capital flow volatility and its monetary and 
exchange rate consequences. There is a disturbing lack of public debate 
about this aspect of macroeconomic policy. In early 2004, a short-lived 
outburst of opposition to the growth and employment im pact of high 
interest rates and ZAR overvaluation elicited little reaction and soon 
died out, notwithstanding that the voices raised included once-power- 
ful m ining and m anufacturing interests. Real interest rates have since 
declined, but remain very high comparatively, and there is widespread 
consensus -  amongst observers concerned with real growth rates -  that 
an exchange rate around ZAR6.00 per dollar is overvalued by as much 
as 50%. A more enduring solution to the problem is required. The 
central bank has recently expressed the view that volatility is "a fact of 
life beyond its control", em phasising its unwillingness to reintroduce 
capital flow regulations. This leaves government on the one hand des­
perately looking for larger direct investment inflows, and on the other 
seeking global responses to capital flow volatility, and neither route is 
very promising in the short to medium term.
Appendix
Table A. P op u lation
1991 2001
Total population  (millions) 36.2 44.5
P op u la tion  groups (%  o f  total):
African 70 79
W hite 16.5 9.5
C olored 10.5 9
Indian 3 2.5
Sources: Statistics SA, South A frican  Statistics 2002; 2001 Census in  Brief.
Note: Population growth rate was 2.0% per annum  between 1991 and 2001.
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Table B. South Africa: Indicators of millennium development goals
Early 1990s Post-2000
a. GDP, current US$ bn 112.090 159.903
b. GDP per capita 1995 US$ 408290 401302
c. GDP per capita, current PPP US$ 828290 9401°°
d. Human D evelopm ent Index 0.6996 0.69500
e. Life expectancy at birth (years) 6290 470z
f. Under 5 m ortality rate (per 1000
live births) 7390 6502
g. Adult literacy rate (%  o f  people 15
and over) 81.290 86.002
h. Net primary enrolm ent rate (%  o f
age group) 10391 89°i
i. Urbanization (%  o f  population) 53 .796 56 .100
Sources:
a, c, e, f, g, i: World Bank, W orld Developm ent Indicators; 
b: SA Reserve Bank, www.sarb.co.za: 
d: Statistics SA H u m a n  Developm ent Index  (2001);
h: Development Bank of Southern Africa, South Africa: Inter-Provincial Comparative Report 
(2000).
Note: The superscript indicates the year to which the data applies.
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